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ABSTRACT
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN AGENT-CAUSAL VIEW
FEBRUARY 2003
MEGHAN E. GRIFFITH, B.A., BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Vere C. Chappell
In this dissertation, I argue that we ought to accept an agent-causal view of free
and responsible action. First, I set the stage for this claim by highlighting our intuitions
regarding moral responsibility and freedom, and by ruling out competing positions. I
support Harry Frankfurt’s claim that responsibility does not require the ability to do
otherwise. I go beyond this claim, however, to argue that responsibility requires that one
be the true originator of one’s action, and that this requires a kind of freedom that is
incompatible with determinism. To bolster this last claim, I argue against the
compatibilist, “guidance control” view of John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. I
believe the weaknesses of their interesting and compelling view denote potential
problems for any compatibilist position. After arguingfor incompatibilism, I argue
against non-agent-causal incompatibilist views. Specifically, I argue against Robert
Kane’s “teleological intelligibility theory.”
In the final chapters ofmy project, I lay out my agent-causal view. I argue that
agent-causation is possible and coherent if one accepts a realist view of causes. I appeal
to Randolph Clarke’s idea that the relation between agent and cause is the same relation
as that between event and cause. This serves to alleviate the “mysteriousness” of agent-
causation. Having shown that it is possible and coherent, and having ruled out competing
IV
views in preceding chapters, I am now in position to claim that agent-causation is the
correct view. I also demonstrate that it is a compelling position in its own right because it
accords with our most basic understanding of ourselves as agents.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Why do we care about moral responsibility and personal freedom? It is clear that
we do care about these issues and that we nearly always have. In ancient times, as is
evident in the writings of Aristotle, the focus was primarily on how a person can lead the
best life and to what extent a person can control (and take credit for) how good his life
turns out to be.
1
Today, discussions often center specifically on the conditions of moral
responsibility, or the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. The
question is often whether determinism would take away the freedom that is required for
moral responsibility.
Sometimes our concerns are practical in nature. Take, for example, our interest in
current legal defenses that try to exempt someone from being legally responsible by
citing factors that supposedly exempt the person from being morally responsible (insanity
pleas, Twinkie defenses, etc. 2 ). The idea is to get the jury to believe that the person
cannot be blamed for his actions, thus he should not be subject to legal punishment.
Getting clearer on our intuitions regarding moral responsibility often helps us to
understand and resolve our mixed feelings about these legal cases. Outside the
courtroom, we not only want to know when our friends and acquaintances should be held
responsible but when we ourselves should be held responsible. To what extent can I
blame myself or give myself credit for the course ofmy life? To what extent can I blame
See The Fragility ofGoodness by Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum 1986).
'
I believe the Twinkie defense refers to a case where the accused claimed to have been out of control due
to a sugar-induced state. For more discussion of insanity defenses, see John Martin Fischer’s introduction
in Moral Responsibility (Fischer 1986a, 13).
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others? What factors can take my (or your) responsibility away? What kind of freedom
(if any) is required?
The puzzles of moral responsibility and human freedom are not just elaborate
games for bored and philosophically-minded individuals—rather, these issues are at the
very heart of some of our most important practical, ethical, and metaphysical concerns.
These issues really matter to us as human persons. They play a large part in how we
view ourselves and our place in the world.
Because responsibility and freedom are such an important part of our human
perspective, I believe we need to rely to a large extent on our human intuitions. What do
our intuitions tell us about responsibility and freedom? Before trying to answer this
question, I will pause briefly to answer the following: what is moral responsibility and
how should the morally responsible agent be characterized? For the time being, I will
give a rough characterization. I will borrow from John Martin Fischer, who claims that
being a morally responsible agent has to do with being “an appropriate candidate for the
reactive attitudes and for such activities as praise and blame and punishment and reward”
(Fischer 1986a, 12).
3
With this characterization in mind, we can go on to examine our intuitions. I will
begin with a story. A woman, named Flora, one day discovers that her beloved
flowerbed has been destroyed. She discovers that her husband, Mo, has run over them
with his riding lawn mower. Should Flora blame her husband? Should Mo be held
morally responsible? To answer these questions, we need more information about the
3
Fischer follows Peter Strawson in writing about the “reactive attitudes.” In “Freedom and Resentment,”
Strawson says “the participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill
will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed in their attitudes and actions” (P. Strawson 1993, 53).
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incident. Let us consider a few different scenarios (i.e., a few different ways of filling in
the necessary details).
In the first scenario, Flora finds out that the mower malfunctioned without any
warning and that Mo could not have stopped it from running over the flowerbed. In this
situation, our intuitions tell us that Mo should not be blamed (let us assume that the
malfunction was not a result of any negligence on Mo’s part but resulted from some
defect). We would not blame Mo because something outside Mo’s control caused the
mower to run over the flowers. In fact, we might even say that Mo did not do anything
—
it was the mower that “performed” the “action.”
But what ifMo had chosen to run over the flowers and did so as a result of his
choice? If this is all we know about the incident, we would be inclined to say that Mo did
perform the action in this case and that Flora should blame him. But what if an
undiagnosed psychiatric illness (an illness Mo did not bring upon himself) caused Mo to
choose to run them over? If this were the case, we probably would not blame Mo
because, once again, something out of his control caused this to happen.
Finally, let us look at what might be a more realistic scenario. Let us suppose that
Mo chose to run over the flowers (and ran them over as a result of this choice) because he
was angry with his wife following a big fight, and he knew that destroying her flowers
would cause her much distress. In this case, it seems that Mo’s pyschological state
caused him to run over the flowers. This psychological state was caused by Mo’s
character and by certain experiences, including his upbringing. In this scenario, we could
even talk about physical events in Mo’s brain (perhaps corresponding to his thoughts,
beliefs, intentions, etc.) that caused his choice (which corresponds to another brain
3
event). We could add that the first events in the series were caused by physical events
external to Mo (certain external stimuli ). 4 But whether we describe the case
psychologically or physically, the fact remains that in this scenario, there is a chain of
causes that begins somewhere outside Mo and is thus (supposedly) beyond his control. It
seems that the thing to do, then, is to exempt Mo from moral responsibility. But don’t
many of us want to be able to blame Mo in this kind of scenario? After all, isn’t this a
common kind of occurrence, one for which we usually do blame each other?
How can we account for the differing intuitions regarding this last scenario?
What makes this case different from those that came before? Some philosophers claim
that we should blame Mo in this last case, because we should hold a person responsible
so long as he was not somehow constrained or compelled to act as he did. Such
philosophers would go on to say that Mo was not constrained or compelled in the last
scenario, but was constrained or compelled in the other scenarios . 5 The fact that the
causal chain originated outside Mo in the last scenario does not take away his
responsibility (or the required kind of freedom)—only constraining or compelling causes
can do that. Constraining or compelling causes would occur in situations with physical
force or restraint, or psychological compulsion, the kinds of things present in some of the
other scenarios. But others may question these suggestions. Who is to say that the more
“ordinary” causes having to do with Mo’s psychological state (or physical brain state) are
not also constraining (after all, they do originate outside Mo in the external world. As
4
1 would like to remain neutral on the mind-body issue.
5
See A. J. Ayer’s Philosophical Essays (Ayer 1994).
4
such, aren t they beyond Mo’s control)? Perhaps they are constraining and we cannot
blame Mo after all. 6
It looks as if we have stumbled onto the compatibilist/incompatibilist debate; the
battle lines are drawn between those who think moral responsibility is compatible with
this sort of “ordinary” causal chain and those who think it is not.
7
But the contemporary
debate is often staged in a different way. It concerns the compatibility of responsibility
and determinism. In The Incompatibility of Responsibility and Determinism” Peter
van Inwagen claims that
determinism is the thesis that the past and the laws of nature together
determine a unique future and is not the thesis that every event has a cause
(“universal causation”). For the thesis of universal causation might be true
and determinism false. (Van Inwagen 1986b, 242)
Foi example, universal causation could be true and determinism false if some causes are
probabilistic, or if some events are caused by agents with free will. Van Inwagen then
goes on to argue that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility (without
appealing to causes). Thus, for an incompatibilist like van Inwagen, the question would
be whether the past and the laws of nature determined that Mo would run over the
flowerbed. If so, then Mo cannot be held responsible. Van Inwagen points to an
Stipulating a definition of ‘constraint’ does not help here. The basic question is whether causal chains
originating outside the agent always take away responsibility.
1 am not suggesting that all compatibilists would characterize the issue in terms of constraint and
compulsion, but something similar does seem to appear in some recent and interesting compatibilist
accounts of moral responsibility. A good example is Fischer and Ravizza’s account of “regulative control”
versus “guidance control” in Responsibility and Control (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). If causal determinism
is true, we do not have regulative control but we still may have guidance control. It is guidance control that
is required for moral responsibility according to their view. Thus, the earlier scenarios of constraint or
compulsion might instead be cases where the agent lacks both regulative control and guidance control.
Their view is discussed in greater detail in my Chapter 3.
8
This complicated issue is sometimes further confounded by the fact that philosophers on either side of the
debate are often using different definitions or varieties of determinism (e.g., sometimes it is causal
determinism, sometimes it is not). More is said about this in Chapter 5.
5
important distinction—i.e.
,
the one between universal causation and (a certain
understanding of) determinism. We should keep this distinction in mind along with
another distinction—the distinction between universal causation and individual causation.
In other words, even if universal causation is false (i.e., not every event has a cause), we
should still investigate how certain causal chains affect responsibility and freedom (even
if universal causation is false, surely some events, including some actions, still have
causes). I believe it is important to understand these distinctions and to examine the
relationships, not only between determinism and responsibility, but also between (various
kinds of) causes and responsibility. Many of the issues surrounding causation are
interwoven with our intuitions about responsibility. Looking at responsibility in light of
these distinctions will help us determine what our intuitions are really telling us about
responsibility.
Synopsis of Chapters
As the reader may have noticed, I have been assuming that freedom is required
for moral responsibility. Although this claim is supported by very strong intuitions, we
cannot just accept it and move on. We need to consider that there are different kinds of
freedom (Fischer). Both compatibilists and incompatibilists (regarding responsibility and
determinism) have often assumed that responsibility requires the freedom “to do
otherwise.” This assumption will be examined in Chapter 2. Here I will discuss Harry
Frankfurt’s famous counterexample in his article “Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility” (Frankfurt 1988a). In this article, Frankfurt demonstrates that one can be
morally responsible for an action without having been able to do otherwise. He sets up a
situation in which an agent commits an act ‘on his own’ but in which another person (or
6
device) is standing by, ready to intervene. This ‘intervener’ will force the agent to
commit the act if it looks like the agent will not go through with it. Thus, the agent really
cannot do otherwise than he does; either way he will commit the act, but he is still
morally responsible for what actually happens because the intervener does not, in fact,
intervene. (For example, we could say that in the Mo and Flora story there is a next door
neighbor. Biff, who has some way of making Mo run over the flowers if he sees that Mo
will not do so on his own).
Frankfurt’s point appears to have implications with regard to the compatibility
issue. His example seems to be a victory for compatibilists (about responsibility and
determinism), because it shows that there is no real conflict between moral responsibility
and some sort of determination of one’s action. But, as John Martin Fischer points out,
incompatibilists have not been defeated just yet. Fischer claims that the real point of
Frankfurt-type examples is that what matters for moral responsibility is what happens in
the actual sequence of action, not the alternative sequence. Thus, an incompatibilist
could easily claim that while moral responsibility does not require freedom to do
otherwise, it does require freedom from determination in the actual sequence. That is,
being unable to do otherwise is not the same as being necessitated by some factor in the
actual sequence (Fischer 1994, 148-9). 9 Frankfurt has not really scored a victory for
compatibilists.
In Chapter 3, 1 will further discuss the intuitions that Frankfurt’s claims
illuminate. What kind of freedom is required for moral responsibility? I will argue that it
These last statements require a qualification. I will argue for the incompatibilist view that moral
responsibility requires freedom from external determination in the actual sequence. My agent-causal view
will require that the agent himselfdetermines the action.
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is a sort of freedom that is incompatible with determinism. I will argue against the
compelling compatibilist view espoused by Fischer and Ravizza, in which something
they call guidance control” is the only kind of freedom required for responsibility.
Fischer gives the following example of guidance control involving driving a car:
The car’s steering apparatus works properly when I steer the car to the
right. But unbeknownst to me, the car’s steering apparatus is broken in
such a way that, if I were to try to turn it in some other direction, the car
would veer off to the right in precisely the way it actually goes to the right.
(Fischer 1994, 133)
Fischer claims that this kind of control is entirely consistent with causal determinism and
is all that is required for moral responsibility. I will argue that whether the driver has the
sort of freedom required for responsibility depends on how we fill in the details of the
example. My intuition is that we need to know more about the conditions of the actual
sequence in order to make this judgment. My suggestion is that what Frankfurt examples
show us is more than what Fischer claims; they show us that our intuitions in these cases
are strongly focused on the origins ofour actions in the actual sequence. I will argue that
certain origins are incompatible with determinism. We feel that the driver is responsible
for steering to the right so long as he somehow originated this action, intended it, and so
on. Frankfurt has shown us that we feel this way, regardless of whether there is some
counterfactual intervener waiting in the wings. Discussions about the ability to do
otherwise have led us astray from the heart of the matter; Frankfurt has put us back on
track. Now that we are back on track, I think incompatibilism reveals itself as the
preferable view.
But the incompatibilist faces grave difficulties. The incompatibilist wants the
agent to be the true originator of her free action. In order to secure this role as true
origin, some incompatibilists have tried to break any causal chain beginning outside the
agent. Not only does this seem to be an unrealistic picture of human agency, but it seems
to leave us with very few truly free actions (as has been suggested by van Inwagen and
others). But even more problematic is what I will refer to as the problem of
intelligibility. This is the problem that undetermined actions (as the incompatibilist
seems to require) would be random or chance occurrences and thus not the kinds of
things we could be held responsible for. 10 Chapter 4 will deal with this problem. It will
be helpful to examine different kinds of incompatibilist views here.
Robert Kane, in “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” makes a distinction between
what he calls “Teleological Intelligibility theories” (borrowing from Watson) and “Agent
Cause theories” (Kane 1995, 1 15). Agent-causal theories (as I prefer to call them) rely
on nonoccurrent or nonevent causation to explain how a person is the originator of (and is
thus responsible for) his action. Teleological Intelligibility theories do not rely on this
sort of causation and attempt to “explain incompatibilist free agency in terms of event
causation alone ’ (124). According to Kane, a TI account needs “(a’) some macroscopic
indeterminacy founded on microscopic indetenninacy, and (b’) some account of the
agent’s willing and acting for reasons that will render choices or actions ‘teleologically
intelligible,’ though not determined” (125). The question will be whether either of these
types of views can solve the major problem faced by the incompatibilist. I will argue that
agent-causal theories can but TI theories cannot.
Chapter 5 will consist of an examination of agent causation. How would such a
theory work? Is it even possible? Answering these questions will require us to get clear
10
See A. J. Ayer’s Philosophical Essays (Ayer 1994).
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on what determinism is and how causation works. As Thomas Reid observes in Essays
on the Active Powers ofMan
,
Our natural desire to know the causes of the phenomena of nature, our
inability to discover them, and the vain theories of philosophers employed
in this search, have made the word cause, and the related words, so
ambiguous
. . . that they have, in a manner, lost their proper and original
meaning, and yet we have no other words to express it.
Everything joined with the effect, and prior to it, is called its cause.
An instrument, an occasion, a reason, a motive, an end, are called causes.
(Reid 1788,607)
I believe Reid’s point to be important in our project. This chapter will involve
discussions of agenthood, causal power, and a realist conception of causes. These issues
will allow us to see how an agent can be said to “nonoccurently” cause things.
In Chapter 6, 1 will deal with further objections to an agent-causal account. First,
I will discuss a recent argument by Peter van Inwagen, in which van Inwagen claims that
agent causation cannot solve the problem of free will. I will argue that van Inwagen’s
objection is not successful. Then I will discuss a recent manuscript by Randolph Clarke,
in which he argues that there are reasons to believe that substance causation (and thus
agent causation) is not possible. I will argue that Clarke’s objections are also not
successful.
My concluding chapter, Chapter 7, will involve putting everything together. I
will show what each chapter contributes to my conclusion that an agent-causal theory is
superior to other views. I will argue that Frankfurt shows us the way toward
understanding our intuitions about responsibility but stops short of an actual solution to
the problem. His examples show us that what matters to responsibility concerns the
actual sequence of action. What he fails to say is that lack of determination (by anything
other than the agent) in the actual sequence is also crucial to responsibility. Compatibilist
10
views will not give us what we need here. Agent causation is what is required in order to
have an intelligible account of moral responsibility. But this does not mean that
responsibility requires a freedom from all causes. What it does require is that the actual
causes present do not necessitate the action. This is consistent with my agent-causal
view.
With that said, I would like to add a brief word about what will not be included in
this project. Although the following topics are both interesting and relevant, I have
decided to leave them aside for the time being. I will not be including questions that
more properly belong in the field of ethics. In other words, I will not be considering how
one should decide if an agent has done right or wrong. The question of whether an agent
should be held responsible can be separated from this ethical question. I will also not be
concerned with some of the finer points of moral responsibility. 1
1
Lastly, 1 will not be
concerned with the rational justification of our practices of blaming and praising. In his
famous article, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson suggests that we cannot give
up these practices regardless of the metaphysical picture and that we are justified in
holding on to them (P. Strawson 1993). Susan Wolf responds to Strawson:
But the guarantee that we are not behaving irrationally or serving as the
unwitting agents of our own humiliation and error—the guarantee, in other
words, that we cannot be faulted for taking an inappropriate attitude
towards ourselves and our place in the world—is not the only guarantee
that one can reasonably wish for. . . . The pessimist fears that if
determinism is true, then we are no better off than puppets. And the lives
of puppets, the pessimist thinks, are meaningless and absurd. .
. . The fact
that we don’t have to think that our lives are meaningless is of little
comfort if, for all that, our lives may actually be meaningless. (Wolf 1993,
117)
11
For a thorough and interesting discussion of these finer points, see Michael Zimmerman’s An Essay on
Moral Responsibility (Zimmerman 1988).
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CHAPTER 2
FREEDOM AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES
Many philosophers claim that freedom to do otherwise is the kind of freedom
required for moral responsibility. 12 In other words, these philosophers hold that a person
is morally responsible for what she does only if she could have done otherwise (Frankfurt
1988a, 1). This principle has been called the Principle of Alternate (or alternative)
Possibilities (PAP) (Frankfurt 1988a, 1). In this chapter, one of my main goals will be to
examine this principle and a famous counterexample to it. I will argue that the
counterexample to PAP is successful and stands up to certain crucial objections. I will go
on to argue that the incompatibilist (about moral responsibility and determinism), also
referred to (in this context) as the “libertarian,” can consistently reject PAP. 13
Background
In his famous article, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry
Frankfurt attempts to show that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is false (Frankfurt
1 988a). He gives a counterexample to PAP; the counterexample is supposed to
demonstrate that PAP fails because there could be times when we would hold a person
morally responsible even if that person could not have done otherwise.
PAP sometimes plays a major role in the debate over whether freedom and
determinism are compatible. The incompatibilist about freedom and determinism may
12
For example, Peter van Inwagen claims in “Ability and Responsibility,” that “we are persuaded that we
cannot make ascriptions of moral responsibility to agents who lack free will” (Van Inwagen 1986a, 153).
He goes on to say that this statement is very much like (if not the same as) the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities (i.e., the principle that responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise) (153).
13
Obviously “incompatibilism” is not the same as “libertarianism.” But in this context I am mostly
concerned with those incompatibilists who want to say we are sometimes free in the sense relevant to moral
responsibility.
12
try to use this principle as leverage against the compatibilist. The incompatibilist could
claim that determinism entails that one could never do otherwise. Therefore, the
incompatibilist would conclude, determinism is not compatible with moral responsibility
and is not compatible with the kind of freedom that matters to us. Such a philosopher
would rely heavily on the intuition that PAP is true and on the intuition that having a
genuine alternative (truly being able to do otherwise) requires that one’s action not be
determined.
Compatibilists about responsibility and determinism, however, could also accept
that the relevant kind of freedom consists in being able to do otherwise (i.e., they could
also accept PAP). These compatibilists could defend their positions by arguing against
the incompatibilist’s claim that determinism entails being unable to do otherwise. Thus,
‘could have done otherwise’ could be understood differently than it is for the
incompatibilist. It could be understood as something like ‘would have done otherwise
had circumstances (e.g., the past, or the laws) been different. 15 But incompatibilists
would remain unconvinced by these arguments. The strong intuition that genuine
alternatives require more than these compatibilist analyses allow seems to work against
these compatibilist positions.
Sometimes PAP is written as “an agent isfree only if he could have done otherwise.” Some of the
compatibilists who defend their positions by analyzing ‘could have done otherwise’ in a certain way may
not be claiming anything about moral responsibility. What is important is that (most) incompatibilists and
these compatibilists accept that having alternate possibilities is the kind of freedom that matters to us.
15
For example, multiple-pasts compatibilists suggest that one can coherently assert both a “can claim” (you
can refrain from x) and a “backtracking” conditional (if you were to refrain from x, y would not have
obtained). Local-miracle compatibilists similarly hold that one can assert both a “can claim” and a “local
miracle" conditional (if you were to refrain from x, some law that held would not have held) (Fischer
1986a, 34-6).
13
Frankfurt, in “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” presumably
scores a victory for a kind of compatibilism (between moral responsibility and
determinism) by attempting to show that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is false
(Frankfurt 1988a). Another main goal for this chapter will be to demonstrate that
Frankfurt’s counterexample, although successful, does not actually work against the
incompatibilist (and in favor of the compatibilist).
Frankfurt tells the following story:
Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants Jones to perform a certain
action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but
he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until
Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless
it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is
going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it
does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else,
Black takes effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he
does do, what he wants him to do. (Frankfurt 1988a, 6) 16
Frankfurt goes on to say that we can suppose that Jones does decide to do what Black
wants him to do (without Black’s having to intervene). In that case, we would clearly
hold Jones morally responsible even though he does not have an alternative (7).
Frankfurt’s counterexample can be seen as an attempt to separate the issue of
whether determinism and freedom to do otherwise are compatible, from the issue of
whether determinism and moral responsibility are compatible (Fischer 1986b, 1 74). Thus
the kind of freedom that is relevant to moral responsibility (assuming, of course, that
there is some kind of freedom relevant) will no longer be freedom to do otherwise} 1
16
1 have omitted the subscript ‘4’ after ‘Jones.’ Frankfurt puts it there to distinguish from three previous
examples in his article.
17
According to Fischer, Frankfurt believes that we do sometimes have freedom to do otherwise (what
Frankfurt calls ‘freedom of action’ or power ‘to do what one wants’), but that this sort of freedom is not
required for moral responsibility. All that is required is something Frankfurt calls ‘acting freely’ (Fischer
1986a, 44-8). Presumably, then, someone who agrees with Frankfurt on these points could hold one of
14
Again, if successful, Frankfurt’s counterexample might, at first, be seen as a
victory for compatibilism. This is because the example would demonstrate how it is that
one’s action can be free in a way that really matters (i.e., in a way that is relevant to
moral responsibility) without having to be undetermined or avoidable (in some sense of
these terms). Then the incompatibilist push for a more intuitive understanding of ‘could
have done otherwise’ would become irrelevant because ‘could have done otherwise’
would become irrelevant if PAP were false. This kind of compatibilism may seem more
plausible than compatibilism between freedom to do otherwise and determinism. Also
(as John Martin Fischer points out) it may be difficult to see why anyone would believe
that determinism “would threaten moral responsibility for some reason apart from its
relationship to alternative possibilities” (Fischer 1994, 149) (I will argue against Fischer’s
claim later on).
With all of this in mind, it is easy to see why attacks on Frankfurt-style
counterexamples to PAP have often come from incompatibilists, specifically those
incompatibilists who believe that we do sometimes possess the kind of freedom relevant
to responsibility (see for example, van Inwagen 1986a, Widerker 1995). 18 It seems that
these incompatibilist philosophers have more to lose if Frankfurt is right. Again, I will
argue later that this is not so. But first, let us look at the strategies used to argue against
Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP.
these combinations of views: he could be a compatibilist or an incompatibilist with respect tofreedom to do
otherwise and determinism, and also be a compatibilist with respect to moral responsibility and
determinism. And of course those who agree with Frankfurt that we do sometimes have freedom to do
otherwise would have to be compatibilists with respect to freedom to do otherwise and determinism, or
they would have to be indeterminists.
18
Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP are counterexamples that stem from Frankfurt’s original idea.
Such examples are usually fleshed out and amended.
15
The Flicker of Freedom Objection to Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples
The flicker of freedom objection centers on the idea that Frankfurt-style
counterexamples to PAP are not counterexamples at all because they all involve some
alternative possibility that has been overlooked. In other words, the claim is that
Fiankfurt and his defenders have not provided an example in which the agent is morally
responsible but has no alternative possibilities. These objectors say that there is some
flicker of freedom involved in these alleged “counterexamples.”
The objection takes different forms. The form I will focus on involves looking
more closely at what happens in the actual sequence of the action and carefully
specifying exactly what the agent is morally responsible for (Fischer 1994, 139). The
idea is that what Jones is morally responsible for is making the decision on his own.
Thus, Jones really does have an alternative—namely, making the same decision not on
his own (Fischer 1994, 139).
John Martin Fischer has an interesting response to “flicker” strategies. He claims
that the alternative possibilities said to be present (by the flicker theorist) do not seem to
be “robust enough to ground moral responsibility ascriptions” (Fischer 1994, 142).
Moreover, Fischer also asks, “how could adding a set of alternatives in which Jones does
not act freely make it the case that he actually acts freely?” (142). The alternative
possibility is Jones beingforced to make the decision by Black. It seems that the fact that
Jones can either do something on his own or be forced to do it is not really why we hold
him morally responsible. We hold him morally responsible because there is some sense
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in which he does what he wants to do and because it is not the case that he does it “only
because he could not have done otherwise” (Frankfurt 1988a, 10).
Perhaps the flicker theorist would respond by claiming that this alternative is, in
fact, robust enough. The flicker theorist might try to support this intuition with a less far-
fetched example (this strategy makes some sense—intuitions are sometimes easier to
identify in more realistic examples). For example, let us suppose that a man is supposed
to go to jail for some crime he has committed. Couldn’t we imagine that this man has the
genuine alternatives of walking into the prison on his own or being dragged there by
force?
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Wouldn’t the man be seen as more despicable if he resisted and had to be
dragged, and more honorable if he willingly walked in to receive his due punishment? In
this case, it seems obvious that there are robust alternatives. Doesn’t such a case support
the intuition that there are alternatives in Jones’s case because Jones’s situation is also
one in which there is a choice between doing something on one’s own and not doing
something on one’s own? Unfortunately, the case of the prisoner does not support this
intuition, because it does not parallel the Frankfurt counterexample.
This prisoner example differs in that it is reasonable to say that the prisoner does
have a genuine choice between alternatives: he can choose to resist or to comply with his
imprisonment. As Fischer points out, Jones “does not deliberate about and choose the
possibility” of not performing the action on his own (Fischer 1994, 143). Jones does not
even choose to resist or comply with Black’s wishes (as Fischer suggests, “in the
alternative sequence Jones does not form an intention to refrain from causing the volition
in question”; 143). Although Jones may have alternatives in some sense of the word, it is
It has been brought to my attention that Hobbes gives such an example.
17
difficult for the flicker theorist to support the idea that Jones has robust alternatives
(whereas we may all agree that the prisoner has robust alternatives).
(I would add to this that it seems strange that some of those who support the
flicker strategy would want to view these flickers as robust alternatives (i.e., as
alternatives that aie able to ground moral responsibility)."0 My reasoning for this is that
incompatibilists are usually the ones offering these flicker strategies—it seems strange to
me that one who suggests that traditional compatibilist forms of alternative possibilities
are not robust enough would at the same time suggest that such flickers are robust
enough
.)
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But perhaps we should try to get clearer on what is meant by a robust alternative
before deciding which side is right. Obviously, Fischer does not want to characterize a
robust alternative as the kind of alternative required for moral responsibility (because he
rejects PAP, he rejects the idea that having alternatives is what is required for moral
responsibility). But Fischer does want to say that those who hold PAP are presumably
relying on the intuition that someone is morally responsible only if she has a true,
genuine, robust alternative. After all, don’t those who hold PAP rely on the strength of
intuition in supporting their position? And doesn’t intuition tell us that this little flicker
of freedom could not possibly be enough to hold someone morally responsible?
Fischer mentions that in Peter van Inwagen’s Essay on Free Will
,
van Inwagen, an incompatibilist
suggests that “all the actual causal antecedents of a particular event are essential to it” (Fischer 1994, 137).
Thus, on this view, Jones would have alternatives because his performing the action on his own is a
different event-particular than his performing the action due to Black’s intervention (i.e., Jones “does
possess the power to bring about a different event particular”) (Fischer 1994, 137). Presumably, van
Inwagen would argue that determinism would rule out our power to bring about any different event-
particulars. Even putting aside objections (against van Inwagen) regarding this kind of event individuation,
one can still object along the lines that Fischer does. Fischer claims: “it is highly implausible to suppose
that it is in virtue of the existence of such an alternative possibility that Jones is morally responsible for
what he does” (Fischer 1994, 140).
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I, of course, recognize the lack of a full-fledged argument here.
18
So how should we characterize a robust alternative? Fischer suggests that robust
alternatives involve the following:
On the traditional alternative-possibilities picture, it is envisaged that an
agent has a choice between two (or more) scenarios ofa certain sort. In
one scenario, he deliberates and forms an intention to perform an act of a
certain kind and then carries out this intention in an appropriate way. In at
least one other possible scenario, he deliberates and forms an intention to
perform a different kind of act (or no act at all) and carries out this
intention in an appropriate way. (Fischer 1994, 142)
Thus Jones does not have a robust alternative because he does not deliberate and carry
out the action in the appropriate way in the alternative sequence ( 1 42)—whereas the
prisoner does do this in both scenarios. Although perhaps one could somehow modify
the Jones example so that the intervener forces Jones to deliberate, Fischer could still
reject this by claiming that for robust alternatives, both sequences must be scenarios in
which the agent actsfreely (143).
I would like to add some thoughts to Fischer’s account of robust alternatives. If
we look at the Jones example, we can see that there is no alternative for Jones that
satisfies both of the following conditions: (1) Jones can perform the action, and (2) Jones
has awareness of the action. I would like to suggest that these two conditions are
required of an alternative in order for it to be robust. In the case of Jones, Jones is not
aware of the alternative ofperforming the action as a result ofBlack ’s intervention (or, if
you prefer, of refrainingfrom performing the action on his own). There is a very
plausible sense in which an agent does not have a genuine choice between two things
unless he is aware of both of them. Although Jones believes he has the alternative of
refrainingfrom performing the action
,
he cannot refrain (because Black will make him
act). So even if we want to say that Jones is aware of this sort of alternative, Jones
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cannot perform it; this sort of alternative satisfies condition (2) but it does not satisfy
condition (1). On the other hand, Jones can perform (in a limited sense of perform) the
action as a result of Black’s intervention, but he is not aware of this alternative; this
alternative satisfies condition (1) but not condition (2).
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Unlike Jones, the prisoner has a
robust alternative because he can comply with his captors or refrain from complying (i.e.,
choose to make them take him by force). He can perform these actions and he is aware
of them.’' 3 Thus we have a way of understanding the difference between robust or
genuine alternatives and the kind of alternatives present in the flicker scenarios. These
latter alternatives are not robust enough to ground responsibility and so their presence
does not save PAP (PAP really only refers to robust alternatives).
Fischer considers a final response that the flicker theorist might give. Fischer
explains the response as follows:
The flicker theorist may not dispute the claim that the alternative
possibilities in the Frankfurt-type examples are insufficiently robust to
2
" The flicker strategist might object that the first sort of alternative (of refraining) and the second sort of
alternative (of performing the act as a result of Black’s intervention) are really the same alternative (thus,
both conditions for a robust alternative would be satisfied). I am suggesting, however, that these are
distinct alternatives because they are distinct sorts of actions. 1 think this is plausible because although 1
am considering them both to be actions, a case could be made that while refraining is an action, being
forced to do something as a result ofBlack 's intervention is not. This points to the difference between
them. Moreover, Fischer seems to imply that the former action would be free whereas the latter would not
(Fischer 1994, 143). This also serves to distinguish them. If the flicker strategist suggests that they are
both cases of refraining (because the second case could be seen as a case of refraining to perform the action
on his own), the objection will not hold because it is the flicker strategist who needs performing an action
on one ’s own to be distinct from performing an action.
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Another objection that might arise is that there seem to be cases in which we would want to say that
someone really had a genuine or robust alternative even though she was not aware of it (i.e., that awareness
is not required for robustness). But what kind of situation would cause a person to lack awareness of any
performable alternative (including the alternative of refraining)? It seems to me that in any such case, if we
were truly convinced that the person was not aware of any performable alternative, we would also be
convinced that the alternative in question was not a robust one. At first it would seem that those who
accept robust alternatives as the requirement for responsibility (i.e., those who accept PAP) would have to
claim that the person is not responsible in such cases. But I do not think one who accepts PAP must always
let such agents off the hook. For example, the agent could still be held responsible for something—perhaps
for failing to acquire awareness of the alternative (if robust alternatives were present at the appropriate
point).
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ground our ascriptions of moral responsibility. That is to say, he may not
wish to argue that the existence of such alternatives in themselves supports
our intuitive judgments that individuals are morally responsible for what
they do. But he nevertheless may insist that alternative possibilities must
be present, whenever an agent is legitimately held morally responsible for
what he does. (Fischer 1994, 145)
The idea behind this move is that there “may be some otherfactor which both grounds
our responsibility ascriptions and also entails that there be some alternative possibility”
(145-6).
Fischer, although admittedly unable to give a decisive argument against this final
response, tries to undermine its plausibility by suggesting that there is no obvious factor
that fulfills the required role. Fie realizes that one might suggest that the falsity of
determinism is the factor, but it does not seem that one would do so unless one had a
prior commitment to the incompatibility of determinism and responsibility (Fischer 1994,
146).
I think Fischer makes a good case against the flicker theorist. The original
strength of PAP appeared to lie in its plausibility as a principle and its direct connection
to freedom (to do otherwise). In other words, PAP has had a hold on philosophers mainly
because it seemed (to them) intuitively plausible (and true) that freedom to do otherwise
was required for moral responsibility. If PAP is weakened so as to rely on some other
factor, it might as well be discarded in favor of a principle that employs that factor
directly. If there is indeed such a factor, we ought to be looking for it and arguing about
it. Of course, if this factor exists, then Frankfurt-style examples cannot be said to have
shown that PAP is false (and those who believe PAP to be true would be justified in
employing it as a principle). But it seems that the burden of proof will have been thrust
upon defenders of PAP. It may now be up to those who support PAP to argue for their
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position (instead of against Frankfurt’s). As Fischer says, it seems that we have reached
a Dialectical Stalemate’
; but, he adds, we need not despair because some of the most
philosophically important and difficult issues often leave us in such a situation. It is up to
us, then, to make our decision based on what seems most plausible and reasonable to us
(Fischer 1994, 146-7). What seems most plausible to Fischer (and to me) is that flickers
of freedom are not robust enough to ground responsibility; and so we can conclude that
moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities (147).
Widerker’s Objection to Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples
David Widerker constructs a different sort of objection against Frankfurt-style
counterexamples. Widerker’s main concern is that if Frankfurt’s attack on PAP is
successful with respect to decisions, then Frankfurt will have refuted libertarianism (one
sort of incompatibilism). In “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities,” Widerker characterizes libertarianism as the view that
An agent s decision (choice) is free in the sense of freedom required for
moral responsibility only if (i) it is not causally determined, and (ii) in the
circumstances in which the agent made that decision (choice), he could
have avoided making it. (Widerker 1995, 247)
Widerker tries to show that Frankfurt’s rejection of PAP does not work for mental acts
(e.g., deciding, choosing, etc.); Widerker adds that mental acts are the kinds of acts that
“constitute the basic loci of moral responsibility” for the libertarian (247). Because
Widerker’s characterization of libertarianism includes a form of PAP that focuses on
mental acts, Widerker fears that a successful attack on PAP (with respect to decisions)
will serve to refute libertarianism (250). Thus he attempts to disprove Frankfurt’s claims.
Widerker starts with Frankfurt’s counterexample to PAP and makes it more
concrete and specific. He asks us to suppose that a person, Jones, is thinking about
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killing another person, Smith. A third person. Black, wants Jones to decide to kill Smith
and then to do so (remember, Widerker wants to consider the example as applied to
decisions). Black can somehow force Jones to kill Smith, but Black prefers “not to show
his hand unnecessarily” (Widerker 1995, 249). Also, Widerker adds:
Black can be sure that he will have his way in view of knowing the
following facts about Jones and himself:
(1) If Jones is blushing at tl, then, provided no one intervenes, Jones will
decide at t2 to kill Smith.
(2) If Jones is not blushing at tl
,
then, provided no one intervenes, he will
not decide at t2 to kill Smith.
(3) If Black sees that Jones shows signs that he will not decide at t2 to kill
Smith, that is, sees that Jones is not blushing at tl
,
then Black forces
Jones to decide at t2 to kill Smith; but if he sees that he is blushing at
tl, then he does nothing.
Finally, suppose that Black does not have to show his hand, because
(4) Jones is blushing at tl, and decides at t2 to kill Smith for reasons of his
own. (249-250)
With this example is mind, Widerker asks whether Frankfurt (with Widerker’s specifics
tilled in) has “succeeded in describing a situation in which a decision for which an agent
is morally responsible is such that, though there is no causally sufficient condition for its
occurrence, it nevertheless is unavoidable?” (250). Widerker claims that this is what
Frankfurt wants to achieve with his counterexample. Widerker supports this claim with
the following quote from Frankfurt:
There may be circumstances in which a person performs some action
which although they make it impossible for him to avoid performing that
action, they in no way bring it about that he performs it. (Frankfurt 1969,
830,837) (Widerker 1995,248)
Widerker adds that Frankfurt’s point is that in such a case, the person “cannot in order to
absolve himself of moral responsibility claim that he acted in circumstances that left him
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no alternative to doing what he did” and that the person would have done the same thing
had these circumstances not obtained (Widerker 1995, 248).
Widerker then argues that the example does not fit Frankfurt’s criteria (as
described by Widerker above) because either we are forced to concede that the decision is
brought about by “the factor” that makes Jones’s action unavoidable (contrary to what
Frankfurt wants to say), or we cannot see how the decision is really unavoidable (which
Frankfurt needs it to be) (Widerker 1995, 251). Widerker argues that in order to ensure
that Jones has no alternatives, we need to rule out the possibility that, in the actual
sequence, Jones could decide not to kill Smith immediately after blushing at tl (in which
case Black would not have intervened) (251). In order to rule out this possibility and to
make sure Jones really does not have any alternative, we would have to assume “that
Jones’s not blushing at tl is a causally necessary condition for his not deciding at t2 to
kill Smith. But this means that his blushing at tl is causally sufficient for his decision to
kill Smith” (251). Widerker seems to suggest that because blushing is causally sufficient
for the decision to kill Smith, then the circumstances which make the decision
unavoidable do actually bring about the decision (contrary to what Frankfurt requires of
his example).
But is Widerker right about this? It seems that Frankfurt could respond to
Widerker’s charge by claiming that although blushing is indeed a “factor” in the scenario,
it is not really what Frankfurt has in mind when asserting that the circumstances that
make the action unavoidable do not bring about the action (see Frankfurt quote above).
The circumstances include things about Black, his desire, his knowledge of and power
over Jones, etc. It seems to me that Widerker is mistaken in claiming that there must be
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no causally sufficient condition” for the occurrence of the action in the actual sequence
in order for the example to qualify as an appropriate counterexample to PAP (Widerker
1995, 250, quoted above). Thus, like the flicker objection, Widerker’s objection to
Frankfurt is not successful. But is the libertarian then defeated as Widerker fears?
If Widerker is right about Jones’s blushing being a causally sufficient condition
for Jones s decision to kill Smith, then, can’t the following claim be made? Can’t one
claim that those who accept Frankfhrt’s counterexample have to accept that an act can be
(causally) determined and at the same time free (with respect to the kind of freedom
required for responsibility)?2
'1
Libertarianism, then, (or so it seems) would be in conflict
with the counterexample (remember, condition (i) of Widerker’s libertarianism requires
that the free mental act or decision not be causally determined). Thus, the question is
again raised whether Frankfurt scores a victory for compatibilists and against
incompatibilists.
Eleanore Stump, a libertarian, responds to this in her paper “Libertarian Freedom
and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities” (Stump 1996). In this paper, she uses a
modifed Frankfurt-style example. In this example (from Fischer), Black (the intervener)
is a neurosurgeon who puts something into Jones’s brain so that he can monitor and
control Jones in order to make Jones decide to vote for Reagan (instead of Carter) that
is, if Jones is not about to decide to vote for Reagan on his own. But, of course. Black
does not, in fact, intervene because the monitor shows that Jones is about to decide to
vote for Reagan (and does so) (Stump 1996, 74). Stump goes on to cite Fischer’s claim
that nothing about [this]
. . . example requires the actual sequence issuing in the decision
Widerker says that "a decision is not causally determined ... if prior to its occurrence there does not
obtain a causally sufficient condition for it” (Widerker 1995, 247, n. 2).
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and action to proceed in a deterministic way ...
.
if it proceeds in a non-deterministic
way that satisfied the libertarian, then Jones can be held morally responsible, even though
he could not have done otherwise”’ (Stump 1996, 74). Thus, according to Stump, Fischer
and Widerker disagree over whether the example does require that the decision proceeds
deterministically (i.e., whether the example violates one of Widerker’s conditions of
libertarian freedom). I will try to determine who is right in what follows. But first, we
should take note of a few things: as discussed earlier, Widerker holds that there must be
some causally sufficient condition (in his example it was blushing) for the decision, so
that the intervener could detect what Jones was going to do. In Stump’s paper, the
example changes in another way—the antecedent state to be detected by the intervener is
now a mental state (an inclination), instead of a sign (blushing), as was used in
Widerker s example. Widerker’s idea is that if Jones shows no such inclination (or sign,
like blushing) before his decision, the neurosurgeon would not be able to intervene in
time to force Jones to decide to vote for Reagan (Stump 1996, 75).
Stump first attempts to demonstrate that Frankfurt-style counterexamples do not
require that there be some antecedent mental state.25 She claims that we can modify the
example so that the neurosurgeon uses a highly sensitive neuroscope that can detect
neural firings. The neurosurgeon also knows that certain sequences of firings correlate
with certain decisions. Thus, we can say that the firing of neurons a, b, c (neural
sequence 1) corresponds to Jones’s decision to vote for Reagan, while the firing of
This part of Stump’s argument, it seems to me, will not apply to an antecedent sign, such as blushing.
Some of Stump's other arguments will directly apply, however.
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neurons x, y, z (neural sequence 2) corresponds to Jones’s decision to vote for Carter.26 If
the neuroscope detects the beginning of sequence 2, the intervener will interrupt the
sequence so that the decision does not come about; he will then do something to bring it
about that Jones decides to vote for Reagan (Stump 1996, 77-8). With these revisions in
place, there is no longer some antecedent mental state that is causally sufficient for
bringing about the decision that is, the firing of neuron a is not a mental state or act, nor
does it correlate to any mental state or act.27
There is, as Stump points out, still a problem for the libertarian (as Widerker
defines libertarian ) defender of Frankfurt. Although Stump’s amendment to the
example may demonstrate that there need be no preceding mental act, inclination, etc.,
she has not shown that the decision need not be causally determined. After all, “the
whole neural sequence of firings ... is the causal outcome of the chain of causal
interactions among the individual neurons constituting the sequence”; thus, the decision
to vote for Reagan “is determined by the chain of causal interactions among the neurons
of the sequence” (Stump 1996, 79).
But Stump has a response to this charge as well. She claims that there is a version
of libertarianism that does not require that a free decision not be causally determined.
She claims that Aquinas is one such libertarian as is Peter van Inwagen (Stump 1996, 80).
Part of her support for promoting this somewhat ‘weaker’ version of libertarianism is to
'6
In her unpublished paper “Alternative Possibilities and Responsibility: the Flicker of Freedom,” Stump
points out that “the correlation between a mental act or state and the firings of neurons is a one-many
relation... Only when the whole sequence of neural firings is completed, do I have the mental act. ...If the
firing of the whole neural sequence correlated with a mental act is not completed, the result isn’t some
truncated or incomplete act. It’s no mental act at all” (Stump unpublished, 8-9).
” 7
Widerker considers this possible response and suggests that it could be claimed that a decision is a simple
mental action that does not have the structure suggested by Stump (Widerker 1995, 252-3).
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claim that, according to Widerker’s formulation of libertarianism, only extreme Cartesian
dualists could be libertarians. This is because such a libertarian would have to hold that
only those mental acts that are not so much as correlated with patterns of neural firings
can count as morally responsible or free” (Stump 1996, 80). 28 This leads Stump to claim
that what is required for libertarianism is that a decision be free “only if it is not the
outcome of a causal chain that originates in a cause outside the agent” (note that Stump
claims that this is not sufficient for libertarianism but it is necessary, 80). Thus, that an
act or decision not be causally determined is not necessary for libertarian freedom. On
this version of libertarianism, it is not a problem that Jones’s decision is determined by
the firing of neurons because these (in the actual sequence) originate from within Jones.29
It seems that Stump has fended off Widerker’s objections by modifying libertarianism. 30
One might object that Stump’s libertarianism is hardly libertarian at all. It may
seem that Stump is advocating some kind of compatibilism between freedom and
determinism. It should be pointed out, however, that although libertarianism must
require that (the relevant kind of) freedom and determinism are incompatible, it need not
require that freedom is incompatible with certain events being detennined by certain
other events (e.g., actions being determined by events internal to the agent). (I would add
Stump seems to be suggesting that a libertarian (in Widerker’s ‘stronger’ sense) would need to rule out
that decisions are causally determined by “the chain of causal interactions among the neurons of the
sequence” (Stump 1996, 79, quoted above). Stump holds that the only way to do this (while maintaining
Widerker s kind of libertarianism) is to deny the strong connection between decisions and neural sequences
(and therefore to be a Cartesian dualist). Stump does not seem to allow any other options for this kind of
libertarian.
Of course, one could argue that there must be causes outside the agent that lead to the firing of these
neurons. Stump attempts to block this move by arguing that neither science nor philosophy has shown that
this is true (Stump 1996, 81-8). I will be discussing this issue further in later chapters.
I assume that this final step of the argument will work with respect to an antecedent sign, like blushing
(so long as we can maintain that blushing originates within the agent).
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here that it need not require that freedom is incompatible with certain events being
determined by agents.) The libertarian must believe that determinism as a doctrine about
the entire world is false (i.e., it is not true that everything is determined), but need not
believe that nothing can be determined. Perhaps what troubles those who make this
objection is that it is the free actions and decisions in this case that end up being
determined. But Stump could respond that the libertarian intuition that freedom is
incompatible with determinism is really the intuition that we are not genuinely free if
everything we do is necessitated by something outside of us. Perhaps even the libertarian
does not mind admitting that the agent is still free and responsible so long as causal
factors are limited to what is internal to the agent . 31 In other words, it is what is internal
that matters because that is how we are the source of our own actions and decisions
.
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For example, Stump points out that Aquinas holds that “the essence of freedom is that the
agent s own mental faculties, her intellect and will, are the ultimate source of my free act,
I Will argue later that not all external causal factors should be ruled out. It does not seem plausible to
insist that there cannot be any external influences—i.e., influences that, in some sense, act as causes—in
order for an act to be free (these points were suggested to me by Vere Chappell). Stump does discuss
influences. She suggests that while “it is uncontroversial that neural events are causally influenced by
events outside the agent, it isn’t at all clear that they are causally determined by events outside the agent”(Stump 1996, 84). Then later she claims that “if either causes outside the agent or sheer accident is
responsible for neural events correlated with the agent’s acts of intellect and will, the ultimate source of the
action isn t the mind of the agent” (Stump 1996, 85). It seems we ought to interpret Stump as claiming that
an external cause does not take away freedom so long as it is not a sufficient cause (in her words, so long as
it is not “responsible” for the neural events—see quote above). There do seem to be some complications.
First of all, in another article, Stump seems to make a distinction between influence and cause. She says
that willing can be “influenced in important ways (but not caused, constrained, or compelled) by previous
choices (Stump 1990, 270). Although Stump is talking about previous choices here (which could be taken
to be internal influences), she uses ‘influence’ in such a way as to suggest that it is not a cause. This seems
to go against one intuitive sense of ‘cause’ and leads to some confusion when she talks about neural events
being causally influenced” (above). Nevertheless, I think Stump is justified in understanding ‘cause’ in a
more restricted sense; but perhaps this should be spelled out more explicitly in her article. Secondly, one
might claim that Stump also ought to spell out exactly how these external influences play any role in action.
When are they responsible and when is the intellect responsible (aren’t external influences at least partly
responsible even in free actions? If not, in what way are they influences at all?). Some of these issues will
be addressed in later chapters. It is these sorts of confusions that I believe need to be dealt with when
discussing responsibility.
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and not something outside the agent” (Stump 1996, 80). So far. Stump and Fischer
appear to be safe in claiming that the libertarian can defend Frankfort (thus rejecting
PAP). Thus, at this point, it appears that Frankfort’s counterexample cannot be used
against the incompatibilist in favor of the compatibilist. But we must consider one more
objection. This objection, if successful, will cause a problem only for the
libertarian/incompatibilist defender of Frankfort-style counterexamples. In other words,
it will work towards showing that Frankfort does indeed help the compatibilist position.
The Fallibility Objection
I will call this objection the fallibility objection” because it centers on the idea
that the neurosurgeon, or the mechanism which he relies on to monitor and control Jones,
could be fallible. The idea behind this objection is that there is nothing in the
counterexample to rule out the possibility that Jones has the alternative of deciding to
vote for Carter instead of Reagan if the neurosurgeon’s mechanism fails to operate
correctly. That is, there is some possible world in which Jones is going to decide to vote
for Carter and the mechanism fails (and is thus unable to stop this decision and bring
about the decision to vote for Reagan) and so Jones does decide to vote for Carter. It
seems that the only way to claim that the mechanism cannot fail is to rely on
determinism. In response, one might suggest that whereas the action of the mechanism is
determined, it is not the case that everything is determined; but this suggestion seems
unrealistic. How would it come about that such a mechanism operated deterministically
in an indeterministic world? It seems that in order for the counterexample to work,
In Chapter 4, 1 will argue that the only kind oflibertarianism that is intelligible is one in which the agent
determines her free and responsible action.
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determinism would have to be true. 33 But this is something Stump (or any libertarian)
does not allow. It seems that if one is an mdeterminist there is more than a flicker of
freedom; there is a genuine (or robust) alternative. Applying the conditions for
robustness as given above, we seem to get the following result: if one is an indeterminist,
there is an altemative^iecidmg to vote for Carter-that Jones is both aware of and that
he can perform (because the mechanism can fail).
Is the libertarian defender of Frankfurt doomed then? I do not think so. The
possibility that the mechanism could (in some possible world) fail, does not mean that
Jones can decide to vote for Carter. This is because the world in which the mechanism
fails is not a world that is accessible to Jones (we hear an echo of the words heard by
many a lost traveler: “you can’t get there from here”). John Martin Fischer makes the
following point about ‘can’:
Now one way of analyzing the “can” of freedom is in terms of the
relationship between the actual world and other possible worlds. That is,
very roughly, it is not unreasonable to say that an agent can do X just in
case there exists a possible world suitably related to the actual world in
which the agent does X. Of course, there is considerable disagreement
about how to specify the “suitable relationship” referred to here, but the
general idea is that can-claims, being modal claims of a certain sort,
correspond to claims about possible worlds. (Fischer 1994, 90)
My suggestion is that the world in which the mechanism fails is not suitably related to the
actual world.
Obviously, the world in which the mechanism fails is not difficult for us to
imagine. It does not, at first, appear to be so different from the actual world. But as the
example stipulates, the actual world is one in which Jones is about to decide to vote for
This interesting objection comes from comments made by Phillip Bricker at a talk given by Stump (on
the subject of moral responsibility and alternative possibilities).
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Reagan. I do not think it is inconsistent (or unrealistic) to hold (similar to what Stump
says about neural sequences) that at this point Jones must decide to vote for Reagan
unless someone intervenes (in other words, the decision process, once begun, cannot be
altered without unusual intervening circumstances). It seems reasonable to suggest that
within the conditions of the example, the only worlds accessible to Jones are those that
diverge from this point. The failure of the mechanism changes nothing because at this
point, Jones is already about to decide to vote for Reagan. One might suggest that it is
possible for the neurosurgeon to have wanted Jones to vote for Carter instead. But again,
we can stipulate35 as part of the example that at this point (when Jones is about to decide),
Black’s decision has already been made and Jones cannot access that world from here . 36
I believe, on the basis of the preceding points, that the indeterminist can still
defend Frankfurt-style counterexamples against PAP. This means that Frankfurt does not
do as much to help the compatibilist position as some may think. But Frankfurt does a
great deal for enhancing our understanding of intuitions about moral responsibility. As
Fischer points out, Frankfurt-style examples show us that what matters for moral
responsibility is what happens in the actual sequence of action, not the alternative
sequence. Thus, the incompatibilist position is not ruled out just yet. An incompatibilist
could claim that while moral responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise, it
34
1 am here employing what Fischer calls the “Principle of the Fixity of the Past.”
‘ if a person’s performing a certain action would require some actual fact about the
fact, then the person cannot perform the act” (Fischer 1994, 9).
This principle states that
past not to have been a
As I recall, at the same talk by Stump (see n. 33), Bruce Aune argued that one could make stipulations
about the example to avoid these objections. My response to the fallibility objection may have been
inspired by Aune’s comments.
I suppose one could object that Jones’s decision process could be interrupted and changed by something
other than Black’s mechanism (unless we hold that determinism is true). I would argue that such worlds
would be markedly different from the actual world and thus not indicative of robust alternatives for Jones.
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does require freedom from (complete) determination in the actual sequence. That is,
being unable to do otherwise is not the same as being necessitated by some factor (other
than the agent himself) in the actual sequence (Fischer 1 994, 1 48-9). In the next chapter,
I will go beyond what Fischer claims to suggest that Frankfiirt examples show us more
than this—they show us that our intuitions in these cases are strongly focused on the
origins of our actions in the actual sequence. The kind of freedom that matters to us, as
illuminated by Frankfurt, is a freedom that is incompatible with determinism.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPATIBILISM AND INCOMPATIBILISM
In the previous chapter, we saw that Frankfurt examples can be neutral with
respect to the compatibility issue. In this chapter, I will argue that although one can
consistently accept the success of these examples and be either compatibilist or
incompatibilist (with respect to responsibility and detenninism), there are strong
intuitions at work on the side of incompatibilism. John Martin Fischer makes the
neutrality claim (see previous chapter), but comes down on the side of the compatibilists
with respect to our intuitions. He claims that he cannot see why causal determinism
“would threaten moral responsibility for some reason apart from its relationship to
alternative possibilities” (Fischer 1994, 149). Thus, according to Fischer, although one
can be an incompatibilist after accepting Frankfurt-style examples, one does not have
much plausible reason to do so (presumably, previous plausible reasons for embracing
incompatibilism had to do with alternative possibilities.)
I will argue that what Frankfurt examples show us is more than what Fischer
claims; they show us that our intuitions in these cases are strongly focused on the origins
of our actions in the actual sequence. These are incompatibilist intuitions. We feel that
the agent is responsible for his action so long as he somehow originated it and intended it,
e*c
- an^ Frankfurt has shown us that we feel this way, regardless of whether there is
some counterfactual intervener. Frankfurt has put us back on the right track. Now that
we are on track, we must look more closely at our intuitions. In order to make my case
for incompatibilism, I will first argue against the compatibilist view set out by Fischer
(with Mark Ravizza). Then I will discuss the incompatibilist intuitions more directly.
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Fischer seems to wonder about the following question: Why couldn’t a person be
responsible for an action even if causally determined to do it? After all, we can see that a
person can be responsible even if unable to do otherwise. Fischer argues against the idea
that an action must not be part of a causally determined sequence in order to be “creative”
or the “agent’s own.” Would Picasso be any less creative if causal determinism were
true? (Fischer 1994, 149). Fischer goes on to claim that something he calls “guidance
control” is all the freedom that is required for moral responsibility (Fischer 1994, 159).
He gives an example of guidance control. Imagine the case of driving a car:
The car’s steering apparatus works properly when I steer the car to the
right. But unbeknownst to me, the car’s steering apparatus is broken in
such a way that, if I were to try to turn it in some other direction, the car
would veer off to the right in precisely the way it actually goes to the right.
(Fischer 1994, 133)
Fischer claims that this kind of control is entirely consistent with causal determinism.
Does intuition favor the compatibilist after all?
The real question, of course, is whether the driver in the example really has the
sort of freedom required for responsibility. Don’t we need more information here? My
intuition is that we need to know more about the conditions of the actual sequence in
order to make this judgment. Furthermore, I believe it makes a difference whether the
driver s steering the car is causally determined or not. The difficult question to answer is
why this makes a difference (since, as Fischer points out, alternative possibilities are no
longer the issue).
Fischer and Ravizza: Guidance Control
Obviously, then, we need to get a better sense of this view. In Responsibility and
Control, co-authored by Fischer and Mark Ravizza, this “guidance control” approach is
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laid out in more detail. The two authors seek to “rectify a deficiency noted by Daniel
Dennett (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 26). They quote the following passage from
Dennett’s Elbow Room :
What we fear—or at any rate a very important part of what we fear—in
determinism is the prospect that determinism would rule out control, and
we very definitely do not want to lose control or be out of control or be
controlled by something or someone else—like a marionette or puppet.
We want to be in control
,
and to control both ourselves and our destinies.
But what is control, and what is its relation to causation and determinism?
Curiously, this obviously important question has scarcely been addressed
by philosophers. (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 26-7)
Fischer and Ravizza then lay out a complex view detailing the kind of control they
believe to be required for moral responsibility.
They begin by arguing (again) that we need not possess the “sort of control that
involves alternative possibilities” in order to be held morally responsible (Fischer and
Ravizza 1998, 29-30). They make a distinction between “regulative control” and
“guidance control”:
Guidance control of an action involves an agent’s freely performing that
action .... Regulative control involves a dual power: for example, the
power freely to do some act A, and the power freely to do something else
instead (where “doing something else” may be simply refraining from
acting at all, or “doing nothing”). Alternatively, one could say that
regulative control involves the dual power to exercise guidance control:
the power to exercise guidance control of A, and the power to exercise
guidance control of something else (instead of A). (31)
Regulative control is the sort of control involving alternative possibilities. They argue
that it is not required for moral responsibility by appealing to the Frankfurt-style
counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (discussed in the previous
chapter). Guidance control, then, is what they call the “freedom-relevant” condition for
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moral responsibility. It is an important part of their theory that guidance control is
compatible with causal determinism. Thus, moral responsibility is compatible with
causal determinism.
Let us take a closer look at guidance control. Fischer and Ravizza lay out a few
different “ingredients” that are required for guidance control. One of these ingredients is
reasons-responsiveness, which will be discussed in more detail below. Another is the
mechanism” or “mechanisms” by which a person acts (it is important to note that this
mechanism must be the agent’s own mechanism—more on this later). Fischer and
Ravizza recommend that in assessing moral responsibility we focus not on the agent, but
on the process(es) or “mechamsm(s)” that lead(s) to the agent’s action. They believe this
to be a useful way of ensuring that we focus on the actual sequence of the action (the
importance of which is demonstrated by the Frankfiirt-style counterexamples). This is
because in Frankfurt cases, the agent is not reasons-responsive (because she cannot do
otherwise) but the mechanism that brings about the action in the actual sequence is
reasons-responsive (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 38).
The crux of their view is that the mechanism by which a person acts (in a given
instance) must be moderately reasons-responsive in order for there to be guidance control
and thus moral responsibility. 38 They roughly characterize moderate reasons-
responsiveness (MRR) in the following way:
Obviously, for Fischer and Ravizza, “acting freely” will be compatible with causal determinism.
They arrive at moderate reasons-responsiveness by first ruling out weak and strong reasons-
responsiveness:
It is important to distinguish different kinds of responsiveness to reasons. Strong
reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism issuing in action requires a tight fit between
sufficient reason and action; this is too much to demand for moral responsibility. Weak
reasons-responsiveness requires a loose fit between sufficient reason and action; this is
too little to demand for moral responsibility. (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 243)
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This kind of responsiveness, then, requires that an agent act on a
mechanism that is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral
reasons, and at least weakly reactive to reason
. .
.
(Fischer and Ravizza
1998, 82)
In their concluding chapter, they give a helpful summary of the finer points of moderate
reasons-responsiveness:
A mechanism of kind K is moderately responsive to reason to the extent
that, holding fixed the operation of a Ai-type mechanism, the agent would
recognize reasons (some of which are moral) in such a way as to give rise
to an understandable pattern (from the viewpoint of a third party who
understands the agent s values and beliefs), and would react to at least one
sufficient reason to do otherwise (in some possible scenario). (243-4)
Thus, with moderate reasons-responsiveness, the idea is to hold fixed the mechanism
used in acting (e.g., practical reasoning) and look at other possible worlds. Note that
moderate responsiveness only requires that the agent react to a reason to do otherwise in
one of these worlds. The agent (via the given mechanism) needs to be able to recognize
various reasons (some of which are moral) and there needs to be some possible world in
which the agent s action would actually be different due to some sufficient reason.
Added to this account is the requirement (mentioned earlier) that the agent’s
mechanism be his own. This is important in order to rule out certain situations in which
we would not want to hold the agent morally responsible even though the mechanism is
Strong reasons-responsiveness is too much to require because it would give the faulty results that the
potentially weak-willed person or the morally imprudent (or blameworthy) person is not responsible. This
is because strong reasons-responsiveness requires these conditions: “ifK [the mechanism in question] were
to operate and there were sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent would recognize the sufficient reason
to do otherwise and thus choose to do otherwise and do otherwise” (41). These conditions are not satisfied
in the cases mentioned above. As for weak reasons-responsiveness, the requirement is only that “there
exist some possible scenario (or possible world) in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the
agent recognizes this reason, and the agent does otherwise” (44). This is not enough for moral
responsibility because it gives the faulty result that an insane person is morally responsible if that person
would respond to some sufficient reason that is bizarre or does not fit a regular pattern dealing with the
strength of reasons (65-6).
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moderately reasons-responsive. Fischer and Ravizza say the following about a
mechanism being the agent’s own:
Someone s being morally responsible requires that the past be a certain
way. We motivated this point (in part) [in their previous chapter] by
reference to certain cases in which the histories behind the configuration
of mental states seemed to rule out moral responsibility. In such a case,
we claimed that the mechanism from which the agent acts is not, in an
appropriate sense, the agent’s own. Thus, in order to establish whether the
mechanism from which an agent acts is his own, we must attend to aspects
of the history of the action.
More specifically, we have suggested that the past must contain a
process of taking responsibility.” Taking responsibility, we believe, is a
necessary feature of moral responsibility. It is part of the process by
which a mechanism leading (say) to an action, becomes one ’s own.
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 207)
Their claim, then, is that in order to determine whether a given mechanism is one’s own,
we must look at whether the agent has “taken responsibility” for it. On their view, taking
responsibility is one of the three stages of becoming a moral agent (the three stages are
“training,” “taking responsibility,” and “being held responsible”; 210), There are three
conditions, or requirements, of taking responsibility. The first requirement is that the
individual “must see himself as an agent; he must see that his choices and actions are
efficacious in the world” (210). The second requirement is that the individual “must
accept that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how he exercises this
agency in certain contexts” (211). The third requirement is that “the individual’s view of
himself specified in the first two conditions be based, in an appropriate way, on the
evidence” (213).
Problems with the Guidance Control View
My objections to the Guidance Control position mainly center on this notion of a
“mechanism” and especially with how it qualifies as one’s own. I will not argue that it is
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never important to look at the mechanism by which one is acting in a given circumstance;
rather, I will argue that relying so heavily on a mechanism-based view as opposed to an
agent-based view can be problematic for reasons that I hope will become clear. I believe
that the agent-based view poses fewer problems because our intuitions regarding agency
are more deeply rooted than those regarding mechanisms. I will also argue that a
mechanism-based view walks hand-in-hand with compatibilist intuitions and sensibilities.
That it should do so is perfectly legitimate, reasonable, and unsurprising—it is just
important to keep in mind that the view is not advanced from neutral ground (as I’m sure
no view ever is). Also, Fischer and Ravizza directly defend compatibilism by impugning
the central principle of an important incompatibilist argument. I will state my objection
to their defense later.
As discussed in the last section, Fischer and Ravizza hold that moral
responsibility requires that the mechanism which leads to the action is the agent’s own.
Taking responsibility is the crucial part of making a mechanism one’s own. 39 What the
agent takes responsibility for is “actingfrom a particular kind ofmechanism" (Fischer
and Ravizza 1998, 215). My main objection centers on these claims. I will illustrate
with an example. Let us imagine that a neurosurgeon decides to perform an experiment
on a newborn baby. He figures out a way to manipulate certain neural pathways that will
serve as the basis for the baby’s practical reasoning mechanism. He fixes them so that in
the future, when the child is able to use her practical reasoning, she will (on any occasion
when she uses practical reasoning) always weigh the options and do whatever she
The reader may notice that Fischer and Ravizza claim that taking responsibility is part of the process of
making a mechanism one’s own (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 207). But it is unclear to me what the
remainder of the process consists of.
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believes will produce the most utility. In cases in which she uses her practical reasoning
mechanism, she will never be weak-willed, amoral (assuming acting according to utility
is a moral principle), or act on a different moral principle. Moreover, she will never
know of the experiment.
Let us say that she goes through the proper stages of moral development (she
undergoes moral “training,” “taking responsibility,” and “being held responsible”;
Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 210). She takes responsibility for her practical reasoning
mechanism by satisfying the three conditions laid out by Fischer and Ravizza. That is,
she comes to see herself as an agent, she sees that she is a fair target of the reactive
attitudes, and she comes to these views of herself through appropriate evidence (210-13,
238). It seems reasonable that she satisfies these conditions. She sees that her actions do
have effects on the world; she sees that it makes sense for others to have certain attitudes
towards her as she has towards them; and I believe these things are appropriately based
on her evidence. Thus, I would conclude that she properly takes responsibility for her
practical reasoning mechanism and makes it her own. The mechanism will also be
reasons-responsive. It will respond to sufficient reasons to do otherwise in alternative
situations—specifically, it will respond to reasons of increased utility. Therefore, we will
be able to hold her morally responsible when she uses this mechanism (at least on
occasions with no other responsibility-undermining circumstances).
My objection, then, is that I have strong intuitions against holding her responsible
lor her actions on these occasions because she has been “programmed” to act this way.
But on Fischer and Ravizza s account, she is morally responsible (and praiseworthy
according to the utilitarian). I would ask the following questions of those whose
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intuitions do not accord with mine: isn’t there at least an intuitive difference in
responsibility between the person in my example and a person whose brain was not
manipulated? Wouldn’t you question your own responsibility if you came to learn that
such a manipulation had been practiced on your brain?
Perhaps someone would contest my claim by suggesting that although she could
not help what the neurosurgeon did to her, perhaps she had significant control over
whether to take responsibility for this mechanism. Thus, she is still responsible. This
will not work, however, because of the following claim made by Fischer and Ravizza:
Our account of taking responsibility requires that an agent come to have a
certain cluster of dispositional beliefs about himself. He need not put these
beliefs into words appropriately, nor need he explicitly deliberate about
the beliefs, entertain them, or otherwise be consciously aware of them.
Taking responsibility is a matter of having certain beliefs, and it is not
evident that an agent can voluntarily control the having of these beliefs.
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 238)40
I would suggest that this claim, coupled with my agent’s lack of knowledge about the
neurosurgeon’s actions, demonstrate that the agent really does not have adequate control
over whether she takes responsibility for this mechanism.
It seems clear to me that making a mechanism one’s own is too easy. It does not
guarantee responsibility. This is why I believe that working from a mechanism-based
view is misleading in a way that working from an agent-based view is not. Perhaps it is
possible to modify a mechanism-based view so that making a mechanism one’s own
would accord better with responsibility. But it is difficult to imagine how this could be
done without ad hoc stipulations. The agent in a mechanism-based view seems to play a
It is interesting to note that this statement, although relevant to my current point, is made in response to
the opposite objection to the one I give. The objection is that some agents never seem to have taken
responsibility and yet we want to hold them morally responsible. My objection is that some agents have
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secondary and indirect role when really the agent should be primary. I agree with Fischer
and Ravizza that looking at the mechanism can be very useful and informative, but it is
not the whole story. As for their claim that Frankfurt-type examples support a
mechanism-based view (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 38), I disagree. They claim (as
mentioned earlier) that the agent is not reasons-responsive in the actual sequence of a
Frankfurt example (because he cannot do otherwise) but that the mechanism is reasons-
responsive. Although the agent cannot do otherwise, I see no reason to claim that he is
not responsive to reasons: I grant that he would not respond to reasons in the alternative
sequence, but he is responsive to reasons in the sense that in some possible world
(without intervention) he would respond to reasons (remember, on their view, moderate
reasons-responsiveness requires that the thing in question—in this case the agent—be
able to respond to a sufficient reason to do otherwise in some possible scenario).
This sort of mechanism-based view seems to me to go together with compatibilist
sensibilities. It works from the assumption that all we care about in assessing moral
responsibility are compatibilist concerns. It assumes that we care about the history of an
action or the mechanism that leads to it only to a certain extent—i.e., only to the extent
that one has gone through normal moral development. Again, it is perfectly reasonable
that their view should work from these compatibilist assumptions. But the
incompatibilist wants a broader and more sweeping sense of freedom and control than
this. To the extent that their view works from assumptions the incompatibilist will not
accept, it cannot sway the incompatibilist. It appears that we have reached an impasse.
taken responsibility and yet we do not want to hold them morally responsible. As far as I can tell, Fischer
and Ravizza do not deal with my objection.
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Defending Incompatibilism Against Fischer and Ravizza
Fischer and Ravizza might claim that this impasse is at least partially overcome
by their criticisms of the major arguments for incompatibilism. They claim that “there
are two sorts of arguments for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral
responsibility: Indirect and Direct” (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 151). They quickly do
away with the indirect kind: the indirect sort of argument claims that determinism and
moral responsibility are incompatible because determinism and alternative possibilities
are incompatible. Because Frankftirt-type examples show that moral responsibility does
not require alternative possibilities, the indirect arguments ultimately fail.
The Direct arguments rely on a special principle which Fischer and Ravizza call
the Principle of the Transfer of Non-Responsibility (or Transfer NR). It is this principle
that Fischer and Ravizza will criticize. And it is this principle that I will attempt to
defend. Transfer NR states that:
(1) Ifp obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for
p\ and
(2) it p obtains, then q obtains, and no one is even partly morally
responsible for the fact that ifp obtains, then q obtains; then
(3) q obtains, and no one is even partly morally responsible for q.
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 152)
They go on to state the argument for incompatibilism:
If causal determinism is true, then there is some state of the world in the
distant past b that is connected by the laws of nature to any action A that
one performs in the present. But since no one (alive now) is even partly
morally responsible for the state of the world b in the distant past, and no
one is even partly morally responsible for the laws of nature that lead from
b to A, it follows that no one is even partly morally responsible for any
action A that is performed in the present. (153)
They mention Peter van Inwagen’s claim that Transfer NR (employed in the previous
argument) is intuitively plausible and they mention van Inwagen’s challenge to critics to
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produce counterexamples (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 153). Fischer and Ravizza believe
they can meet this challenge (154).
Fischer and Ravizza begin by claiming that Frankfurt-type examples “call into
question a principle closely related to Transfer NR,” which they dub “Transfer NR*,”
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 155). They then claim that “with certain modifications, the
examples can also serve as counterexamples to Transfer NR” (155). Transfer NR*
differs from Transfer NR in that it substitutes an agent, 'S', for ‘no one’. Thus, it claims
(roughly) that if an agent, 5, is not responsible forp and is not responsible for “ifp then
^ ^ is not responsible for q (1 57). They give a Frankfbrt-type example in which a
counterfactual intervener (Ralph) would ensure that an avalanche occurred (by detonating
explosives) if the agent (Betty) did not decide to detonate her own explosives to create
the avalanche. But of course, in the actual sequence, Betty does decide (without
intervention) to detonate them (155-6).
They claim that the example is successful in defeating Transfer NR*. This is
because Betty (5) is responsible for the avalanche (q), even though she is not responsible
for Ralph’s presence (p) and is thus not responsible for the fact that if Ralph is present
(p), then the avalanche must occur (q ) (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 156). They attempt to
defeat Transfer NR by modifying the example in the following way: they substitute the
natural forces of erosion for Ralph, and say that “had Betty not placed dynamite in the
crevices, some ice and rocks would have broken free at T2, starting a natural
avalanche....” (157). They claim that Transfer NR is defeated because although no one is
responsible for the erosion (p) and no one is responsible for the fact that if the erosion
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occurs (p), then the avalanche occurs (q ), Betty is in fact responsible for the occurrence
of the avalanche (q
)
(i.e., it is false that no one is responsible for the avalanche) (157).
My objection to these alleged counterexamples is probably somewhat
controversial, but I believe it to be supported by intuition. I think their arguments are
misleading because they falsely represent what Betty is primarily (or directly) responsible
for. I am suggesting that Betty is not primarily responsible for “the occurrence of the
avalanche but is primarily responsible for “detonating explosives.” 1 believe there is
considerable intuitive plausibility to the idea that agents are primarily responsible for
actions, and only indirectly responsible for consequences. 41 On my view, Transfer NR is
intended to be a principle about primary responsibility, i.e., about actions.42 Notice that
the argument for incompatibilism (as stated by Fischer and Ravizza above) claims that if
determinism is true, “no one is even partly morally responsible for any action
(Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 153, my emphasis). Although Fischer and Ravizza are here
discussing the incompatibility (or compatibility) of moral responsibility and determinism
(rather than freedom and determinism), we cannot ignore the fact that free action is more
directly connected to responsibility than are consequences. It seems reasonable to
suggest that if one wants to impugn an argument for the incompatibility of responsibility
I would add that sometimes we should not even be held responsible for the direct consequences of what
we do. A wonderful example can be found in the popular children's book Harry Potter and the Goblet of
Fire (Rowling 2000). Near the end of the book, the hero, Harry, generously and from benevolent motives
encourages his competitor to grasp the goblet of fire with him (whoever grasps it first is the winner of an
important contest). As a direct result, Harry and his friend are magically transported to the vicinity of the
evil villain. Unbeknownst to Harry, the villain had set it up so that this would happen. The villain then
callously kills Harry's competitor. The competitor's death is a direct result of Harry's actions, yet I do not
think we should hold Harry responsible for this.
I will grant that, as it stands, Transfer NR is not explicitly limited to actions. But the principle could
easily be revised to do so. I do not think it is necessary to do that here.
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and determinism, one ought to speak to the primary target of responsibility (i.e.,
actions). 43
Our social and legal practices tend to emphasize consequences for practical
purposes. For example, let us suppose a man, Greg, puts arsenic in Tony’s drink with the
belief and intention of killing him. As a result of this action, Tony dies. Let us suppose
that another man, Bert, puts what he believes to be arsenic, but what is actually a
harmless powder, into Nancy’s drink with the belief and intention of killing her. Nancy
is unharmed. Intuitively, Greg and Bert are equally blameworthy. The law charges and
sentences them differently, however—presumably for various practical reasons (e.g., the
impossibility of being certain about others’ intentions, the desire to send a strong message
to potential criminals that more serious harm equals more serious punishment).
Fischer and Ravizza apparently have quite different intuitions from mine. In
support of their view that we hold people directly responsible for consequences, they
suggest an example:
Consider the case of the Exxon Valdeez. The captain was (presumably)
morally responsible for the way he steered his ship, and thus for his
actions. But we are not just (or even primarily) interested in his actions;
we are very much interested in fixing moral responsibility for the
consequence—the huge, damaging, and costly oil slick. (Fischer and
Ravizza 1998, 92)
Although I would grant that we do hold the captain responsible for these consequences
and that these consequences become our main concern, I would add that the
consequences are actually the evidence of his blameworthiness, not the target of it. Had
the accident been a “near miss” due to some intervention of some other agent or event,
the captain would be equally culpable. Perhaps many people would not hold him
After writing this, I came across an article by David Widerker, in which a similar point is made
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responsible in that case, but that is only because they would not see such damning
evidence against him (perhaps it would not have even made the news).
That their intuitions differ from mine is further suggested by their conditions for
guidance control of a consequence (and thus moral responsibility for it). They claim that
The agent displays guidance control of a consequence insofar as the
consequence emanates from a responsive sequence. It is necessary, in the
context ot a consequence that is more than simply a bodily movement, to
distinguish two components of the sequence leading to the consequence.
The first component is the mechanism leading to the bodily movement,
and the second component is the process leading from the bodily
movement to the event in the external world. We shall say that, in order
for the sequence leading to a consequence to be responsive, both the
mechanism leading to the bodily movement must be moderately reasons-
responsive and the process leading from the bodily movement to the event
in the external world must be “sensitive to action.” (Fischer and Ravizza
1998, 107)
Their suggestion is that in addition to their prior requirement of reasons-responsiveness,
there is an additional requirement: while holding certain things fixed, the agent’s
performing a different bodily movement must result in a different consequence (108,
1 10). In other words, if the same consequence would occur no matter how the agent
moves his body, the agent is not responsible for the consequence. This is because this
process was not “sensitive to action.” To illustrate their point, they cite an example from
William Rowe, in which a dog is tied to train tracks. Track #1 and Track #2 converge
where the dog is tied. The agent has it within his power to switch the train to track #1
(the switch is previously set to track #2). Thus, the train will still hit the dog, regardless
of what bodily movement the agent makes (Fischer and Ravizza 1998, 109). But I assess
this example quite differently. The agent is responsible for “throwing the switch.”
Whether we hold him blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing so depends upon whether
(Widerker 2002, 319).
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in throwing the switch he intended to save the dog, kill the dog, or otherwise. If he
believed his actions to be ineffective, then we do not hold him blameworthy. If he
believed his throwing the switch to track #1 would guarantee that the dog would die a
painful death, we blame him for throwing the switch. My suggestion, then, is that their
additional condition bears no weight. We are not really (directly) responsible for
consequences, regardless of whether our bodily movements are able to affect an outcome.
We really have no control over whether our bodily movements are effective. But we are
directly responsible for making bodily movements with certain beliefs about their
effectiveness in mind.
It is significant that Fischer and Ravizza use an example pertaining to
consequences. Counterexamples using actions (instead of consequences) cannot be
generated. Let us see why. In their avalanche example, q is ‘the occurrence of the
avalanche.’ In an example using an action instead of a consequence, q will be some
action, perhaps ‘detonating the explosives.’ Their example relies on the notion that q
stands for the same thing whether the avalanche occurs as a result of Betty’s actions or as
a result of natural forces (presumably so long as the avalanche occurs in the same place
and at the same time either way). The plausibility of their example comes from the
notion that we need not differentiate between these sorts of events just on the basis of
their causal history (although even this may be questioned). But what about actions?
Although an action is also a type of event, it is highly plausible to assert that some parts
of the causal history of an action are essential features of that action. Thus, when we
attempt to generate a counterexample, we fail, because q ends up standing for two
different things (e.g., ‘Betty detonating explosives,’ versus ‘a rock falling on the
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detonator’ or even ‘Betty intentionally detonating’ versus ‘Betty being forced to
detonate’).
To return to the crucial point, I maintain that Transfer NR remains unscathed.
The alleged counterexamples to Transfer NR involve the dubious assumption that
Transfer NR applies to consequences. I have argued that we are not primarily
responsible for consequences, and that Transfer NR is meant to apply to actions (and that
a counterexample cannot be generated using actions). Because Transfer NR still stands, a
very strong argument for incompatibilism still stands.
Taking Stock
Let us take stock of where we are now. I have argued that Fischer and Ravizza’s
mechanism-based view of moral responsibility does not support our intuitions because it
is, in a manner of speaking, too easy to make the relevant sort of mechanism (i.e., a
moderately reasons-responsive one) one’s own via “taking responsibility.” I would add
here that their view cannot survive without some appeal to historical factors such as
taking responsibility.” Moderate reasons-responsiveness is not enough for moral
responsibility. For example, in the computer industry—specifically the field of artificial
intelligence (AI)—computers have been programmed with an ability that seems very
similar to the ability to respond to reasons. The computers evaluate scenarios and choose
the one that maximizes the desired result (we can imagine that someday, these abilities
will come even closer to the ability to respond to reasons). Obviously, on the view
espoused by Fischer and Ravizza, these computers would not be held responsible because
they never underwent the important process of becoming moral agents and taking
responsibility for the relevant mechanisms. But we have seen that this process does not
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always guarantee responsibility, either. As I argued earlier, we get cases of people who
are held responsible according to the view of Fischer and Ravizza, who intuitively should
not be held responsible.
After arguing against the effectiveness of their guidance control view, I then
argued that their objection to a major incompatibilist argument does not hold. I claimed
that their objection relies on the faulty notion that Transfer NR applies to consequences.
I believe this puts incompatibilism in a good position. Obviously, objecting to one
compatibilist view does not guarantee the tiuth of incompatibilism. But, 1 have purposely
picked what I believe to be one of the most effective and plausible compatibilist views. I
would maintain that other compatibilist views would rely on similar principles, or
perhaps less plausible ones. Moreover, I will attempt to bolster the case for
incompatibilism by looking more closely at our intuitions, especially in Frankfurt-type
examples. This is what I turn to in the next section.
The Case for Incompatibilism
First, I would like to comment on a claim made by Frankfurt in the famous article
from which Frankfurt-type examples come (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility”). Frankfurt suggests a principle to replace the original Principle of
Alternate Possibilities. He states the principle as follows: “a person is not morally
responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done
otherwise” (Frankfurt 1988a, 10). This principle appears to be a more plausible principle
than the original to those who accept the success of Frankfurt-type counterexamples. Its
initial plausibility probably leads many to accept it. And accepting it probably leads
many to conclude that compatibilism is on surer footing than incompatibilism. This is
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because in light of this principle, it is difficult to see how determinism would rule out our
responsibility. In other words, why would determinism lead to the result that a person
acted only because he could not have done otherwise”?
But I believe this new principle is ambiguous and misleading (and need not be
lauded by those who accept the success of Frankfiirt-type counterexamples). What does
it really mean to say that a person did something “only because he could not have done
otherwise”? If we view “because...” as the beginning of an answer to the question, “why
did he do what he did?,” we see that numerous descriptions can be filled in for any given
situation (e.g„ “because he had a compulsion,” “because a gun was held to his head,”
because an evil neurosurgeon forced the appropriate neurons to fire”). I do not think
these various descriptions can be assimilated under the heading “only because he could
not do otherwise.” The lesson we should take away from Frankfiirt-type
counterexamples is that looking to the ability or inability to do otherwise is not fruitful.
We need to replace PAP with something that does not appeal to doing otherwise. When
we do this, I think we will come up with something that does not rule in favor of
compatibilism. That is, I think we will come up with something that accurately shows us
what determinism would threaten—namely, our originative ability and the sort of
freedom that matters.
Responding to a claim made by Fischer (mentioned earlier), I would suggest that
Picasso would indeed be less creative if determinism were true. I can accept that
Picasso’s creativity remains intact even if it were somehow his “destiny” to paint
masterpieces. I cannot accept that his creativity remains intact if every stroke of his
brush is predetermined—in such a case, something important has been lost. As Robert
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Kane notes in his book The Significance ofFree Will, incompatibilists rely on the
intuitions that true desert, autonomy, creativity, individuality, and uniqueness (along with
moral responsibility), require a freedom from determinism (Kane 1998, 81-9). I believe
the intuitions brought out by Frankfurt-type examples accord with these incompatibilist
intuitions.
Of course the main intuition that comes out of Frankfurt-type examples is that the
actual sequence is what matters for responsibility (not the ability to do otherwise). But in
highlighting the actual sequence, these examples also reveal something else. They reveal
that what is significant in assessing responsibility is what actually occurs inside the agent
and in the actual history of the action. It is not whether the agent could have done
something else, as incompatibilists previously asserted. It is whether the agent actually
did something he himself originated and intended to do. In emphasizing the importance
of the actual sequence, we also emphasize the importance of assessing what this sequence
is like. This is one of the crucial elements that gets overlooked in arguments relying on
PAP.
Determinism threatens the agent’s originative role and his moral responsibility.
Let us return to my very first example (in my introductory chapter) concerning Mo and
his wife, Flora. In this example, Mo runs over his wife’s flowers with his riding lawn
mower. Mo is unaware that his neighbor, Biff, is standing by, ready to force him to mow
over the flowers if Mo will not do so of his own accord. We think Mo is responsible for
running over the flowers (even though Biff is standing by), if Mo originated his action. I
believe that if we were to compare the case ofMo with another case (let’s say, of Larry),
we would see this more clearly. Let us suppose that determinism does not hold in Mo’s
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world but that it does in Larry’s. Thus, Larry runs over the flowers because he is angry
with his wife just as Mo does. But in Larry’s case, it is predetermined that he will do so.
My intuitions in these cases suggest that Mo has a sort of freedom that Larry does not—
and it is the sort of freedom that matters for moral responsibility
.
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One might object that I am being inconsistent with previous points (in the previous chapter). The
objector might say that there is indeed some “flicker of freedom” (i.e., a flicker of freedom to do
otherwise obviously I believe the freedom necessary for moral responsibility is present) when one is the
originator of one’s actions. But with Fischer, I would hold that these “flickers” would not be robust enough
to ground responsibility even if they were present. Thus, perhaps if “flickers” are found, I would have to
ultimately concede that PAP is not actually false. But I could maintain that it is still a misleading and
ineffective principle that should be replaced by one that captures our intuitions more directly.
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CHAPTER 4
KINDS OF INCOMPATIBILISM
The purpose of this chapter is to deal directly with the most pressing objection to
incompatibilism. The objection can be described in the following way: The kind of
action that qualifies as free (in the relevant sense) for the incompatibilist necessarily
involves something that is undetermined. As such, the action would seem to be a random
or chance occurrence and therefore not the kind of thing an agent should be held morally
responsible for. Thus, the incompatibilist version of a free and responsible action makes
no sense. In “Two Kinds of Incompatibilism,” Robert Kane highlights this objection and
claims that in order to respond to it, we must first realize that there are two distinct types
of incompatibilist views to consider (Kane 1995, 115-17). In this chapter, 1 will examine
both types of views to see which (if either) can resolve the problem.
Kane s distinction is between what he calls “Teleological Intelligibility theories”
(borrowing from Watson) and “Agent Cause theories” (Kane 1995, 117). Agent Cause
(or what I call agent-causal) theories rely on nonoccurrent or nonevent causation45 to
explain how a person is the originator of (and is thus responsible for) his action.
Teleological Intelligibility (TI) theories do not rely on this sort of causation. Instead,
they attempt to “explain incompatibilist free agency in terms of event causation alone”
(124). According to Kane, a TI account needs “(a’) some macroscopic indeterminacy
founded on microscopic indeterminacy, and (b’) some account of the agent’s willing and
acting for reasons that will render choices or actions ‘teleologically intelligible,’ though
not determined (125). Kane argues that TI theories can resolve the problem concerning
randomness, whereas agent-causal theories cannot.
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Kane states conditions for incotnpatib.list freedom based on what he regards as
the main incompatibilist intuitions. He lays out an “Explanation Condttion” and an
“Ultimacy Condition”:
(i)
(ii)
(The Explanation Condition) A free action for which the agent is
ultimately responsible is the product of the agent, i.e., is caused by
t e agent, in such a way that we can satisfactorily answer the
question “Why did this act occur here and now rather than some
other?” (whichever occurs) by saying that the agent caused it to
occur rather than not, or vice versa, here and now
(The Ultimacy Condition) The free action for which the agent is
ultimately responsible is such that its occurring rather than not here
and now, or vice versa, has as its ultimate orfinal explanation the
120)
^ ™ CaUSed^ aSent here and now. (Kane 1995,
Kane claims that the problem for incompatibilists is that these two conditions-both
required tor incompatibilist freedom—are in conflict. As he puts it, “the Ultimacy
Condition implies indeterminism, but indeterminism makes it difficult to satisfy the
Explanation Condition” (122). Kane goes on to argue that agent-causal theories (which
require both conditions) cannot solve the problem. This is because if the agent-causal
theorist were to claim, in order to satisfy the Explanation Condition, that the agent
performed some action (rather than doing otherwise) because ofher character and
motives, there would be a regress of responsibility. This regress would pose problems in
satisfying the Ultimacy Condition: Why did the agent have these motives? What caused
them? According to Kane, some agent-causal theorists (such as Taylor) “disallow”
explanations in terms of reasons or causes in order to stop this regress. But this move
does not solve the explanation problem because it does not tell us why the agent
performed the action instead of some other (123). Kane then claims that other agent-
causal theorists (like Chisholm) do allow reasons to be part of the explanation by relying
45 An account of nonoccurrent causation will be given in subsequent chapters.
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eibmzian notion that reasons may incline without necessitating'” (Kane 1995,
1 23). Kane claims that this cannot solve the explanation problem either. This is because
of the following possibility: suppose that the agent's reasons incline her to choose act,on
A over action B. If reasons do not necessitate, i, is possible for the agent to choose B
(and there are cases which the agent does choose B). If the agent chooses B, how can
we explatn her chotce? We cannot appeal he, reasons. We must appeal the agent-
cause. But this does not really explain her choice, either, according to Kane (124).
Kane then turns to TI theories to see if they fare any better. He gives more
specific conditions (corresponding to the origtnal two) that he believes a successfitl TI
theory must satisfy:
(UR) An agent has ultimate responsibility for the choice ofA and the
choosing otherwise ( = it is “up to the agent here and now” in the sense ofu imate responsibility whether the agent chooses A or chooses otherwise)just in case the agent’s choosing A here and now rather than choosing
’
otherwise, or vice versa (whichever occurs)
8
0)
if
1
wilUlw^T
C0ndi
!
i0n
^,
ls the intentional termination of an effort
ot ill that is the agent’s effort of will, and
(2)
TI!
6
^
ationallty Condition) the agent (rl) has reasons for doing so(w ichever occurs), (r2) does itfor those reasons, (r3) does not choose(tor those reasons) compulsively, and (r4) believes at the time of
choice that the reasons for which it is made are in some sense the
weightier reasons, more worth acting upon that [sic] their alternatives,
(3) (The Ultimacy Condition) given the facts of the situation, no other
explanation (other than the conjunction of (1) and (2)) for the agent’s
choosing A or choosing otherwise (whichever occurs) is possible
unless that explanation can in turn be explained by the conjunction of
(1 ) and (-) itself (i.e., the explanation provided by (1) and (2) is
ultimate or “final”). In particular, any explanation of the agent’s
making the effort of will in (1) and of the agent’s having the character
and the reasons or motives for choosing in (2) will not also explain the
?o?‘^46
eVen though t 1 ) and (2 ) win explain the choice. (Kane 1995
125-6)
For simplicity, I have omitted Kane’s footnotes.
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Kane claims that there are two problems that TI theories (and presumably any
incompatibilist theories, such as agent-causal theories) must face. The first problem
(which corresponds to condifion (1)) is the problem of dual production. The problem is
that “indeterminism seems to undermine the idea that the agent is in control of the
outcome whichever way it goes” (126). The second problem (which corresponds to
condition (2)) is the problem of dual rationality, “indeterminism also seems to undermine
the idea that the choice will be rational whichever way it goes” (127). Kane brings the
discussion back to agent-causal theories briefly to make the point that these theories have
trouble with dual rationality for the reasons already stated (concerning the Explanation
Condition above). He goes on to claim that they also have trouble with dual production.
Agent-causal theories cannot deal with condition (1) (which deals with production)
because it has to do with efforts of will. An effort of will would be a fiirther event or
occurrence which would cause a regress of events. But to say that the agent causes some
things without actually doing something else (i.e., without any event occurring) seems to
leave us in confusion “not only about why the agent produced one effect rather than
another (rationality), but also about how the agent produced one effect rather than another
(production)” (127). Kane claims that agent-causal theories fail because they do not
explain dual rationality and dual production; and these, he claims, are the elements of free
agency that most need explaining (141).
He then returns the discussion to TI theories and attempts to explain how a TI
theory can meet the conditions he has laid out. On his theory, the actions for which we
are ultimately responsible are choices or decisions (see UR), not the efforts of will that
appear in condition (1). The efforts of will “precede the choices and terminate in them”
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(Kane 1995, 127). They are “mental efforts directed at getting one’s ends (purposes,
intentions) sorted out” (127). He claims that the “paradigm cases” of free action (or
choice)47 are cases in which we struggle between conflicting motives or reasons, either
morally (e.g., choosing to steal or not) or prudentially (e.g„ choosing to overeat or not)
(127-8). In these cases, the conflict and thus the effort can be explained by motives, past
character, etc. Such things can explain why the agent makes the effort (e.g., because he
thinks it is wrong to steal) and why it is an effort (e.g., because he desires to steal
something) (129).
Being able to explain this effort in terms of these motives and beliefs, etc. does
not lead to a regress of willings, suggests Kane. This is important to his view. According
to Kane, we cannot attribute ultimate responsibility to an agent until we find something
that can only be explained by the fact that it was caused by her; otherwise, we will always
be worried about whether it is the agent or some cause outside the agent that is ultimately
responsible (Kane 1995, 120). Kane claims that his view will not push ultimate
responsibility further back indefinitely. This is because his Ultimacy Condition only
requires that the prior character and motives, or the prior character and motives plus the
effort, cannot explain the choice. (Presumably if they did explain the choice, then
ultimate responsibility would be pushed backwards because we would want to know how
or whether the agent is responsible for those things.) Ultimacy does not require that there
be no explanation for why the effort is made or why the agent has that character or those
motives (128). The choice, then, can be fully explained “by saying that the agent (with
such and such a prior character) intentionally terminated the effort of will (condition (1))
The points of this chapter do not seem to require that we carefiilly distinguish action and choice so Ihave not been concerned with doing so (in general, a choice can be seen as a mental action).
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for such and such prior reasons or motives (condition (2))” (128, my italics). For
example, if an agent chooses to have another helping of ice cream, we determine whether
the agent is ultimately responsible for this (in a direct sense—more will be said later
about derivative responsibility) by seeing whether the agent’s character, motives, effort,
etc. (e.g., desiring ice cream, being hungry, wanting to lose weight, being weak-willed,
struggling between these conflicting reasons, etc.) folly explain the choice. If they do,
then it appears that the outcome has been determined by these things and the agent is not
ultimately responsible. If, on the other hand, these things do not folly explain the agent’s
choice, then we can hold the agent ultimately responsible, even though it may be possible
to folly explain why the agent has this character and these motives and is involved in this
particular struggle. Thus, a free choice (one for which we can hold the agent ultimately
responsible) requires additional explanation (beyond motives, character and effort)—it
requires that the agent intentionally terminated an (indeterminate) effort of will.
Kane wants us to suppose that the effort of will is indeterminate and thus the
choice is undetermined. He gives a quantum analogue: in quantum physics, it is
undetermined whether an isolated particle will penetrate a thin atomic barrier (i.e., the
outcome is undetermined like our undetermined choice) because the position and
momentum of the particle are not both determinate (i.e., the process is indeterminate like
our indeterminate efforts of will) (Kane 1995, 129).
To those who wonder how we can have an explanation of why the agent
terminated the effort the one way rather than the other, Kane answers that we explain this
by saying that “the agent came to believe at the time that these were all things considered
the weightier reasons” (Kane 1 995, 138). In other words, by choosing, the agent makes
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those reasons the weightier ones (1 35). Kane admits that this is circular, but no,
vacuous. Furthermore, he believes Ultimacy requires a kind of circularity: "such an act
is ‘ultimate’ or ‘final’ because i, is in a way ‘self-explaining’” (138). Kane believes his
vtew incorporates both the dual production condifion and the dual rational,* eond.tion
(or, if you prefer, i, solves the dual production problem and the dual rationality problem,.
We can explain how the agent produced the outcome either way: if he gave in to
temptation, we can say that the choice was produced by the motives which the effort
failed to resist, whereas if he chose the moral path, we can say that the choice was
brought about by his effort (because it was an effort to resist temptation) (137) In either
scenario, these things (e.g., the effort, the motives) are the agent's. Thus, the outcome is
Willed by the agent either way (137). This is his way of claiming that the agent caused
the action either way. Kane also bolsters his Production Condition by appealing to
Elizabeth Anscombe’s Inaugural Lecture, “Causality and Determination" in which she
argues that something can be caused without being determined. Thus, “one can be said to
cause or ‘produce' an outcome even if that outcome is not inevitable given one’s effort”
(Kane 1 995, 143). As for the dual rationality condition, Kane suggests that this is
satisfied due to the fact that the agent will have reasons for the outcome either way and
will have acted for those reasons (134).
fnrm
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^
nP“ons t^ane IWi, 138). But Kane suggests that this is not vacuous’ rather it is
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Problems with Teleological Intelligibility Theories
Although Kane comes up with an interesting and intricate view, I believe in the
end his position will no, work f„r v, ri„„s reasons, examtntng the problems with
Kane’s position, 1 also hope to highlight the problems that would face any tncompa.ibtlis,
theory relying solely on event causation.
One problem centers on explanation. Although I do no. wish dtgress into the
complex issue of explanation, I believe some general points ought to be brought out.
Firs, of all, there may be strong reasons to dtsagree with Kane concerning what needs
be explained and wha, should be considered an adequate explanation for a free action.
some instances, Kane requtres too much from an explanation, other cases, too little. In
"Agent Causation," Timothy O’Connor makes the following point:
Kane is clearly presuming that there is only one type of adequate
explanation of a choice, the type that explains why only that choice cm,Id
sZZZT1' po,nt:n ,he asenrs JTbTSunsupported The agency theorist may cheerfully concede that
theo^-i’e” T arf PredUded by are described by his
,
y exPlanahons that cite factors that could put an observer in aposition to predict outcomes with certainty. And though we may grant that
explanations of that sort are highly desirable for scientific purposes(among others), no reason has been given why we cannot allow
explanations that account for an occurrence by characterizing it as the
reely mitiated behavior of an agent motivated by such and such a reason(O Connor 1995a, 190, his footnotes omitted)
O’Connor’s point seems to be that Kane is requiring too much from an explanation of a
free action. Although 1 do not think Kane actually requires that anyone be able to predict
outcomes with certainty (after all, the effort needs to be indeterminate), Kane does
require that an explanation tell us why the agent here and now did A rather than doing
otherwise, or did otherwise rather than doing A (Kane 1995, 122). Kane even adds that
statistical or probabilistic explanations will not suffice because such explanations only
62
tell us that the agent misH, have done either A or B and that there was a probability for
each option; these explanations do no, tell us why the agent did A here and now rather
than doing otawise (122). This is a strong re,„,reme„t. Bn, why is i, strong?
Shouldn’t we require this sort of explanation?
I do no. think that we should. As O'Connor points
,ater in his artjc|(, ,here
nray be cases in wh.ch there is no explanation of “why I acted just then (rathe, than a,
some other time)" if (within a certain time frame) any time is as good as any other
(O'Connor l 995 a, 1 93>. There may likew.se be cases wh.ch either choice is equally
good or in which no choice presents itself as preferable the res. (O'Connor l 995a,
1 S9)<> In other words, there is no, always an answer to why the agent did A here and
now rather than B. Presumably Kane wants to use a reason explanat.on here (for wha,
reasons did the agent do A here and now?).” He has already claimed that a probab.lis.ic
or statistical explanation of a free (and therefore undetermined) action will not suffice.
Bu, a reasons explanation cannot give us reasons where there are none.” Requiring these
reasons is asking for too much.
There is evidence that in other ways, Kane is asking for too little from an
explanation. Indeterminist views like Kane’s fail to show “how it can be up to an agent
to determine which among a range of possible courses of action he will actually
en >
/•
1995, e?)
880"8 explanation, I mean “an explanation in terms of reasons for which the agent did it” (Ginet
not have a
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undertake” (O’Connor 1995a, 191). 52 I believe the problem is underscored by Kane’s
use of a quantum analogue (mentioned above). He claims that our choices can be
compared to the “penetration event” in quantum physics when a particle is moving
toward an atomic barrier (Kane 1995, 129). It is undetermined (although a probability
can be assigned) whether the particle will penetrate the barrier or not, due to
indeterminacies in its momentum and position, etc. (129). Kane wants to suggest that our
efforts of will could be like this indeterminate process—perhaps correlated to
indeterminate brain processes (129). But the problem with the analogy is the problem
noted by Kane earlier probability and statistics do not give us what we need. Perhaps
the quantum analogue makes sense if we want merely a scientific explanation of our
actions; but that is not all we want. In his article, “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal
Account of Free Will, Randolph Clarke makes the following remarks (about his own
agent-causal view):
If prediction and explanation are paradigmatic of scientific understanding,
it appears that agent causation neither contributes to nor detracts from
such understanding. Its contribution, rather, would be to our understanding
of ourselves as moral agents. We believe, most of us, that we are morally
responsible for much of what we do. Agent causation, it may be argued, is
a condition of the possibility of morally responsible agency. Affirming
something like the view sketched here, then, would give us an explication
of how we can be what we seem, from the moral point of view, to be.
Importantly, the explication provided would be one that is consistent with
how we view ourselves from the scientific point of view. (Clarke 1995
210)
Clarke makes an important point: our philosophical discourse about free action is really
aimed (or should be, I would argue) at gaining an understanding of our free and moral
O Connor explains that views that allow for reasons to cause actions without determining them (as
Kane s view seems to do) are superior to simple indeterminist views that do not allow this causal link. This
is because views such as Kane’s can at least provide for reasons explanations (even if they ultimately fail)
(O Connor 1995a). More will be said about simple indeterminism later in the chapter.
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agency. We need to make sure this is consistent with our scientific understanding of
human behavior, but we are not primarily interested in a scientific explanation. Kane
would probably respond that his view gives us more than a scientific understanding
because reasons and motives explain our efforts of will. But this still does not get us
what we need. If we are to be moral agents, we need to be the “undetermined
determinants” (to use Clarke’s phrase; Clarke 1995, 204) of our actions. What is missing
from Kane’s view is the basic intuition that we do indeed determine what we do. We are
significantly different from isolated particles—and merely adding reasons and motives to
indeterminate processes does not get us all the way to true moral agency. We do not just
influence our actions or increase their probability, we determine them. 53 Kane’s view
does not accord with intuition because it takes a significant amount of control away from
the agent by not allowing the agent to determine his own action or choice.
Kane recognizes that he is limiting the control of the agent, but he sees this as a
required concession for the incompatibilist. He makes the following argument:
We have already seen that absolute or complete control is not available to
finite agents, if it means that choices are not limited by heredity,
environment, and conditioning. What else could absolute or complete
control over choice mean? Given the present objection, one could guess
that it might mean the choice was determined by a determinate effort of
the agent, which was in turn determined by character and motives, so that,
given the character, motives and effort, the result was inevitable. But if
Kane might say that I am begging the question against his view:
To insist that the explanation [of action that Kane offers] is inadequate given all these
acts is, I suspect, to tacitly assume that reason explanations cannot adequately explain
unless they are deterministic. For what is missing seems to be that the reasons and the
effort do not determine the outcome. But, given the nature of this debate, such an
assumption is question begging in the extreme. (Kane 1995 139)
1 would like to distinguish my objection from the one Kane is referring to here. I am suggesting that his
for
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6 exP aaatl0n adequate. First of all, his explanation is inadequate because on his view, the agentlacks the control required for responsibility and many kinds of free actions are ruled out But mostimportantly, his view is inadequate because it does not allow that the agent determines her actions.
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.^nooiliLTith’ /T ,‘S haV' already jested, °bs°‘»“ »nh»ls compat ble with ultimate control, because the former impliesdeterminism and the latter indeterminism. (Kane 1995, 140)
But Kane obviously assumes there is no middle ground between his limited form of
control and absolute control. According to the agent-causal theorist, an agent can have a
significant amount of control by determining (i.e., agent-causing) his action. This kind of
control does not conflict with ultimate control because this kind of control does not imply
determinism. Kane seems to suppose that thrs kind of determinacy is either unimportant
or insupportable. He considers whether “the introduction of nonoccurrent causation
would make up for some of the uncertainty and limitation produced by indeterminate
efforts” but seems to suggest that nonoccurrent causation would introduce problems and
solve little. He raises the following questions: how does nonoccurrent causation make
the outcome certain and why are these outcomes certain? Why is this sort of control
absolute and not limited? What more will be explained “about why the agent
determinated chose A rather than B or B rather than A, if we are told that the agent chose
A (or B) nonoccurrently?” (145). He suggests that although some myste^ may be
present in his view, especially concerning quantum phenomena (perhaps most notably
“the mystery of indeterminate efforts of will, described by quantum analogies”), it is not
nearly as troubling as the mysteiy of nonoccurrent causation (141). His view is that
“nonoccurrent causes do not explain what most needs explaining by an incompatibilist
theory of free agency, namely, dual production and dual rationality” (141).
My suggestion is that Kane is making a lot of faulty assumptions here.
Nonoccurrent causation, when properly understood, will significantly add to the
explanation because it will show how it is that free and moral agents determine their own
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choices. How it will do this will be left to later chapters. Also, the sort of control
possible according to agent-causation is significantly less limited than Kane’s version. It
is not absolute in the sense that nothing affects or delimits it, 54 but it is a significant kind
of control, nonetheless. The mystery of Kane’s theory is not specifically the mystery of
indeterministic causation (as he supposes); it is the mystery of how the sort of choice
described by his theory is the kind of thing we are really responsible for. This mystery
has yet to be solved. What most needs explaining is not dual production and dual
rationality, but how it is that an agent can be morally responsible for an action that is not
determined (i.e., not determined except, according to agent-causal views, by the agent’s
own agent-causation).
My suspicion is that Kane (like others who espouse indeterminist views like his)
does not appreciate the full force of a crucial incompatibilist intuition. This intuition is
that in order to be free in the relevant sense, we must be the authors of our actions. My
understanding is that Kane believes he has accounted for this intuition with his Ultimacy
Condition, and suggests that ultimacy implies indeterminism (Kane 1995, 146). He
claims that indeterminism confers the following power on agents: “the power to make
choices which can only andfinally be explained in terms oftheir own wills (i.e.,
character, motives, and efforts of will)” (146).
But let us look more closely at this Ultimacy Condition. It says that the only
explanation allowed for a free action is the conjunction of (1) and (2), i.e., the intentional
termination of an effort of will, and the agent’s reasons (see conditions above). It is
difficult to see what would really be lost if we were to find out that our efforts of will
For instance, Clarke suggests that an agent "can cause only what is naturally possible” (Clarke 1995,
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were actually determined. Isn’t it conceivable that our efforts of will could be
detemtined due to something other than our reasons o, motives (perhaps something
physical inside the “willing” part of „ur own brains that does no. correspond to our
reasons or mottves)? (I do not think we need to suppose that the effort is undetermined
just because it is an effort
.) In this sort of situation, wouldn’t the reasons explanation of
the choiee still be in terms of one’s own will and the only reasons explanation terms of
the conjunction of (1) and (2)?
I assume that Kane would argue that in this case, Ultimacy would not actually be
satisfied because Ultimacy does not just specify reasons explanation. And in this case,
thefinal and only explanation would not be in terms of the agent’s will (because
whatever factor makes the process detemiinate would have to be explained). As Kane
puts it, “ultimacy implies indeterminism” (Kane 1995, 126). In this case, the motives and
character plus the (determinate) effort would fully explain the action and ultimacy would
not be satisfied (as explained above). But I think there is something to be learned here. It
seems that in some sense there is little difference between Kane’s view and the view of a
compatibihst. If the only difference between the two is that in one case the effort of will
must be an indeterminate process (perhaps by correlating to some quantum
indeterminacy) and in the other the effort of will can be a determinate one, I do not see
what we have really gained in the first case—what extra power is really given to the
agent? Apparently the extra power has to do with this intentional termination of an
indeterminate effort of will. But how is this enough to bestow upon us the kind of
authorship and agency we feel so sure that we have?
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Perhaps what leads Kane astray is that he has an implausible view of what our
free actions are actually like ” According to Kane, “the paradigm cases of undetermined
free choices are those involving i„„er struggle and effort of will which must be exercised
against countervailing inclinations- (Kane 1 995, 1 34) and that choices that involve no
such conflict (as many of our choices do not) “are not the paradigms ofchoices for whtch
we have ultimate responsib.lity in the incompatibilist sense" (133), We only have
responsibility for these latter sorts of choiees in a derivative sense (i.e„ because we are
responsible for making our present character and motives what they are through ou, past
conflicts) (144), Kane agrees with Peter van Inwagen that this implies that free choices
or actions occur less frequently than we ordinarily believe they do (Kane 1995, 143). 56
These assumptions about our free choices or actions seem unfounded. First of all,
Kane seems to assume that we must have robust alternatives in order to make a free
choice (he relies on PAP). An effort of will (which is a required element of free choice
according to Kane) presupposes that the agent is aware that more than one option is open
to him (or else no effort would be made). Because ultimacy implies indeterminism (Kane
1995, 126), the effort must be indeterminate; thus, the agent must also be able to choose
from among the options. Both conditions for robustness are satisfied. I hope to have
already shown (in Chapter 2) that an agent need not have robust alternatives in order to
be morally responsible (and free in the relevant sense). If I am right about this, notice
how the problems of dual rationality and dual production become somewhat deflated: it is
no longer as important to be able to explain the outcome of the effort either way. This
This idea comes from comments made by Lynne Baker.
Kane is referring to van Inwagen ’s “When is the Will Free?.”
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strengthens my earlier claim that dual rationality and dual production are not what most
need explaining.
From an intuitive standpoint, it seems plainly false to me that efforts of will
(which presuppose robust alternatives) are required for free choice. Sometimes a
decision or course of action presents itself as the only thing to do and in many cases we
are (and should be) held responsible for such an action (and not just in a derivative
sense). 57 Incompatibilists often support their theories by appealing to the strong intuition
that we really feel that we act freely. I believe they are justified in doing so. But if this
intuition is to have any weight, we must allow it to do its job—my intuition tells me that 1
act freely much more often than Kane or van Inwagen seem to allow.
There is further evidence that Kane’s view of free choice or action is sometimes
unrealistic. Take, for example, one of his problems with agent-causation. Kane claims
that it is problematic for the agent-causal theorist to use the notion of “inclining without
necessitating” because it does not explain why the agent chose B when reasons inclined
toward A (see above). But his characterization of the situation here seems much too
simplistic. Usually the picture is much more complex. In the case where the agent
appears to have chosen one option even though reasons inclined toward the other, there
are at least two possible explanations. In many cases, the situation is such that certain
types of reasons are inclining the agent one way and other types of reasons are inclining
I believe Susan Wolf and Eleanore Stump both make this point. Also, Clarke says:
I emphasize here that I do not believe that a libertarian need require, for free will, that an
agent be able to do anything significantly different from what she actually does. If an
agent has very good reason to perform an action of a certain type (A’ing), and if she has
no reason not to, then, although it may be causally indeterminate when she A’s, or exactlyhow she A’s, it may not be naturally possible that she not A. So long as she is an
undetermined determinant of her A'ing, it seems to me that it ought to be allowed that
she acts with free will. (Clarke 1995, 212, n. 6)
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the agent the other way (Kane himself uses this idea in his efforts of will). Another
possibility, not entertained by Kane, is that the agent acts irrationally. It seems possible
for an agent to act irrationally and still be responsible for the action. 58 That we
sometimes do act this way is part of the mystery of agency. This mystery is not
something introduced into agency by agent-causation—rather, it is a pre-existing
mystery.
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Does the failure of Kane’s view imply the failure of other indeterminist (and non-
agent-causal) views? Not completely, but the prospects look bleak. Let us look at an
alternative view called simple indeterminism. According to O’Connor the simple
indeterminist “claims that a (causally) simple mental event of the proper sort (e.g., a
volition), if causally undetermined, is intrinsically such as to be under the control of the
agent who is its subject” (O’Connor 1995a, 186, his footnotes omitted). Such a view
appears to avoid some of the problems of Kane’s position, but O’Connor argues that this
view will not work for the following reason:
we cannot simply appeal, as, for example, Ginet (“Reasons Explanation of
Action”) does, to internal (and referential) relations between concurrent
intention and prior motives, on the one hand, and that same concurrent
intention and the decision (or action), on the other. Without the mediation
of a (necessarily causal) ‘mechanism of control’, prior motives cannot
explain a decision, even though (as it happens) they may coincide with it.
(O’Connor 1995a, 195)
O’Connor’s intuition here is that “agent-control—the type of immediate control we take
ourselves to have over our own actions—is clearly causal in nature” (186). I agree with
O’Connor here. In this sense, simple indeterminism may fare worse than Kane’s view.
58 As O’Connor says, “don’t we sometimes make irrational decisions?” (O’Connor 1995a, 189).
59 More will be said about the mystery of agency in subsequent chapters.
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As O’Connor explains, views that allow for reasons to cause actions without determining
them (as Kane’s view seems to do) are superior to simple indeterminist views that do not
allow this causal link. This is because views such as Kane’s can at least provide for
reasons explanations (even if they ultimately fail). 1 believe other (non-simple)
indeterminist views will ultimately fail because they will not be able to show how we
have the type of control required for moral agency.
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CHAPTER 5
AGENT-CAUSATION
In previous chapters, I have attempted to show that Frankfurt-type examples
(along with other considerations) should lead us to incompatibilism. I have also argued
that agent-causal theories are preferable to other incompatibilist theories because they
illustrate how we can be responsible for our free actions (by being “undetermined
determinants” of our actions). The focus of this chapter, then, will be to demonstrate how
an agent-causal theory is possible and how such a theory might work. In explicating an
agent causal theory, it will be necessary to make certain claims about causation in
general. Before moving on to these projects, however, it will be useful to make a few
remarks about determinism and the kind of incompatibilism I am espousing.
A Few Notes on Determinism and Incompatibilism
Thus far, I have not made any distinction between different kinds of determinism.
For the purposes of this chapter it will be important to (roughly) characterize what
determinism is and what it is not. There are numerous species of determinism:
psychological, causal, nomic (to name a few). Each kind is a theory about the world
which holds that the past together with certain factors serves to predetermine a unique
future. Presumably, the claim of psychological determinism is that past beliefs, desires,
and other psychological states fix a unique psychological future. With causal
determinism, a chain of causes fixes the future. And with nomic, the laws of nature fix
the future. I believe that each of these is essentially causal—that is, the only way the past
together with the laws can determine a unique future is for the laws to have implications
for causal relations (i.e., laws are descriptive, so one would have to say that they describe
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the parameters under which causes fix the future60). Although all forms of determinism
are essentially causal, sometimes there is a need to distinguish them. For example, what I
will call simple causal determinism could be true and nomic determinism false (i.e., if a
chain of causes fixed the future but these causes did not operate under laws). For my
purposes, however, what is most important is recognizing that any type of determinism
which entails that all actions are predetermined is incompatible with the kind of freedom
relevant to moral responsibility (presumably in each of these types of determinism, the
unique future that is fixed will include human actions).
Now we can say what determinism is not. Here it is crucial to reiterate the claim
(made by van Inwagen, Clarke, and others) that universal causation (the principle that
every event has a cause) is not equivalent to any type of determinism. This is because
causes need not necessitate—they can, for example, be probabilistic . 61 Thus, the
principle that every event is caused is not enough to fix a unique future . 62
Agenthood
True freedom requires not only that a free action not be predetermined by external
factors, but also that it not be predetermined by internal factors such as desires and
beliefs .
63 On the other hand, on my view, an agent acting freely must be an
60 As Thomas Reid claims, “a law of nature is not the efficient cause of any event” but is something
“conceived in the mind of a rational being, not a thing that has a real existence” (Reid 1788, 628).
61
This point is accepted by many. Anscombe argues for it convincingly in “Causality and Determination”
(Anscombe 1993). Wesley Salmon discusses probabilistic causation in “Probabilistic Causality” (Salmon
1993b). Clarke supports this view and uses it to bolster his agent-causal theory (Clarke 1995; more will be
said about this below).
62
Clarke makes a lot out of this distinction. He embraces this principle of universal causation as highly
plausible and reconciles his agent-causal theory with it. He claims that this “allows for our ability to
predict and explain human behavior” (Clarke 1995, 204).
63 Thomas Williams attributes a view like this to Augustine in his Introduction to Augustine’s “On Free
Choice of the Will” (Williams 1993, xii).
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“undetermined determinant" of his action (see Chapter 4). I believe that this is entirely
consistent. On my view, a free action is determined not by something inside the agent
but by the agent himself as an agent. But what does this mean?
Let us consider the concept of agenthood. One might suggest that an agent is
merely “one who acts.” On my view, this depends on how broadly we construe the
concept of action. There is a sense in which a goldfish can do things and thus perform
actions (in some sense of the term). A goldfish, however, is not a full-fledged moral
agent. To understand agenthood in its fullest sense, then, we ought to look to the
differences between the person and the goldfish. To be an agent in the fullest sense, one
must be the sort of being to which we can appropriately attribute moral responsibility.
The goldfish is not morally responsible for anything it does, because the goldfish lacks
certain crucial mental capacities. A goldfish does not have the capacity for reflective
practical reasoning, the ability to deliberate, or the ability to understand that his actions
are efficacious in the world.
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The goldfish does not have the capacity to make moral
distinctions, nor does he have the ability to make plans and execute them. 6 ' The goldfish
does not have the ability to act with intention and purpose. A full-fledged moral agent,
on the other hand, will have these capacities (and probably many others—my list is not
meant to be exhaustive). The reader should note that these abilities need not be exercised
on every occasion of a free action; what is required is the capacity to exercise them.
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This last suggestion comes from Fischer and Ravizza in Responsibility and Control (Fischer and Ravizza
1998,238).
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This last suggestion comes from Thomas Reid, as explicated in the unpublished paper, “Planning,
Character and Agent-Causation: Reid’s Third Argument for Moral Liberty," by Gideon Yaffe. Yaffe
explains that “in the third argument, Reid attempts to derive the claim that human beings are the agent-
causes of their free actions from the fact that we are endowed with the capacity to make and execute plans”
(Yaffe unpublished, 1).
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I think it reasonable to suggest that there could be something like degrees of
moral agenthood. If someone possesses all the relevant mental capacities, she is a moral
agent in the fullest sense. But let us suppose that someone has all but one of the required
mental capacities, or has some (or all) of them only to a certain degree. Thus, perhaps as
a child develops mentally, he becomes more and more fully a moral agent. This
understanding goes along with degrees of moral responsibility
.
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For example, think of a
toddler who begins to test his boundaries through small acts of defiance. He intentionally
disobeys his parents and smacks the cat even though he knows not to. I think that to a
certain degree, we hold the child responsible for this. The degree to which we hold him
responsible corresponds to the degree of moral agenthood present (i.e., his mental
development as an agent—or at least to how we perceive this development). An older
child would be more blameworthy in such an instance. Furthermore, we might even
regard an intelligent pet as an agent in some sense. A dog who purposely chews up the
sofa out of anger towards his owner (assuming this is a possibility—many dog owners
would say that it is) is held responsible for this. But of course, he is not held responsible
to the degree that a normal adult would be if she intentionally destroyed the sofa.
I do not think it plausible to suggest that an agent-cause can occur to a certain
degree; something is either agent-caused or it is not. Thus, to claim that agenthood can
come in varying degrees is just to say that a full-fledged moral agent will be able to
agent-cause a wider range of actions and will be held more morally responsible for those
actions. For example, perhaps my labrador retriever agent-causes some of his actions
(such as his seemingly premeditated bids for attention) and not others (such as his
bb
I believe Michael Zimmerman has such a view.
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instinctive lunges towards small moving animals). Perhaps compared with a normal
human adult, his agent-caused actions are fewer and his instinctive actions more
numerous. Moreover, his responsibility, even for those agent-caused actions, is less than
would be attributed to a normal human adult, because the dog presumably does not have
all the same capacities. The implication here is that although agent-causation is required
for moral responsibility, it is not always sufficient for moral responsibility.
Causal Power
If the agent as an agent is to determine his free actions, the agent must agent-
cause them. This requires that the agent have causal power. Simply put, causal power is
the ability to cause something (for an agent, it is the ability to cause an action).
Something has causal power because of certain properties it possesses
.
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For an agent,
these properties will probably include the mental capacities discussed in the last section.
It seems quite possible that different properties could give rise to causal power in
different kinds of things (just as different chemical properties give rise to the property of
“water solubility” in different substances). Thus, if any other kinds of objects besides
agents turn out to have causal power, it may not be in virtue of having the sorts of mental
capacities mentioned above, but in virtue of having a different set of properties: these
different properties are what gives rise to causal power. In these cases, what is caused
will not be a free action but something else . 68
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This suggestion about properties is made by both O’Connor and Clarke. In Chapter 6, 1 discuss Clarke’s
suggestion that these properties could be seen as either dispositional or relational.
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In Essays on the Active Powers ofMan, Thomas Reid says the following about external objects that
appear to have “some motions and changes in them”:
Our first thoughts seem to be, That the objects in which we perceive such
motion have understanding and active power as we have.
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Acceptance of this picture allows for a crucial point to be made. As Clarke
suggests, we are now in a position to see that agent causation can involve the same
relation as event causation: “the only difference between the two kinds of causation
concerns the types of entities related, not the relation” (Clarke 1995, 207).69 This claim is
powerful because it removes what used to be considered the main obstacle to agent-
causal theories: that is, the idea that agent-causation is something special, mysterious, and
entirely different from event causation (Clarke 1995, 207). In order to support this
powerful claim, however, we must espouse a certain controversial conception of
causes—i.e., a realist conception.
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The central idea behind any realist account is that causal relations are not
“reducible to other states of affairs, including the non-causal properties of, and relations
between, events” (Tooley 1993, 172). Thus, causes are real things that add to the
ontological makeup of the world. The more popular reductionist accounts of causation,
on the other hand, do reduce causation to these other states of affairs. Reductionist
accounts pose a problem for agent-causal views. Clarke puts the problem this way:
The most familiar accounts of event causation are reductionist, aiming to
analyze causation in terms of such noncausal and nonnomological features
as constant conjunction or counterfactual dependence, or in terms of the
“Savages,” says the Abbe Raynal, “wherever they see motion which they cannot
account for, there they suppose a soul.” (Reid 1788, 605)
Reid’s suggestion appears to be that these objects do not really have active power. I agree with Reid that
these objects do not have understanding and thus do not act. But we can leave open the possibility that
some objects have causal power.
69 One might object here that it is strange (or even impossible) for the same relation to hold in cases where
the first relata of each relation are in different ontological categories (i.e., events in the event-to-event
causal relation, versus substances in the agent-to-event causal relation). But we have no trouble accepting
that with other relations. For example, the spatiotemporal relation holds between both objects and events.
I owe this point to Jonathan Schaffer.
70 O’Connor does not agree that the two kinds of causation are the same. Even so, he supports a realist
conception of causes (O’Connor 1995a, 175).
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modalities of necessity and sufficiency. Certainly, if any of this type of
account of event causation is correct, then agent causation cannot be the
same relation as event causation. For agent causation plainly cannot be
either the constant conjunction of an agent and an action type or the
counterfactual dependence of an action on an agent, nor can it consist in
an agent’s being a necessary or sufficient condition for the performance of
a particular action. (Clarke 1995, 207, his footnote omitted)
It does not make much sense to suppose that an agent could be constantly conjoined with
action types or that an agent could be a condition for a particular action. Moreover,
reductive analyses of agent-causation would take away the most important element of
agency as envisioned by the agent-causal theorist: they would eliminate the power of the
agent as the truefree source of his action. A realist account, on the other hand, would
allow that the agent really brings about his free action and is not merely related to it in
some reductive way. Because a reductive analysis of causes does not work for agent-
causation, we must adopt a realist view. If we want to claim that event-causation and
agent-causation involve the same relation, we must adopt this realist view for both. As
Clarke goes on to say, a realist account of causes may be preferable anyway due to the
“grave difficulties” reductionist accounts have suffered (208) (see below for one account
of these difficulties).
A Realist Conception of Causes
Do we really have enough evidence in favor of a realist conception of causes?
Before citing some of the difficulties with reductionist accounts, let us look to some of
the intuitive power behind realist accounts. In “Causality and Determination” Elizabeth
Anscombe argues for a realist conception of causes. She claims that
There is something to observe here that lies under our noses. It is little
attended to, and yet still so obvious as to seem trite. It is this: causality
consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core,
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the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from,
arise out of, come of, their causes. (Anscombe 1993, 91-2)
Anscombe points to the intuitive notion that a cause is a real thing which brings about its
effect; it is not reducible to something else. Anscombe attempts to turn the Humean
picture of causality—according to which causes are nothing more than constant
conjunctions of one kind of event preceding another—on its head. Anscombe argues that
causation does not require analysis (i.e., it is basic or primitive) because it is observable. 71
This is not the only approach a realist about causes can take, however. In “Causation:
Reductionism versus Realism,” Michael Tooley suggests what he sees as a preferable
view: “the view that causal concepts are theoretical concepts, so that causal relations can
only be characterized, indirectly, as those relations that satisfy some appropriate theory”
(Tooley 1993, 190). For my purposes, either realist view will work. 72 Again, the central
idea behind any realist account is that causal relations are not “reducible to other states of
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This interpretation of her argument is made by Sosa and Tooley in their “Introduction” to Causation
(Sosa and Tooley 1993, 13).
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1 tend to agree with Michael Scriven’s claim in “Defects of the Necessary Condition Analysis of
Causation” that “the concept of cause is fundamental to our conception of the world in much the same way
as the concept of number: we cannot define it in terms of other notions without conceptual or ostensive
circularity” (Scriven 1993, 56, his footnote omitted). As Hume recognized, our reasoning about the
external world is through cause and effect. And as Thomas Reid points out in Essays on the Active Powers
ofMan , we come to see cause and effect in the world because we first notice our (causal) ability to affect
things in the world (Reid 1788, 603ff). These sorts of considerations lead me to believe there is something
basic and fundamental about the notion of “causing” or “bringing about” or being a “source.” But is this
observable as Anscombe seems to claim? It seems to me that at the very least, we can have observational
evidence of causes and give it status equal to other observational evidence scientists are willing to use (as
Anscombe points out, “someone who says [we can never observe causality in the individual case] is just
not going to count anything as ‘observation of causality’”; Anscombe 1993, 92). But even if this is right,
does this prove its primitiveness? Against philosophers like Anscombe, Tooley claims that observational
knowledge does not seem like enough to support the claim that causation is analytically basic (Tooley
1993, 190). Tooley gives the example that scientists can observe electrons in cloud chambers but the
concept of electron is still able to be analysed (190). But Tooley goes on to mention David Armstrong’s
“more sophisticated” argument for the primitiveness (due to the observability) of causes which discusses
the difference between perceptual knowledge involving inference and the non-inferential variety;
Armstrong claims that one can have non-inferential knowledge of causes (Tooley 1993, 190). Regardless, I
think there is a good deal of intuitive plausibility to the idea that causes are primitive. But again, my agent-
causal view does not depend upon this particular claim.
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affairs” (Tooley 1993, 172). There is strong intuitive plausibility to the idea that a world
in which events merely follow upon one another is not the same as a world in which one
thing can actually bring about another.
Tooley gives two arguments against reductive approaches to causal relations. He
says this in summarizing the first of his arguments:
In the case of causal relations, 1 advanced two sorts of objections. First,
there were the objections that focused upon the problem of explaining the
direction of causation. I argued that a reductionist approach is unable to
provide a satisfactory account of the direction of causation either for
certain very simple universes, or for inverted universes, unless one is
prepared both to define the direction of causation in terms of the direction
of time, and to adopt a realist view of the latter. (Tooley 1993, 192)
The underlying idea of the first sort of objection is that there are possible worlds in which
there are causes and effects but in which there is no way “to distinguish between the
direction from cause to effect and the inverse one from effect to cause” just by looking at
the underlying structures of the events (180). He gives the example of a simple world in
which there are only two uncharged particles rotating around one another. The particles
enter into causal relations because they exert gravity upon one another and accelerate as a
result (180). Certain features of our actual complex world will not be present in this
simple world: e.g., this simple world will be symmetrical in time (180). The crux of the
argument is that we would need a realist conception of causes to be able to say which
thing “brings about” the other in this simple world because we cannot rely on underlying
factors such as temporal direction.
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Tooley summarizes the second sort of objection as follows:
73 More specifically, Tooley claims that this simple world, although causal, “is also a world that is utterly
devoid of changes of entropy, of propagation of order, and of open forks” (Tooley 1993, 180). These are
the sorts of features (existent in the actual world) that we often rely on in determining the direction of
causation (180).
Secondly, there were the under-determination objections, the thrust of
which was that causal relations between events are not logically
supervenient even upon the totality of all non-causal facts, together with
all laws, both causal and non-causal, plus the direction of causation in all
potential causal processes. (Tooley 1993, 192)
The second sort of argument employs the following kind of example: event P causes
event M. It is possible that there is another event, M*, that has all the same properties 74
(both intrinsic and relational) as M, but which is not caused by P (187). Tooley asks us to
consider the logical possibility of two immaterial minds (A and A*) that exist
simultaneously and are qualitatively indistinguishable (i.e., their mental contents are the
same at every instant) (187). Let us suppose that identity over time “must be analysed in
terms of causal relations between different events in the history of the enduring entity in
question” (a view which Tooley finds plausible and supportable) (187). P and M will be
“any two temporal slices of mind A, and P* and M* [will] be the corresponding temporal
slices of A*” (187). This would then be an example where P is causally related to M but
not M* and where M* has the same properties as M. If we allow that this sort of example
is possible, then causal relations are not reducible to non-causal facts; the non-causal
facts leave out the causal relations (i.e., all the non-causal facts about P, P*, M, and M*
fail to distinguish that P is causally related to M but not to M*).
I think these two arguments provide adequate reason for being skeptical of
reductionist views and for giving realist views a try.
Agents as Causes
Simply put, an agent causes something just as an event does: by bringing it about.
Certain properties the agent possesses allow this. At first, one may question the
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In a footnote, Tooley restricts properties to those which do not involve particulars (e.g., “being 5 miles
from the Grand Canyon does not count as a property”) (Tooley 1993, 187, n. 12).
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plausibility of an agent (i.e., a substance) entering into a relation usually reserved for
events. But it is an unwarranted assumption to believe that only events can enter into
causal relations.
It is not too difficult to understand and identify the sources of this assumption.
The evidence of cause and effect observed by scientists (and other observers) is usually in
the form of one event followed by another: the cue ball strikes the eight ball and this is
followed by the eight ball moving away in a certain direction. We observe a temporal
relationship between cause and effect. Because our experiences and observations are
necessarily temporal, it makes sense for us to couch our talk of cause and effect in terms
of events—the cause-event followed by the effect-event. But these temporal observations
are misleading. Going back to Tooley’s example of the simple world, we see that we
cannot always rely on the direction of time, or more specifically on “the temporal
direction in which order is propagated” (because the world he describes is symmetrical in
time; Tooley 1993, 180). We need a broader picture of the world beyond our
unidirectional temporal experiences.
75
But does this broader picture give us enough reason to allow other entities
(besides events) to enter into the causal relation (after all, Tooley’s example is still put in
terms of events)? It is not an air-tight argument, of course, but I believe it does give us
reason to consider other entities. It appears that our assumption that events are the only
causal entities arises in the following way: we have these temporal observational
experiences (we see one event followed by another), we accept the Humean notion that
75 As Tooley acknowledges, it is possible (though not desirable) to be a realist with respect to the direction
of time (Tooley 1993). Presumably, since the time of Einstein, however, science has made this possibility
less tenable.
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such experiences (i.e., of events) are the only sort we have (regarding cause and effect),
we come to the Humean conclusion that these experiences correlate with all that it is
possible to know about causation (i.e., all we experience is one event followed by another
event so this is all we have knowledge of), and then we assume that what it is possible to
know is indicative of the metaphysical status of cause and effect. 76
But competing with this picture of causality is the one Thomas Reid illustrates in
Essays on the Active Powers ofMan. His claim is that our notion of causation in the
world comes from our direct experience of causing things ourselves (Reid 1788, 603ff).
The implication here is that we can experience cause and effect in a way Hume rejects,
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that is, as a relation between an agent and his action (not merely between events,
although there will be an event—or process—on one side of the relation. In other words,
the effect will be an action which is an event or process). But how do we decide which
picture to accept?
If we have already accepted the realist account of causes (as I have argued that we
should), then we can accept that it is possible to experience causation as something real in
the world, not reducible to a constant conjunction of events (or to anything else). There
seems to be no reason to hold on to the idea that this real relation (of causation) can only
be found between events.
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It is not even clear that this is all we experience with regard to cause and effect. It seems that we also
experience many of the contributing conditions or circumstances (discussed below) that help cause the
event. Our tendency is to ignore these things and to place emphasis on some triggering event as the cause.
I owe this point to Stephen Griffith (this issue is also discussed in Chapter 6).
77
See Enq. Sect. VII. (Hume 1999).
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1 realize that epistemological issues are intertwined with metaphysical ones. But I think it is relevant to
consider where our assumptions originate in order to see if those assumptions are justified.
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As limited human beings, we must make choices about how we carve up reality.
Sometimes it makes sense to see the world in terms of events, sometimes in terms of
processes (more will be said about processes below), sometimes in terms of states of
affairs, objects, substances, etc. On my view, there is no adequate reason to rule out the
idea that an agent or even some (non-agent) physical object could possess the appropriate
properties to enable it to enter into a causal relation with something else . 79 One might
object that causal relations must be limited to events because causation requires that the
cause be temporally prior to its effect. With agent-causation, the objection goes, it does
not make sense to say that an agent is temporally prior to the effect. I think this objection
does not work, however, because there is the possibility of simultaneous and even
backward causation . 80
Temporal considerations, however, do raise a legitimate question for the agent-
causal theorist: if agent-causation is not in terms of events (it is nonoccurrent), how can
we explain why actions occur at one time rather than another? The answer is actually
quite simple and partly concerns the role of desires and beliefs. This is what we turn to in
the next section.
The Role of Desires and Beliefs
Although the agent-causal theory is a theory of incompatibilist freedom, it allows,
and even requires, that the agent be limited by certain conditions. As Clarke suggests,
The occurrence of certain prior events will be a necessary condition of an
agent’s causing a certain event. Absent those prior events, the later event
79
See also Sosa and Tooley (Sosa and Tooley 1993, 1), who claim that states of affairs can enter into causal
relations, and David Lewis (Lewis 1993, 195) who suggests that events are not the only things that can
cause.
80
See David Lewis’s “Causation” in which he rejects a certain solution because “it rejects a prion certain
legitimate physical hypotheses that posit backward or simultaneous causation (Lewis 1993, 203).
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will not be naturally possible, and an agent can cause only what is
naturally possible. (Clarke 1995, 204)
I will call these events “contributing conditions.” (I will also add that certain states of
affairs can be contributing conditions.) These conditions will include events such as the
birth of the agent, any events that led to the agent’s being in his current circumstances,
etc. They will also include the agent’s desires and beliefs (although not every desire and
belief will play a causal role in every free action).
sl
These conditions will act as partial
causes of the agent’s free actions but will not determine his free actions. This is possible
if causes are probabilistic (as Clarke suggests; 204). It is also possible if we understand
these conditions as not sufficient in themselves but only when joined together with the
agent-cause.
8
" Let us look at an analogous example with event causation. Suppose a
discarded lit cigarette starts a raging forest fire (for simplicity’s sake, let us ignore the
role of the agent in this case). There are many partial or contributing causes of the fire.
Some of the contributing conditions are the dryness of the brush on which the cigarette
lands and the wind conditions at the time. The dryness and the wind do not alone cause
the fire. It is only when these conditions are joined with the landing of the cigarette that
the raging fire ensues. Still, these conditions influence what happens without
necessitating it. The same can be said with human free actions.
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Also, we might want to allow that some desires and beliefs are part of the action itself as Timothy
O’Connor suggests in “Agent Causation" (O’Connor 1995a, 182) (although it is not clear to me whether
this suggestion is meant to be a part of his own view or if it is merely made in the context of an argument).
For example, a complex act of deliberation will include desires and beliefs.
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Although perhaps part of the inspiration for my suggestion, INUS conditions (see John Mackie's "Causes
and Conditions"; Mackie 1993) are quite different from what I am proposing here. On my understanding,
views such as Mackie's are meant to be reductionist
,
attempting to analyze causation completely in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions.
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If it happens that contributing conditions “crowd out” the agent-cause on some
occasions, then the agent will not act freely on these occasions. For example, let us say
that someone raises a baseball bat over my head. I react by immediately raising my
hands over my head for protection. It seems possible that my belief that there is a
baseball bat about to come down on my head, my belief about the pain involved in such a
situation, my beliefs about the intentions of the bat-wielding agent, and my acute desire
to avoid intense pain, all cause me to raise my hands over my head. It also seems
possible to suppose that my action of raising my hands is not freely performed because
my beliefs and desires in this case so strongly affect my action—so much so, in fact, that
there is “no room” left for agent-causation.
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But let us go back to free actions. What is important here is that if we accept that
free actions can have contributing causes, then there is no problem with timing. The
timing of free actions can be explained by the timing of these contributing causes. Clarke
claims that
The agent-causal view thus has the same resources as does a wholly event-
causal view ofhuman agency to explain why an agent performs a certain
action at a certain time, rather than earlier or later. If there is an event,
such as her acquiring new reasons, that explains why she acted then and
not at some other time, then both sorts of views have available an
explanation. If there is no such event, then neither sort of view has
available an explanation. (Clarke 1995, 204)
In other words, these partial causes can explain the timing of an action just as well when
they are partial (as on the agent-causal view) as they can when they are the whole story
(as on the wholly event-causal view). I agent-caused my action of going to the door at
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This is not to suggest that every agent in such a situation would not agent-cause her action. Some agents
may have mastered their physical reactions to such things. There is a story that the actress Patty Duke,
while playing Helen Keller in the play The Miracle Worker, had so mastered her reactions that she was able
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this time because I just came to believe that someone was knocking on it. Sometimes,
however, nothing can explain the timing of an action. In such cases, we must be satisfied
to say that there is no reason the agent performed the action now rather than later. This is
true whichever view we accept.
But more needs to be said about desires and beliefs. It seems quite clear that
agents have both occurrent desires and beliefs (which can help explain timing, as
discussed above) and long-standing, or dispositional, desires and beliefs. Both types can
be contributing conditions, or partial causes, of free actions. For example, if I choose to
help a drowning victim, this could be partially caused by my long-standing belief that
helping others is a good thing to do, as well as by my occurrent belief that there is a
drowning victim before me in need ofmy help. No particular desires and beliefs are
required for free action, however. It does seem necessary, though, that an agent have
some beliefs or other in order to even be an agent
.
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This characterization of action fits well with our intuitions about acting for certain
reasons. As Clarke suggests, “what an agent directly causes, when she acts with free
will, is her acting on (or for) certain of her reasons. . .” (presumably these reasons are her
beliefs and desires). He goes on to say that “her acting for that ordering of reasons is
itself a complex event, one that consists, in part, of her behavior’s being caused by those
to resist any flinching (in keeping with her deaf character) when stage lights accidentally fell right near her
during a performance.
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1 do not think the mere capacity for belief is enough here. Under what sort of circumstances would an
agent cease to have any beliefs while still remaining an agent? It might be plausible to suppose that an
agent can freely act against his beliefs (as in an irrational action—although perhaps it is more plausible to
say that the agent is acting on certain beliefs while acting against others). But here the agent at least has
beliefs. Even God as an agent would fall under this requirement (This is the case unless we reject the idea
that belief is a necessary part of knowledge. This point was suggested to me by Vere Chappell).
Presumably, God would cause all his own beliefs while ours would come from various sources.
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reasons” (Clarke 1995, 205, his footnote omitted). 1 should add here that I do not want to
rule out the possibility of free irrational actions. What is difficult to determine in the case
of irrational actions is whether the agent is acting against all reasons or whether he just
appears to be (and is really acting on strange or unlikely ones). 85 But what is important
here is that many agent-caused actions can be explained in terms of the agent’s reasons
(that is, the agent’s beliefs and desires). Thus, in these cases, the agent-caused action will
be rational (Clarke 1995, 205). And rationality is an important feature of free action
(Clarke 1995,206).
The Agent-Caused Action
In the previous section, we saw how desires and beliefs come into play in our
actions. This helped us understand how we can explain our actions as being rational and
as occurring at one time rather than another. But much still needs to be explained. Most
importantly, we want to know what the agent-caused action is supposed to be like.
Obviously, although agent-causes are nonoccurrent, actions occur at a time. This
means that there must be some exertion of causal power that is temporal. The nature of
this exertion has caused problems for the agent-causal theorist in the past. It has led
some philosophers to argue that the agent-causal view suffers from a regress problem.
William Rowe discusses the regress problem in “Two Concepts of Freedom.”
Rowe is specifically discussing the agent-causal view of Thomas Reid, as set out in
Reid’s Essays on the Active Powers ofMan. Rowe characterizes Reid’s view as follows:
On Reid’s theory, when an agent wills some action, the act of will is itself
an event and, as such, requires a cause. If the act of will is free, its cause
is not some event, it is the agent whose act of will it is. Being the casue
85 On this subject, Clarke says that “although our freedom of the will might consist partly in an ability to
behave irrationally, free will is more desirable if it is the freedom to determine which of several genuine
alternatives one will rationally pursue” (Clarke 1995, 205-6).
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[sic] of the act of will, the agent must satisfy Reid’s three conditions of
agent-causation. Thus the agent must have had the power to bring about
the act of will as well as the power to refrain from bringing about the act
of will, and she must have exerted her power to bring about the act of will.
It is the last of these conditions that generates an infinite regress of events
that an agent must cause if she is to cause her act of will. For what it tells
us is that to produce the act of will the agent must exert her power to bring
about the act of will. Now an exertion of power is itself an event. As
such, it too must have a cause. On Reid’s view the cause must again be
the agent herself. But to have caused this exertion the agent must have
had the power to bring it about and must have exerted that power. Each
exertion of power is itself an event which the agent can cause only by
having the power to cause it and by exerting that power. (Rowe 1995,
161)
Thus, claims Rowe,
Reid’s theory of agent-causation, when conjoined with the principle that
every event has a cause, leads to the absurdity of an infinite regress of
agent-produced exertions for every act of will the agent produces. (162)
In other words, Reid’s view seems to require that in order to perform an act of will, an
agent must perform an exertion of his causal power. But in order to perform this
exertion, the agent must perform another exertion, etc. (I say he must “perform” an
exertion because the exertion is an event which must be agent-caused).
Rowe suggests that we must significantly modify Reid’s theory in order to avoid
this regress. Rowe claims that
Although some actions (moving one’s arm, e.g.) can be caused by the
agent only by the agent exerting his power to produce his action of
moving his arm, other actions such as acts of will are produced directly by
the agent and not by means of exertions that are distinct from the acts of
will produced. To deny the possibility of the latter is simply to claim that
ultimately only events can be causes of events—thus if there is no exertion
of power by the agent (and no other event causes the volition), no act of
will can be produced. But the whole idea of agent-causation is that agents
are causes of events, that in addition to event-causes there are causes of a
wholly different kind—agents. (Rowe 1995, 163)
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Rowe attempts to solve the regress by suggesting that acts of will require no “prior”
exertion in order to be agent-caused. He does seem to hold, however, that some actions,
such as bodily movements, will require prior exertions. What is unclear to me, is whether
Rowe is suggesting separate standards for acts of will and bodily actions. He says that
acts of will are produced directly and “not by means of exertions that are distinct from the
acts of will produced” (quoted above). This is ambiguous as to whether acts of will are
produced by exertions, but exertions identical to the acts of will, or whether they are
produced by no exertions at all. The latter does not seem to make much sense; how could
an agent cause something with no exertion of causal power? Also, this would suggest
separate standards for acts of will and for bodily acts (no exertions versus exertions). The
former, however, does bring us closer to solving the regress problem.
The key to solving the regress problem lies in the suggestion that when an agent
acts freely, the exertion of power just is the action. On the former interpretation of
Rowe’s claim (quoted above), an act of will just is the exertion of power. This seems
right to me. I do not agree with Rowe, however, when he claims that bodily movements
“can be caused by the agent only by the agent exerting his power to produce his action of
moving his arm” (quoted above), if by this he means that the agent cannot directly cause
such an action. Rowe seems to be suggesting that only acts of will can be directly
caused . 86 It seems plausible to suggest that in some cases, the agent directly causes a
process which is a bodily movement (more will be said about processes below). In these
cases, the exertion is the action, just as it is with acts of will.
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It may be that Rowe is confusing two different meanings of ‘by’ in ‘I do x by doing y.’ With respect to
bodily movements, he may take ‘by’ to mean ‘in order to’ or ‘by means of,’ whereas with respect to acts of
will he may take “I do x by doing y” to mean “my doing x amounts to my doing y in which case x = y. 1
owe this point to Vere Chappell.
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Giving priority to acts of will seems to be what starts the regress problem in the
first place. We trace actions backwards to acts of will and then wonder what comes
before them, and so on. In a sense, saying that every action requires a prior act of will is
somewhat (although not perfectly) analogous to saying that every action we perform
requires that we first try to perform it. 87 Acts of will are certainly one class of actions
(and likewise sometimes trying to do something is itself an action), but we need not give
them special status. Clarke makes the following remarks:
An agent’s exercise of her causal power is simply the obtaining of this
[causal] relation between her and an event. An agent need not do
anything—if by that is meant perform some action—in order to cause
something. Thus, agent causation is not fundamentally the performance of
some special kind of action that then causes one's bodily movements.
Nevertheless, the causal power that such an account [i.e., Clarke’s agent-
causal one] attributes to agents is no more “magical” than that which we
attribute to events. For an event need not perform any action in order to
cause another event, and event causation is not fundamentally the
occurrence of some third event between cause and effect; it is
fundamentally the obtaining of a relation between the two. (Clarke 1995,
209)88
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This point comes from statements made by Gideon Yaffe in his unpublished paper, “Planning, Character
and Agent-Causation: Reid’s Third Argument for Moral Liberty.” Yaffe says:
(1) If a person succeeds in doing something voluntarily that she tried to do, she did not do
two things but only one. To try and to succeed is ontologically no different from just
succeeding. (Yaffe unpublished, 3)
Yaffe goes on to say that “it seems likely that the appearance of regress problems with agent-causalism
derives from a failure to notice that (1) is true” (3). Interestingly, he characterizes Reid’s view in the
following way. He suggests that “Reid thinks of the exerting ofpower as the familiar process of trying to
do something,” and that “the effort Reid is discussing here is something distinct from the volition that is
rightly attributed to the agent whenever she has a volition to do something,” (3). But Yaffe claims that
Reid does not classify tryings or exertions as events (3) (note that this goes against Rowe’s account above).
Specifically, Yaffe says their status is at least different from “ordinary events like actions” (3). In a
footnote, he suggests that Reid was not particularly concerned with how to classify trying—“as relation or
event, or what have you” (n. 18). Although their ontological status is somewhat mysterious, Reid believes
exertions to have real metaphysical import, according to Yaffe (3). It appears that Reid himself could then
solve the regress problem by denying that these exertions are events. But the mysteriousness of these
exertions is just what has prevented agent-causal theories from being taken seriously. Thus, even if Reid
escapes the regress this way, his view is still in some trouble.
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Apparently, some philosophers do assume that a realist conception of causes entails that there be this
third event. In an interesting paper about agent causation, Erik Wielenberg claims that “because the non-
reductivist [about causes] holds that causation is a real, positive relation—the production of the effect by
the cause—he must say that a’s causing of b does introduce a further event. The further event has a and b
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(I would merely add to Clarke’s account that sometimes we do in fact do one thing in
order to cause another, but his point is well taken that we need not always do so.) The
regress problem is solved once we realize that these exertions are not some additional
event or action that require an additional cause. These exertions of power are either the
action-event or part of the process that is the complex action.
The Individuation of Actions
Questions about acts of will and bodily actions raise the very complicated issue of
action individuation. I think we can, and should, allow for a broad range of possibilities.
Actions are diverse and complex. Whatever the agent (as an agent) directly causes is an
action (i.e., whatever enters into the agent-causal relation as the second relatum is an
action
89
). It seems plausible to suppose that the agent can enter into the causal relation
with a broad range of types of action . 90 Thus, we can and should be open-minded about
what counts as an action. Obviously there will be things extending outside the agent that
will be said to have been caused by the agent. It seems reasonable to suggest that some
of these things will not be included in the action because they will not enter into the
agent-causal relation as the second relatum—instead, they will be caused by the agent
as its constituents” (Wielenberg unpublished, 3, n. 4). I do not think the realist must multiply events in this
way.
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As Clarke points out, “agents enter into such relations [i.e., agent causation] only as first relata, never as
second relata” (Clarke 1995, 207).
"ideally the individuation of an action would be a matter for discovery, as opposed to being a matter for
decision or stipulation—we would have to find out what entered into the relation with the agent in order to
characterize it as an action. This is not to say there would be nothing to “decide.” We would still have to
decide upon the most appropriate way of interpreting or carving up reality. For example, we would have to
decide whether to look at actions or at sequences of neurons firing (more will be said about this below).
My point here is that although we can decide how to interpret any observations, we cannot simply stipulate
what enters into the causal relation with the agent. With a realist conception of causes, there will be a real
answer to the question, “what did the agent directly cause?” This is the agent’s action. But for all practical
purposes, it is impossible to have certainty about the answer.
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indirectly in virtue of the fact that something the agent did caused them. In other words,
the causal relation in these cases could be between the agent’s action and further events
or states of affairs. On my view, these further events or states of affairs are beyond the
agent’s direct control. Some might argue that this view of human action does not allow
us to identify and individuate our actions easily. But why should that job be easy?
Perhaps any theory which allows us to individuate actions easily would necessarily lead
us to do so inaccurately (due to the inherent complexity of acting).
But it is worth speculating on different sorts of actions. 1 would like to speculate
that some actions are not events, but processes. In “Causality: Production and
Propagation,” Wesley Salmon argues for the acceptance of processes as basic entities in
causality (Salmon 1993a, 155). 1 think his ideas may give us some insight into certain
types of actions. He suggests that a causal process is capable of transmitting signals or of
transmitting a mark ( 1 56). He gives the following example:
Suppose that we have a very large circular building—a sort of super-
Astrodome, if you will—with a spotlight mounted at its center. When the
light is turned on in the otherwise darkened building, it casts a spot of light
upon the wall. If we turn the light on for a brief moment, and then off
again, a light pulse travels from the light to the wall. This pulse of light,
traveling from the spotlight to the wall, is a paradigm of what we mean by
a causal process. (156)
Let us draw an (admittedly imperfect) analogy to human action. Let us suppose
that with certain actions, it does not make sense to slice things into events, but rather, to
look at the whole process. For example, raising one's arm can be seen as an action-
process rather than an action-event (such as an act of will) because the act of raising one's
arm has some duration.
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Admitting that some actions are processes rather than events allows the following
point to be made: sometimes the target of agent-causation is a whole process. Let us
return to the arm-raising example. In simple terms, I agent-cause the whole raising
process, not the first muscular contractions or the beginning of some neural sequence
(although these things are certainly part of what happens). Like the spotlight, we could
say that the agent transmits a sort of signal. And like the spotlight, this signal is
transmitted over a length of time (namely, the time it takes to raise the arm), not just to a
singular event. The intuition here is just that the agent’s causal power relates to the
whole action. 91 I am not denying that something within the agent causes the firing of
neurons or the contraction of muscles, just as Salmon is surely not denying that the
turning on of the spotlight causes the existence of light at each point between the
spotlight and the wall. The point here is that the signal is transmitted throughout the
process and the agent-causal relation holds for the whole process.
This notion of actions as processes appears to be reminiscent of a view advanced
by Anthony Kenny in Action, Emotion and Will. According to Kenny, verbs can be
divided into three categories based on their "tense-implications": static verbs (e.g.,
understand, love, be taller than), performance verbs (e.g., discover, learn, build a house,
lift), or activity verbs (e.g., listen to, ponder on, enjoy) (Kenny 1 963, 175). Kenny
observes that "states may lastfor a time, and activities go onfor a time" but "only
performances take time" (176). For example, Joe may be taller than his younger brother
for five years (until his brother hits a growth spurt, for instance). Likewise, Joe may
11
Donald Davidson suggests that “doing something that causes my finger to move does not cause me to
move my finger; it is moving my finger” (Davidson 1980b, 49-50). Although Davidson is not making a
point about processes here, his point seems to lend credence to the idea that with bodily movements what is
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listen to a Mozart symphonyfor five minutes (whereas the performance of the symphony
may take longer, and it itself may last longer). But Joe takes five years to build his house
(whereas it does not take five minutes to listen to Mozart). Kenny goes on to point out
that only performance verbs can be done quickly or slowly: "it is possible to learn French
slowly, but not to know French slowly" (176-7). Also, performance verbs "come to a
definite end and are finished," whereas "activities and states may be prolonged
indefinitely or they may cease" (177). Kenny explains that with performance verbs, A is
phi-ing implies A has not phi-ed, whereas with other verbs A is phi-ing implies A has phi-
ed (172). He gives the following examples:
if a man is building a house, he has not yet built it. . . . On the other hand,
if I am living in Rome it does not follow that I have not lived in Rome; on
the contrary, told that I am living in Rome you may at once ask me "And
how long have you lived in Rome?" (172)
Although Kenny's observations are interesting and valuable (and I do not take
issue with any of his assertions), I would like to distinguish my notion of actions as
processes from his notion of performance verbs. On my account, an action that is a
process cannot be meaningfully divided into other actions. For example, when I raise my
arm above my head, there does not seem to be much point in dividing this action into
events such as individual muscular contractions or individual motions from point A to B,
B to C, C to D, etc. The action of building a house (an example of the performance verb
category), on the other hand, can easily and meaningfully be divided into other actions
(e.g., constructing the foundation, erecting walls, nailing parts together, etc.).
Presumably, an agent directs his causal power to these smaller actions whereas he does
caused is not some prior event which then causes the movement via a causal chain; rather, the causal
relation is between agent and the bodily movement that is the action.
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not do so in the arm-raising example. 92 In fact, I do not think an agent could build a
house without intentionally performing smaller actions, whereas he could raise his arm
without intentionally performing smaller actions.
These distinctions are important. Although Kenny's observations are insightful
(and probably too often ignored), they do not do much to illuminate how an agent's
agent-causal power relates to his actions (and to be fair, Kenny probably never intended
to do so). I believe that seeing some actions as processes, on the other hand, does help us
to understand how an agent's causal power relates to his actions. But nothing about my
agent-causal view depends on the acceptance of some actions as processes.
Explanatory Value: Is Agent-Causation Reducible to Other Sorts of
Causation?
Now that we have (I hope) a better understanding of what an agent-caused action
is like, the following objection must be faced. It is sometimes claimed that agent-
causation has no explanatory role to play. If this is the case, perhaps it is reducible to
other sorts of causation. Why aren’t we just satisfied with the suggestion that when 1
cause my free action this just means that the action is caused by my unique beliefs and
desires (as opposed to being caused—irreducibly—by me)? Ifmy actions can be
explained by my desires and beliefs and agent-causation has nothing to add, why accept it
as a theory of free action?
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This is not to say that an agent could not direct his causal power to raising his arm from point A to B,
then from point B to C, etc. if he wanted to. The point is that in some cases, the agent is not directing his
causal power to these smaller actions but to the action of raising his arm above his head. Moreover, it
seems quite clear that the agent cannot direct his causal power to the firing of neurons or to certain kinds of
muscular contractions (I should make one qualification here. Some people may be able to direct
themselves toward making some sorts of muscular contractions because they know more about physiology.
But even so, it is questionable whether in the case of raising one's arm such an agent could actually contract
his muscles as an action separate from raising his arm. How would one do this other than by actually
raising it or at least trying to raise it?).
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I am suggesting that agent-causation is not reducible to event-causation (or any
other sort of causation).
93
This is in part because the sort of freedom that matters to us
(the sort required for responsibility) is not guaranteed without agent-causation (see
Chapters 3 and 4) (see also Clarke’s statement, quoted below).
But perhaps there is another reason. In “Freedom to Act,” Donald Davidson gives
a fascinating example:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding
another man on a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on
the rope he could rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief and
want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it
might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it
intentionally. (Davidson 1980c, 79)
Davidson gives the example to highlight a problem he must overcome if he wants to give
a causal analysis of free action. According to Davidson
the only hope for the causal analysis is to find states or events which are
causal conditions of intentional actions, but which are not themselves
actions or events about which the question whether the agent can perform
them can intelligibly be raised. (72)
He suggests the following analysis:
A can do x intentionally (under the description d) means that ifA has
desires and beliefs that rationalize x (under d), then A does x. (73)
Although his suggestion seems quite reasonable, his climber example leads to difficulties.
The problem is that his analysis does not account for these “wayward causal chains” (79).
It does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional. In other words, even
though the climber’s desires and beliefs rationalize his loosening his hold, it does not
follow that the climber loosens his hold intentionally. The climber’s beliefs and desires
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1 add “any other sort,” because one could claim that agent-causation is not reducible to event-causation
just because some of our actions are caused by states of affairs (such as long-standing beliefs) rather than
by events. I am saying more than this.
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cause the loosening, but not in the way they would need to in order to say that he acted
intentionally. Davidson never fully resolves the difficulty, yet insists that we not
abandon a causal theory of action (80-1 ).
The agent-causal theorist can, however, resolve the difficulty. The agent-causal
theorist explains the example by claiming that the climber does not agent-cause his
loosening of his hold. His beliefs and desires cause the loosening without him, so to
speak. Thus the climber does not act freely (or intentionally). If, on the other hand, the
climber had, contrary to the example, loosened his hold intentionally, the agent-causal
theorist could explain this by claiming that he agent-caused his loosening, together with
his desires and beliefs.
Davidson would not accept this strategy. He famously argues against agent-
causation on the grounds that it has no explanatory value. In “Agency,” he poses the
following dilemma for the agent-causal theorist:
Either the causing by an agent of a primitive action is an event discrete
from the primitive action, in which case we have problems about acts of
the will or worse, or it is not a discrete event, in which case there seems to
be no difference between saying someone caused a primitive action and
saying he was the agent. (Davidson 1980b, 52)
Davidson says that we cannot embrace horn one (that the causing of a primitive action is
a discrete event). This is because we would then be forced to decide whether this discrete
event is an action or not. If it is, then our original action was not primitive, counter to our
assumption. If it is not an action, however, we have the strange notion of “a causing that
is not a doing” (52). He goes on to say that horn two (that the causing is not a discrete
event) is just as troubling because
Then what more have we said when we say the agent caused the action
than when we say he was the agent of the action? The concept of cause
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seems to play no role. . . . What distinguishes agent causation from
ordinary causation is that no expansion into a tale of two events is
possible, and no law lurks. By the same token, nothing is explained.
(52-3)
In “Agent Causation,” Timothy O’Connor discusses Dav idson’s dilemma and
claims to avoid it. This is because, according to O’Connor’s view, the causal relation is
not between the agent and the action but, rather, “the relational complex constitutes the
action” (O’Connor 1995a, 182). Presumably, Davidson’s dilemma depends on the
assumption that “the agency theory maintains that there is an irreducible causal relation
between the agent and his (free) action" (O’Connor 1995a, 181). O’Connor’s theory,
however, does not maintain this. O’Connor appears to maintain that agents cause events,
but that these events are not their actions.
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I disagree with O’Connor’s claim that the causal relation is not between agent and
action. In fact, the power of the agent-causal view is that the causal relation is between
agent and action. That is what it means to say that the agent causes her action; and the
relation is the same as that between events (in event-causation). We can be held morally
responsible for free actions because we actually cause or determine what we do. I do not
see why we need to be pushed into claiming that the causal relation does not hold
between agent and action. Thus, I must avoid Davidson’s dilemma some other way.
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1 owe this clarification to Erik Wielenberg. In his unpublished paper, “In Defense of Agent Causation,”
he explains O’Connor’s position. He claims that on O’Connor’s view, “agents do not a-cause [i.e., agent-
cause] their actions
—
primitive or non-primitive. Primitive actions just are a-causings, and these a-
causings are in turn part of the non-primitive action” (Wielenberg unpublished, 1 1). Wielenberg also
explains that for O’Connor, “primitive actions are what the entire schema, ‘SAe’ refers to,” where ‘S’
ranges over agents, ‘A’ stands for the agent-causation relation and ‘e’ ranges over events (9). So on my
understanding, O’Connor holds that agents cause events
,
but that these events are not actions (primitive or
non-primitive). Later in his paper, Wielenberg claims that according to O’Connor, agents specifically
cause volitions (12).
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I avoid his dilemma by disagreeing with the claim (quoted above) that the concept
of cause plays no role (if we embrace horn two). What Davidson seems to miss is the
significance of the fact that when we say ‘he was the agent of the action,’ we are
presupposing a causal relation. Causation is inherent in the very concepts of agency and
action (thus, the concept of cause does play a role).
95 And if we accept a view closer to
Clarke’s, as I do (whereby event-causation and agent-causation are the same relation but
with different entities), we can say that Davidson is wrong about what distinguishes
agent-causation: what distinguishes it is that in agent-causation, as opposed to event-
causation, an agent with rational capacity and moral responsibility is entering into the
causal relation. We need not even deny the existence of some appropriate law. Clarke
suggests that “causal relations are grounded in laws of nature” and that there could be “a
law of nature to the effect that any individual who acts with such a capacity [as reflective
practical reasoning] acts with free will” (Clarke 1995, 208). Davidson’s overriding
assumption seems to be that agent-causation cannot go beyond event-causation in its
explanation of human action. I disagree.
Perhaps some would make the objection in more physical terms. Let us say a
scientist could look inside my brain and see things happening as I act. Doesn’t this show
that my picture of action is inherently flawed because clearly the scientist sees sequences
of events (and no agent-causation)? But what does the scientist really see? Let us
suppose that he sees electrical impulses moving along neural pathways. Can he really see
a series of discrete events? Most likely, the scientist will see something more akin to a
95
To be fair, Davidson does recognize that “causality is central to the concept of agency” (Davidson 1980b,
53), but he seems to deny that there is something explanatory about positing an agent as the cause of
something. This seems to be begging the question against the agent-causal theorist.
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“process” or “processes.” In any case, we (and the scientist) can interpret what is seen
and decide what it tells us about reality. Presumably scientists often must interpret their
observations (e.g., inferring certain relationships among events and making decisions
about what to count as observational evidence of some phenomenon).96 We can choose
how to slice up reality—what is crucial, though, is that if we make our slices too small
when looking for human agency, we will miss what we are looking for. We could slice
the process into events, but how small should we go? How do we individuate these
events? We run into a Zeno-like paradox with this approach whereby we will keep
dividing thus making it impossible to reach our goal.
The agent-causal theorist is sometimes accused of seeking to solve the mysteries
ofhuman action by positing something more mysterious, false, and lacking in
explanatory value. If this were the proper thing to do, the objector says, why don’t we
merely posit an “agent” tor any mystery? For example, why not posit a uranium agent to
explain the mysterious unpredictability of the decay of uranium?97 But (the agent-causal
theorist will respond) the cases are not analogous. We have prior reason to believe that
we are moral agents
—
persons who perform actions, make decisions, etc. for which we
are morally accountable. We have no reason to believe that uranium is like this. There is
no problem of free will for uranium that would be solved by the existence of a uranium
agent
.
98
96
See also n. 72 of this chapter.
97
This objection comes from comments made by Phillip Bricker.
98 We can leave open the possibility that there could be some sort of substance (but not specifically agent)
causation at work (e.g., if scientists came to believe that event-causation alone could not explain the
phenomena involved).
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Explanatory value is relative to that which we want explained. If it is the timing
alone that we are seeking to explain, event causation should be our focus (and even here,
event causation can fail due to the randomness of certain phenomena). Ifwe want to
explain the timing ofhuman actions, we look to the events occurring within (and in
relation to) the agents in question. But there is more to be explained in the realm of
human action.
So why should we believe the agent-causal picture? Clearly, we do not have to.
This is especially the case if we believe that there is no requirement for explaining certain
problems associated with human agency. But if we feel the force of certain problems,
then I say we should believe it. We should believe it if we want to know how it is that we
are both free and in control of what we do. We should believe it if we feel that things do
not just happen to us (and inside of us), but that we truly cause them. We should believe
it if we think there is a difference between doing something intentionally and
unintentionally (i.e., if we want to explain wayward causal chains). It appears that no
other views of action can account for these things. There is a considerable burden on
alternative theories to explain how these problems can be solved. Thus, it seems to me, if
we are concerned about these problems, we should believe the agent-causal view if we
can.
Even in the scientific world, there is room to postulate theories and believe things
that have not been scientifically proven if doing so solves certain theoretical difficulties
and is of some positive value. Sometimes even in the realm of science doing so is
tantamount to believing things that, at first, seem utterly mysterious, strange, and lacking
in concrete evidence. Why should we not afford the same respect to the agent-causal
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theory? Of course, none of this is to say that science (or philosophy) could not one day
rule out the possibility of agent-causation (the ability of a theory to solve problems does
not guarantee its truth). But (as is discussed further in Chapter 6), this has not happened
yet. If agent-causation turns out to be impossible, then something valuable has been lost.
Our most basic and compelling intuitions of ourselves will have turned out to be wrong."
Philosophers worry about the role of intuitions. Any given intuition is certainly
not always accurate, and not always inescapable. But intuitions are always in play
whether we admit this or not. Every scientific theory, as well as every philosophical one,
must start with certain intuitions. Sometimes we do not agree about which intuitions are
most basic. When this happens, we reach a dialectical stalemate and no argument will
do.
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It seems that in the case of agent-causation, those who dismiss it as explanatorily
useless, do not share the intuition that there are problems to be explained beyond what
would normally be considered the ‘scientific’ ones.
Clarke makes the following point about the relationship between science and the
agent-causal view (as quoted in Chapter 4):
If prediction and explanation are paradigmatic of scientific
understanding, it appears that agent causation neither contributes to nor
Timothy O’Connor makes a similar point in Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics ofFree Will. When
discussing Robert Kane’s incompatibilist non-agent-causal view, he states
If I had strong reasons to think [Kane’s view] were true, I wouldn't say that no one ever
does anything. Nonetheless, I would say that our activity comes to less than I (we)
prereflectively thought. The account gives a diminished conception of our capacity to
freely determine our own ends. (O’Connor 2000, 41-2)
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Timothy O’Connor says this about the competing intuitions at work in the compatibilist/incompatibilist
debate:
the late Alan Donagan commented recently that philosophical discussion of this issue
often resembles a “dialogue of the deaf.”...Although most of the professional
philosophers who have thought about this issue and come to a firmly held compatibilism
are unlikely to be moved by further variations on a familiar argument, my discussion is
not directed primarily at them. I am much more hopeful of persuading those without firm
convictions.... (O’Connor 2000, 5)
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detracts from such understanding. Its contribution, rather, would be to our
understanding of ourselves as moral agents. We believe, most of us, that
we are morally responsible for much of what we do. Agent causation, it
may be argued, is a condition of the possibility of morally responsible
agency. Affirming something like the view sketched here, then, would
give us an explication ofhow we can be what we seem, from the moral
point of view, to be. Importantly, the explication provided would be one
that is consistent with how we view ourselves from the scientific point of
view. (Clarke 1995, 210, his footnote omitted)
Clarke makes an important point here. If we are looking for strictly scientific
explanations and predictions of human behavior, agent-causation will not suffice
(although admittedly we would want to get clearer on what is meant by scientific
explanation in order to make this claim). Moreover, as Clarke implies, science (at least
as it is presently construed and practiced) will not suffice to explain moral agency. This
is an ‘^unsolved mystery” as far as science is concerned. Agent-causation does not
attempt to solve the mystery in scientific tenns (but also, not in anti-scientific ones
either). The difference between agent-causal theories and other theories is not that agent-
causal theories add mystery where others subtract it. The difference is that agent-causal
theories admit that it exists where others pretend that it does not.
To many, this mystery is just unacceptable. But why should it be? The mysteries
unsolved by science are the springboard for philosophical inquiry and discovery. True
understanding and explanation, if this is what we are seeking, requires embracing the
mysterious and supplementing science with philosophical examination. As Albert
Einstein is said to have claimed:
The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the
source of all true art and science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger,
who can no longer pause to wonder and stand rapt in awe, is as good as
dead: his eyes are closed.
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' The first two sentences of the quote are attributed to Einstein in Adventures ofa Mathematician by S. M.
Ulam (Ulam 1976, 289). The longer version of the quote is also attributed to Einstein.
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Let us keep our eyes open. 102
102
1 am grateful to Stephen Griffith for helpful discussions and valuable insights concerning the material in
this chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
FURTHER OBJECTIONS TO AN AGENT-CAUSAL ACCOUNT
In this chapter, I will deal with some further objections that have been made
against the agent-causal view. First, I will discuss a recent argument by Peter van
Inwagen in his article, “Free Will Remains a Mystery.” In this article, van Inwagen
argues that agent causation cannot solve the problem of free will. This is so even if one
grants that agent causation is coherent and that it in fact exists (Van Inwagen 2000, 11). I
will argue that van Inwagen’s argument is not successful. Then I will discuss a recent
manuscript by Randolph Clarke, in which he argues that there are reasons to believe that
substance causation (and thus agent causation) is not possible.
Van Inwagen’s Objection
In the second part of his paper, van Inwagen discusses the problem of free will.
He characterizes the problem in the following way:
Free will seems to be incompatible both with determinism and
indeterminism. Free will seems, therefore, to be impossible. But free will
also seems to exist. The impossible therefore seems to exist. (Van
Inwagen 2000, 11)
He claims to have already shown, via the first part of his paper, that freedom is
incompatible with determinism (I will not deal with the first part of his paper here). Then
he claims that freedom is also incompatible with indeterminism. Here van Inwagen
employs the popular argument concerning the chanciness of undetermined actions (see
my Chapter 4).
As van Inwagen notes, agent causation is embraced as a solution to the problem
of free will (Van Inwagen 2000, 11). He claims that the agent-causal view is supposed to
solve the problem of free will by claiming that if agent causation exists then freedom is in
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fact compatible with indeterminism (12). 1 agree with this characterization. Agent
causation is posited as a way of getting around the chance objection (again see my
Chapter 4). But he goes on to say that agent causation is not really a solution because it
cannot actually avoid the chance objection. Obviously, if van Inwagen is correct, that is a
major blow to my position (because I am embracing the agent-causal view as a solution
to the problem). Thus, I will argue that van Inwagen is not correct.
Van Inwagen proceeds to give a more detailed account of the chance objection by
means of an interesting example. He tells the following story:
Suppose, for example, that in some difficult situation Alice was faced with
a choice between lying and telling the truth and that she freely chose to tell
the truth—or, what is the same thing, she seriously considered telling the
truth, seriously considered lying, told the truth, and was able to tell the lie
she had been contemplating. And let us assume that free will is
incompatible with determinism, and that Alice’s telling the truth, being a
free act, was therefore undetermined. Now suppose that immediately after
Alice told the truth, God caused the universe to revert to precisely its state
one minute before Alice told the truth (let us call the first moment the
universe was in this state
‘fi’ and the second moment the universe was in
this state and then let things “go forward again.” What would have
happened the second time? What would have happened after t{! Would
she have lied or would she have told the truth? (Van Inwagen 2000, 14)
Van Inwagen claims that because Alice’s decision is undetermined, we cannot really
answer this question. He goes on to ask us to suppose that God caused the universe to
revert like this a thousand times (14). What if, after one thousand replays, we see that
Alice has lied five hundred and eight times and has told the truth four hundred and
ninety-three times (15)?
103 The suggestion van Inwagen is making is that seeing this
result leads us to believe that the decision is a matter of chance (15). He asks, “is it not
true that as we watch the replays increase, we shall become convinced that what happens
103
The numbers here add up to one thousand and one. Presumably, this is because we have counted the
original action plus the one thousand replays.
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in the next replay is a matter of chance?” (15). He claims that there is no reason to resist
this conviction (or impression as he then calls it) (15). This is because “there is nothing
we could learn about the situation that could undermine the impression” (15). In other
words, the initial conditions and state of the universe are the same for each replay. These
exact same conditions lead both to lying and to truth-telling (each about half of the time).
Thus, we are left with the following conclusion about a given replay (how about “the
seven-hundred-and-twenty-seventh?” as van Inwagen suggests; 15): “each of the two
possible outcomes of this replay has an objective, ‘ground-floor’ probability of 0.5 and
there’s nothing more to be said” (15). Finally, we are to conclude that Alice’s decision is
a matter of chance and not something that is properly termed a free action (i.e., not
something she is really able to do) (15-16).
Van Inwagen then goes on to suggest why it is that agent causation cannot solve
the problem regarding chance. He retells the Alice story with certain details filled in
—
details that are supposed to be characteristic of the agent-causal view. In this version of
the story, Alice “will either agent-cause cerebral events that, a second or so later, will
result in bodily movements that constitute her telling the truth or agent-cause cerebral
events that, a second or so later, will result in bodily movements that constitute her lying”
(Van Inwagen 2000, 16). Van Inwagen claims that we should still be convinced that
what Alice will do on the seven hundred and twenty-seventh replay is a matter of chance.
The obvious agent-causalist response is one that van Inwagen recognizes,
mentions, and attempts to dismiss (although I will argue that it is somewhat
mischaracterized and thus unfairly dismissed). The agent-causalist response, according
to van Inwagen is as follows: “if it turns out that Alice agent-causes tiuth-antecedent
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cerebral events, this will not be a matter of chance because it will be she, Alice, who is
the cause of the event ‘its coming to pass that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent
cerebral events (Van Inwagen 2000, 16). Van Inwagen dismisses this response by
asking whether there is another event that we must regard as a matter of chance. This
fiirther event is “its coming to pass that Alice agent-causes the event ‘its coming to pass
that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent cerebral events’” (17). Van Inwagen suggests
that there is a simultaneous occurrence of an infinite series of agent-caused events (17).
This simultaneous occurrence should be viewed as a mere matter of chance (17). Again,
this is because there is nothing more for us to leam (17) (also discussed above).
There are a number of things that are puzzling about van Inwagen’s argument
here. First of all, why is it not open to the agent-causal theorist to claim that in each
event mentioned, and indeed in the infinite series, the agent determines what happens? In
other words, the further event, “its coming to pass that Alice agent-causes the event ‘its
coming to pass that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent cerebral events’” (quoted above)
is also determined by Alice and is thus not a matter of chance. It is not entirely clear why
van Inwagen thinks this infinite series will undermine the agent-causal response.
Earlier in his paper, van Inwagen makes the following remarks concerning this
infinite regress:
Nor shall I raise questions about the cause of the event “its coming to pass
that Reid is the agent-cause of the antecedent brain-event.” Again, I think
Chisholm has seen what the friends of agent causation should say about
the cause of this event, to wit, that Reid was its agent-cause—and was,
moreover, the agent-cause of the event “its coming to pass that Reid is the
agent-cause of the event ‘its coming to pass that Reid is the agent-cause of
the antecedent brain-event
,
’ and so ad infinitum. Some may object to the
thesis that, as an indispensable component of his writing a certain
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sentence, Reid, without being aware of it, became the agent cause of an
infinite number of events; I don’t. (Van Inwagen 2000, 13) 104
This passage seems to suggest that van Inwagen recognizes that any of these events will
be determined (because they will be agent-caused) by the agent. It also seems to suggest
that van Inwagen does not take issue with the coherence of this infinite regress. So why
does he fail to recognize that the agent-causalist could respond as I just mentioned (i.e,
the agent-causalist could say that these “further” events are not a matter of chance
because they are also determined by the agent)? Perhaps van Inwagen’s argument
against the agent-causalist response is not based on this infinite regress, but then it is
puzzling why he makes mention of the regress at all.
But even if this regress were to cause the problem, the agent-causalist could
rescue her position. As I argue in Chapter 5, there is no reason why the agent-causalist
need accept this characterization of agent-caused action in the first place. Van Inwagen
claims that, according to the agent-causalist, Alice causes “the event ‘its coming to pass
that Alice agent-causes truth-antecedent cerebral events’” (Van Inwagen 2000, 16). On
my view, what Alice directly causes is her action. And the exertion of her causal power
just is her action. There is no multiplication of events. There is no separately occurring
event that is the agent-causing of the action.
What we need to decide, then, is whether Alice’s action, thus understood, is a
mere matter of chance. Obviously, I would say that it is not because it is determined by
Alice. Probably, van Inwagen would say that Alice’s action is a matter of chance in any
case (regardless of how we characterize agent-caused action). This is because “nothing
we could possibly learn, nothing God knows, it would seem, should lead us to distrust our
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For simplicity, I have omitted van Inwagen’s footnotes.
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initial inclination to say that the outcome of the next replay will be a matter of chance”
(Van Inwagen 2000, 17). Apparently, it is the unpredictability (even theoretically) of our
free actions that leads him to this conclusion.
At the end of his article, he gives another example:
You are a candidate for public office, and I, your best friend, know some
discreditable tact about your past that, it made public, would—and
should cost you the election. I am pulled two ways, one way by the
claims of citizenship and the other by the claims of friendship. You know
about my situation and beg me not to “tell.” I know (perhaps God has told
me this) that there exist exactly two possible continuations of the
present.
. .in one of which I tell all to the press and in the other of which I
keep silent; and I know that the objective, “ground-floor” probability of
my telling” is 0.43 and that the objective, “ground-floor” probability of
my keeping silent is 0.57. Am I in a position to promise you that I will
keep silent? (Van Inwagen 2000, 17)
The suggestion he then makes is that he (‘I’ in the scenario above) cannot “in good
conscience make the promise to keep silent because there is a good chance (about 0.5)
that he won’t. This, in turn, suggests that he should not see himself as able to keep silent
because it he believed he was able to keep silent, he could make the promise (17). The
implication then, is that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism—that is, if
indeterminism is true, as in the example, the person in the example is not free because he
is not able to keep silent (or to “tell” for that matter). Furthermore, according to van
Inwagen, agent-causation does not do anything to help (18).
Obviously, I disagree. But how can I get around van Inwagen’s interesting
examples? 1 think the solution lies in recognizing that van Inwagen inaccurately
characterizes the problem. The problem with regard to chanciness is not as he describes
it. The problem is not that free agents are theoretically unpredictable, or that there is
nothing more anyone could learn in order to “predict” what an agent is going to do. The
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problem with chanciness is that there is no control afforded to the agent. When the non-
agent-causal mdeterminist (such as Kane, discussed in Chapter 4) suggests that our free
actions are intentional terminations of indeterminate efforts of will (for example), the
problem is not that there is nothing more to learn. The problem is that how the effort is
terminated is not controlled by the agent (unless Kane, or any other such theorist, is
tacitly adopting some form of agent-causation) 105 but is controlled by an indetenninate
event within the agent, presumably one the agent is not even aware of. Agent-causal
views do avoid this problem.
There is a sense in which our free actions will necessarily be chancy. But this
sense of chanciness (although perhaps regarded as mysteriousness) does not take away
freedom in any significant way. Our free actions are chancy in just this way: sometimes
no one, not even the agent, knows what she is going to do before she does it. How does
this affect our freedom?
Let us return to the example regarding promising to keep silent. Van Inwagen
claims that if one comes to know the probabilities of the two alternatives, one cannot help
but think that the promise cannot be made (and that the person must conclude that he is
therefore not free). Is this right? I think it more likely that one would resist this
conclusion (I don’t think knowledge about ourselves in other possible worlds detracts
from our deep-seated intuitions about our own control in this one). But perhaps we can
grant his point if we add to the story. Let us suppose that the person in the story is also
told, and becomes convinced, that his actions are indeterminately caused by events within
himself (and thus, that sometimes the events lead one way, sometimes another). If the
105
This point comes from O’Connor (O’Connor 2000, 39).
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person in the story is truly convinced that his actions arise in this way, perhaps he will
come to the conclusion that van Inwagen claims. But van Inwagen claims that coming to
leam that one is the agent-cause will not help here. Why not? Won’t this knowledge just
allow us to more firmly believe what we already believe prior to any knowledge “from
above”?
Even so, such questions may not even be entirely relevant. The problem of
chanciness is not a problem concerning belief. It is a problem concerning what we are,
metaphysically, in control of. If we agent-cause our actions, we are in control of them,
regardless of whether there is anything more to leam (except that the action is agent-
caused). To assume that there must be more to leam in order to explain what we do is to
assume that only event-causes can explain anything, and thus to beg the question against
agent causation.
Clarke’s Objections
In a recent manuscript (Chapter 10 of his forthcoming book), Randolph Clarke
argues that although substance-causation (and thus agent-causation, which is a kind of
substance-causation) can be made intelligible, there are reasons to believe that it is not
possible.
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Clarke first expounds on the idea of substance-causation in order to illustrate
its intelligibility. Then he discusses objections to its possibility. Clarke ends up
dismissing many of these objections, but a few remain. According to Clarke, the
remaining objections are enough to cast doubt on the possibility of agent-causation.
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This seems to be a recent change in position, as is evident in the previous chapter (in which the article
by Clarke—Clarke 1995—was used as a show of support for the possibility of agent-causation).
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Going through Clarke’s chapter will be instructive for several reasons. 107 First, his
attempt to demonstrate the intelligibility of agent-causation helps to support my view.
Secondly, his responses to many of the objections against its possibility also help to
support my view. Lastly, ifmy view can withstand his remaining objections (as I will
argue that it can), then it will only be the stronger for it.
Clarke begins by demonstrating the intelligibility of the agent-causal view. As
discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 5), Clarke again appeals to the idea that event
causation and agent (or substance) causation will actually only differ in that the first
relatum of the causal relation will be different in each case; the causal relation itself will
be the same (Clarke forthcoming, 234). He also, again, stresses the need for espousing a
realist conception of causes (Clarke forthcoming, 235). He asserts that assuming this
realist conception will give the agent-causal view its best chance at success (235). And,
(as shown in my Chapter 5) there are independent reasons for preferring such a realist
view (Clarke forthcoming, 235). Thus, we are alleviating the mysteriousness of the view
and uncovering its intelligibility.
Clarke moves on to a discussion of causal powers. He notes that those who
accept a realist conception of causes “must be serious about causal powers” (Clarke
forthcoming, 236). He discusses two different views of causal powers. On the first view,
these powers are taken to be “intrinsic to properties,” a view he calls “dispositionalism”.
On the second view, these powers are “due to (external) relations between properties”
(236). He calls this second view “relationalism” (238). According to Clarke, either view
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The reader should note that I will not consider every point discussed by Clarke, either because such
points would take us too far afield, because they are not of direct relevance to my particular agent-causal
view, or because they have already been addressed in the previous chapter.
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“will work equally well (or equally poorly)” (236). In my discussion of properties (see
Chapter 5) 1 do not commit myself to one view or the other.
Dispositionalism is characterized as follows: “intrinsic to each property is a
certain dispositionality, a pointedness or directedness (in combination with certain
dispositional partners) to certain effects” (Clarke forthcoming, 236). 108 One of the
potential problems with this view is explaining how it is that an agent can have a causal
power that is directed towards action without being directed to any determinate degree
(237). The agent-causalist needs to say that the agent does not have “any determinate
tendency to cause an action” (237). Presumably, this is because a determinate tendency
would remove a measure of true freedom and agent control. Clarke dismisses this
objection (discussed below in the section on directedness). Another problem (a much
more serious one, according to Clarke, and one that he does not dismiss) involves how
the agent-causal property works. Clarke claims that agent-causal properties must work
differently from other properties (namely, those involved in event-causation). He asks:
How can it be, we may wonder, that while in a manifestation of the
directedness of another property, the cause is an object’s having that
property, in the case of the agent-causal property, the cause is the
substance that has the property? How can this property work differently
from others? If an agent has certain causal powers in virtue of having a
certain property, why is it not (how can it not be), as it is with other
properties, the agent’s having this property (an event) that brings about the
effect? (23 8)
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I will address this problem below (in the section on uniformity), and argue that his worry
is unfounded.
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For simplicity, I have omitted Clarke’s citation of examples and his footnote.
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Again, I have omitted his footnote.
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On the alternative view of causal powers (the relationalist view), “a given
property may carry certain causal powers in virtue of standing in contingent, irreducible
second-order relations, such as causal necessitation or probabilification, to other
properties—relations between universals rather than between particulars” (Clarke
forthcoming, 238). Moreover, “these second-order states of affairs are causal laws”
(238). One who holds this relationalist view can either hold that the causal relation is
observable (or directly perceived) or that it is an irreducible theoretical relation (239).
Clarke claims that both of these latter positions are helpful in responding to a worry
raised by Chisholm. Chisholm asked, “’What is the difference between saying, of an
event A, that A just happened and saying that someone caused A to happen?’” (as quoted
by Clarke; Clarke forthcoming, 240). Clarke suggests that according to the view that the
causal relation is observable, we can answer Chisholm’s question by saying that someone
having caused A to happen (unlike A having just happened) means that “the agent stood
to A in a relation that we directly observe in certain (specifiable) situations” (240). On
the view that the causal relation is a theoretical relation, we can answer Chisholm by
claiming that when the agent caused A (again, unlike when A just happened), “the agent
stood to A in a certain theoretical relation, the very same relation in which one event
stands to another” (240). This appears to be an advantage.
I would add that the advantage is obtained by holding a realist conception of
causes and by understanding agents to have causal power (not just by holding this
relationalist view, as Clarke seems to imply). Thus, the advantage would also hold for
the agent-causal theorist who accepts the dispositionalist view. To say that the agent
causes A, on the dispositionalist view, would differ from A just happening because when
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the agent causes A, she exerts her causal power. This instance of causation will be “a
manifestation of the directedness of a certain property (or properties)” (Clarke
forthcoming, 237).
According to Clarke, the same problems arise with the relationalist view. Again,
we have the problem of indeterminate directedness (here the directedness differs in that it
“is simply contingent, a matter of external relations of properties to each other”; Clarke
forthcoming, 240). More importantly, Clarke again raises the worry concerning how
causal powers of an agent seem to work differently from others. Specifically, Clarke
wonders “how, in virtue of standing in this relation to some other property (or properties),
the agent-causal property can confer on the substance possessing it, rather than on the
event that is the substance’s possessing it, a power to cause an effect” (240). This
problem will be addressed later (in the section concerning uniformity).
Explanation
The first objection I will discuss concerns causal explanation. The charge that is
leveled against the agent-causal view starts with the claim that a substance cannot
contribute to causal explanations (Clarke forthcoming, 249). Therefore, the argument
goes, a substance cannot be a cause (249). Although Clarke agrees with the plausibility
of the claim that in order for something to be a cause, it should contribute to a causal
explanation, he argues against this objection (250). Clarke suggests that causal
explanations can answer two kinds of questions: why-questions, and how-actually
questions (250). If this is the case, we can say that citing an agent-cause answers the
second question. It tells us how something actually occurred (by being caused by the
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agent). This is useful if the event in question could have occurred in different ways
(250).
He goes on to say that perhaps citing an agent-cause could even help us to answer
the why-question. He asks us to consider a case in which the agent (Diana) does
something that leads to tragedy. If we ask why the tragedy occurred, part of the answer
will involve citing the agent—i.e., it occurred ‘because of Diana’. We need not require
that the answer be in terms of her actions because unless we have already ruled out agent
causation, we can admit that the tragedy did literally occur because of her (Clarke
forthcoming, 251). Clarke goes on to say that even if we want to know more about why
the tragedy occurred (more than just ‘because of Diana’), this does not detract from the
explanatory nature of our original answer. This is because “causal explanations can be
true even when unilluminating or not relevant to our usual interests in seeking an
explanation” (251).
Moreover, Clarke suggests that agent-causal views are not espoused in order to
solve problems of explanation; instead, Clarke suggests, they are concerned with solving
a “problem of control” and “the issue of control is different from that of explanation”
(Clarke forthcoming, 251). Clarke rescues the agent-causal view from the objections
concerning explanation, but I think more can be done in this regard. Although I agree
with Clarke’s claim that the agent-causal view is asserted in order to solve a problem of
control, I disagree with the claim that it cannot solve problems of explanation; in fact, the
two may be more closely linked than Clarke wants to admit. As suggested in the
previous chapter, the agent-causal view has explanatory value for several reasons. One
of the crucial questions answered by the agent-causal view will be explanatorily valuable,
1 19
and will also involve the issue of control. This question is, “how is it that the agent is
both free and in control in a significant way?” The agent-causal view can explain how
this is possible.
Granted, this sort of explanation is not the causal explanation that is at issue in
the objection. But even so, it is not entirely clear that an event cause provides a complete
causal explanation either. If we want to know, for example, what caused the forest fire,
we can cite some triggering event, such as the lit match landing on the brush. But this is
not a complete causal explanation. The complete explanation will include the
surrounding circumstances, i.e., the other contributing conditions such as the presence of
oxygen, the dryness of the brush, etc. (mentioned previously). There is a natural bias
towards the triggering event as ‘ the cause’ because the effect is noticed as something
temporal—i.e., the fire began at a specific point in time. And part of what we want to
know is why the fire began at that time. But it is not at all clear that that is all we want to
know, or that these other contributing conditions should be subordinate. 1
1,1
Don’t we also
want to know about the other conditions that led to the fire? Likewise, in the case of the
occurrence of the tragedy, we want to know why it happened when it did, but we also
want to know more generally why it happened at all. The former question can only be
answered by appeal to temporal things (e.g., events occurring inside Diana). The latter
question, however, can be answered by appeal to Diana’s agent-causal power. The
tragedy did occur, as Clarke points out, ‘because of Diana.’ This is explanatorily
significant (and even in a causal way). Had Diana not exerted her causal power so as to
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These points came from a conversation with Stephen Griffith (they are also discussed in Chapter 5).
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cause the tragedy, it might not have occurred. 1 1
1
As Clarke suggests, “unless we
presuppose that no substance can be a cause, it is far from clear that citing a substance
can never contribute to any sort of causal explanation” (Clarke forthcoming, 251).
Probability
The next objection I will consider concerns probability. The problem for the
agent-causal view is that it appears that event-causes can affect the objective probabilities
of their effects (before the effects occur) but that agent-causes cannot (Clarke
forthcoming, 254-5). But Clarke claims that he does not believe that causation can be
reductively analyzed in terms of probabilities (255); after all, we are assuming a realist
conception of causes here. He notes that event-causes do not always make their effects
more likely. As Clarke points out, “even an undetermined cause may, with its
occurrence, leave the probability of a later effect unchanged; and there is reason to think
that a cause may even, with its occurrence, decrease the probability of an event that it
then causes” (255, his footnotes omitted). But Clarke nevertheless maintains that it does
seem plausible to suppose that event-causes “have something to do with objective
probabilities” (255). It appears to be important for this objection that the cause affect the
probability of what it causes before this event occurs. Clarke claims that “if a substance
directly causes an event, it brings the probability of that effect to 1
,
but only when the
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In his discussion of the ‘how-actually’ question, Clarke suggests that agent-causation answers that
question because it “tells us how something that could have been brought about without substance
causation was in fact brought about in this case. (Diana’s decision, had she lacked an agent-causal power,
might have been brought about only by events. . .)” (Clarke forthcoming, 250). This points to why I say,
“might not have occurred” (instead of “would not have occurred”)—because it could have been brought
about in some other way. But I think the fact that the tragedy might not have occurred without Diana or
even that it might have occurred in some other way points to more than an answer to a ‘how-actually’
question. We may want to know why the tragedy occurred (in this way) and our answer will not just be
‘because of Diana,' but will be ‘because Diana has agent-causal power which she exerted on that occasion.’
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effect occurs” (255), whereas an event-cause supposedly has an effect on probability
before the caused event occurs (255).
Clarke goes on to explain why substance-causes cannot affect probabilities in this
way. He claims that the substance has no effect because it is the acquisition (by the
substance) of some property at some time (an event) that affects the probability. Thus,
“there is nothing left for [the substance] to do in this regard” (Clarke forthcoming, 256).
Apparently, when some event, x, occurs that will act as a cause of another event, y, x will
affect the probability ofy before y even happens. In the case of a substance, s, on the
other hand, it is the event, a, of acquiring some new property at a time, that would affect
the probability of event b (before it happens).
I find this objection puzzling. First of all, it is not entirely clear that the same
objection could not be made of an event-cause. In some circumstances, isn’t it
conceivable that the event affects the probability only in virtue of its acquiring a certain
property? Clarke would argue that this is not the case, because for Clarke, it appears that
an event just is “the acquisition. . .of some property at some time” (Clarke forthcoming,
256, quoted above). I am not certain that this is the only, or even the best, way to
understand the nature of an event (this will be discussed further in the section on
uniformity).
But even if we grant that the same objection (that it is the acquisition of a property
that affects the probability) cannot be made of an event, is it really the case that event-
causes always have this effect on probabilities? Is it the case that x always has this effect
on the probability ofy before y occurs? If causes cannot be reduced to probabilities, as
Clarke suggests, and some causes actually leave the probability of their effects
122
unchanged (see quote above), in what sense does x affect the probability of beforehand
in these cases? We can assign a probability to the occurrence ofy upon the occurrence of
x, but if this probability is the same as before the occurrence of x, there does not seem to
be anything for x to do in this regard (to use Clarke’s own phrase—see quote above).
Moreover, if causes cannot be reduced to probabilities, it does not seem of value to insist
upon this requirement. Clarke can only suggest the following:
But is it really a requirement of something’s being a cause that it be this
sort of entity? There is, I think, considerable plausibility to the claim. If
some entity has a tendency to cause a certain effect, it thereby seems to be
the kind of thing that is capable, in some circumstances at least, of
influencing the chance of that effect, even prior to the occurrence of the
affect. Granted, this claim may fairly be said to lack luminous self-
evidence. Perhaps a good theory of causation will support the suggested
requirement, but no such theory is itself immensely certain. (Clarke
forthcoming, 256)
I take it that Clarke’s suggestion is that the requirement is as follows: it is not that causes
must affect probabilities on all occasions, but that they should at least be the sort of thing
that is able to in some circumstances. But why should this be?
There does not seem to be a non-question-begging way to argue that causes must
be the kind of entity that has this effect on probabilities. The only way to insist on this is
to argue that causes must be events. 112 Clarke claims that the reason that substances do
not seem to have this effect on probabilities is that “substances, unlike events, do not
occur. They are not dated entities—they are not in time—in the way that events are dated
entities” (Clarke forthcoming, 255). So it is only events that can have this effect on
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Clarke makes an analogous but distinct point when he says, “it might be objected that, unless we
presuppose that substances cannot be causes, we have no grounds for holding that they cannot have the
indicated influence on probabilities” (Clarke forthcoming, 255). He then goes on to give grounds for
holding this (as discussed above).
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probabilities. But how do we get from here to the claim that causes must be able to effect
probabilities (without presupposing that events are the only kinds of causes)?
Perhaps the intuition is that probabilities and causes are always linked. But this
does not seem to be right. Isn’t it the case that sometimes something can affect the
probability of another thing that it does not cause?
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If so, the link between causes and
probabilities is somewhat weakened and it appears that an independent argument ought to
be given for the claim that causes must be inexorably linked to probabilities in the way
Clarke requires. I do not see any such argument.
Structure
Clarke goes on to discuss an objection concerning structure. He ends up
dismissing one version of the objection and supporting the versions that are “related to
that concerning probability” (Clarke forthcoming, 263). It is my hope, then, that my
arguments against the objection concerning probability will undennine these versions of
the objection concerning structure. But let us consider all versions of the objection.
Clarke begins by giving his account of events and of substances. For him, events
are “structured particulars, particulars’ (such as objects’) having properties (or standing in
relations) at times” (Clarke forthcoming, 256). On his account, substances are particulars
but “are not so structured” (256). It is not entirely clear to me what a substance is like
according to Clarke. But let us move ahead to consider the objection. The objection is
that perhaps only particulars that are structured in the way that events are can act as
causes (256-7).
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For example, suppose that scientists were to discover that men who developed receding hairlines were
statistically much more likely to develop heart disease. Suppose further that there was no causal link
between these two things; the correlation was instead due to the fact that both were caused by the same
underlying disorder. Couldn’t we then say that developing a receding hairline increased the probability of
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The first version of the objection is related (as mentioned above) to the one
concerning probability. The suggestion is that perhaps the structure of an event, which
has “a time as a constituent,” is such that it can “have the indicated impact on the
objective probabilities of future events;” a substance, on the other hand, cannot because it
is not structured so as to have a time as a constituent (Clarke forthcoming, 257). And
being in time in this way is necessary for being a cause (257).
He goes on to suggest in a related vein that “having a property as a constituent” is
also required so as to have the crucial effect on probabilities (Clarke forthcoming, 257).
The implication is that a substance does not have a property as a constituent (although,
again, his account of what a substance is has not been made explicit as far as I can tell).
As discussed above, it is the having of a property at a time that affects the probability and
not the substance itself. Both of the previous versions of the objection rely on the
dubious claim that affecting probability is a requirement of being a cause. Thus, based on
my previous rejection of this claim, I can reject these versions of the objection
concerning structure.
His next version of the objection is the one he rejects. This version is supposed to
“provide independent support for the objection that a cause must have the structure of an
event” (Clarke forthcoming, 257). The objection is that when some object is a cause (his
example is a knife which causes something’s being cut), it is a cause in virtue of having
certain properties (while its other properties are irrelevant) (257). Thus “it may be
thought that it is not the knife itself but an entity with a different structure—the knife’s
having the relevant properties—that is the cause, strictly speaking” (257). So perhaps,
developing heart disease even though it in no way caused it? (1 would like to thank Kristopher Denio for
this example).
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the objection goes, only entities with that structure can act as causes (257-8). Clarke
dismisses this objection for the following reasons:
When one object stands in the relation bigger than to another, it does so in
virtue of having a certain property (its size); its other properties (its color,
for example) are quite irrelevant to its standing in this relation to the other
object. Still, it is the object, not the object’s having that size, that stands in
the relation bigger than to the other object. Hence the fact that an object
stands in a causal relation to another in virtue of having certain of its
properties does not alone suffice to show that it cannot be the object itself,
rather than something with the structure of an event, that is the cause.
(258, his footnote omitted)
Thus, the final version of the structure objection can be dismissed as well.
Directedness
Finally, Clarke comes back to the issue of directedness (as mentioned in the
discussion of dispositional and relational properties). One of the issues concerning
directedness is that agents are supposed, on the agent-causal view, to cause things in
virtue of their having properties that are directed towards effects to no determinate
degree. Some might see this as problematic because they believe that probabilistic event
causation involves directedness of a determinate degree (“greater than 0 and less than 1 ”)
(Clarke forthcoming, 258). If we accept a non-reductive, realist account of causes,
however, then it does not seem that event causation must be like this, according to Clarke
(258). Thus, there is no peculiarity of substance causation on these grounds.
Next, Clarke discusses a different issue involving directedness. There appears to
be another supposed peculiarity with agent-causes. According to the agent-causal
account (or at least certain versions, including mine), the substance (i.e., the agent) causes
“all and only events that are (appropriately) caused also by such events as its having
certain reasons and certain intentions” (Clarke forthcoming, 259). The properties that
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enable the agent to cause things, then, would be directed or disposed to cause only those
things that are also caused by certain other events (259). The objection, then, is that this
is a strange sort of directedness that does not, at first, seem plausible and would be
peculiar to agent-causation.
But, as Clarke points out, the same could be said of event-causation. Clarke gives
the example whereby “an increase of temperature and an influx of oxygen, in a certain
situation, either together cause combustion or neither causes it” (Clarke forthcoming,
259).
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Thus, even with event-causation there appears to be directedness that involves
the occurrence of other events. The objections concerning directedness, then, lose their
force when we notice that event-causation can involve these kinds of directedness as
well.
Uniformity
Clarke seems to consider the next objection to be the most damning to the
possibility of substance-causation. This objection centers on the idea that “the way
causation works” should be uniform. If substance-causation occurs, according to this
objection, it does not work in the same way as it does in event-causation (Clarke
forthcoming, 260). Although it does not appear that he makes it entirely explicit in this
section of his chapter, 1 believe that Clarke supposes a lack of uniformity for the
following previously stated reason: how is it that in the case of agent (or more generally,
substance) causation “the cause is the substance that has the property” while in the case
of event-causation “the cause is an object’s having that property” (238)? This claim
appears to be based on Clarke’s construal of an event as ‘the having of a property at a
114
1 make similar points in Chapter 5 regarding contributing conditions and partial causes.
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time’. Thus, when a property confers its power on an agent, or substance, the substance
itself causes it, whereas when a property confers its power on an event, the ‘having of the
property’ (i.e., the event) causes it.
Clarke goes on to admit that causation can vary in some ways, but that this sort of
variation “is a more fundamental matter, one of the ontological category of causes”
(Clarke forthcoming, 260). Obviously, it would be question-begging to suggest that only
events can be causes and thus causes must be in the same category. I do not think Clarke
is guilty of this. But 1 will admit that his claim seems a bit surprising given his previous
commitment to the idea that there is no problem understanding the way substance-
causation works. As he states earlier in his chapter, “there is no more to ‘how [substance
causation] works’ than there is to how an instance of (direct) event causation works”
(235, his footnote omitted) because the relation is the same. Apparently, Clarke is
requiring more uniformity than just the obtaining of the same relation in both cases.
Clarke admits that uniformity could be achieved if one claimed that all causation
is actually substance causation. As Clarke points out, this move is made by Thomas Reid
(who says that all causation is more specifically agent causation). It is also made by
medieval Aristotelians, and contemporary philosophers such as Byerly, Swinburne, and
Lowe (Clarke forthcoming, 261). Clarke claims that this proposal is unsatisfactory
because “familiar instances of causation are best understood as causation by events, in
part for reasons discussed in some of the preceding sections” (261). Although this does
not appear to be a very strong argument, I will grant his point here because I do not think
this move needs to be made in order to avoid the uniformity objection. 1 15
115 To be fair, Clarke further discusses the issue in a footnote (Clarke forthcoming).
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So how does the agent-causal theorist avoid the uniformity objection? First of all,
there is not much of an argument given as to why causation must be uniform beyond the
basic intuition that “it is simply incredible that causation might work in such different
ways” (Clarke forthcoming, 260). Thus, one could claim that they do not need to be
uniform (except in that they involve the same relation). I see no further argument in
Clarke’s chapter which would serve to explain the need for uniformity.
But what if we grant that Clarke’s intuition concerning uniformity is correct?
Then what options are left for the agent-causal theorist? Perhaps we ought to consider
what sorts of uniformity should be required of a relation. Uniformity of ontological
category should not be required (although Clarke seems to imply that it should be—see
quote above). The spatiotemporal relation, for example, can hold between things of
different categories, such as objects and events. 1 16 The main sort of uniformity at issue,
then, seems to concern how causation works in each case.
This brings us back to the worry about the conferral of causal power (discussed
above). Clarke sees a real problem in that for substance-causation causal power is
conferred on the substance itself in virtue of having certain properties but for event-
causation it is just the having of a property at a time (the event). There are a number of
options open to the agent-causal theorist. In the first place, the agent-causal theorist need
not accept Clarke’s assumption that an event is just the having of a property at a time. 1 17
If we reject this view of events, there does not seem to be a problem with uniformity (as
discussed below).
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Again, this example comes from Jonathan Schaffer (see Chapter 5, n. 69).
1 17
It is my understanding that although Jaegwon Kim construes events this way, others, such as Davidson
and Quine, do not (see Lombard 1996, 159).
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Clarke makes it clear that the problem does not reside just in the conferral of
power on a substance (but, rather, in the fact that this does not also happen with events).
For instance, during his discussion of structure, Clarke suggests that although a relation
obtains due to certain properties of an object and not others (e.g., an object is bigger than
another due to its size but not its color; Clarke forthcoming, 258, quoted above), this does
not point to the fact that the relation does not obtain between the first object and the
other. Thus there is no problem in the conferral of causal power on a substance. The
problem is again the problem of uniformity—i.e, the problem that this does not occur
with events. But it does not seem clear to me that this could not occur with events. If we
reject the view that an event is just the having of a property at a time, it seems plausible
to suppose that an event causes another event in virtue of its having certain properties but
not in virtue of its having other properties (and that it is still the event that stands in the
causal relation).
Clarke seems to be suggesting that in the case of event-causation we can pick out
just those properties that bring about an effect and identify them as the event (that which
caused the said effect); with substance-causation, on the other hand, the suggestion is that
we identify the whole substance as the cause (even though it is the cause in virtue of only
some of its properties). As Clarke suggests about the relation ‘bigger than,’ although the
relation holds in virtue of only certain properties and not others, we still say that the
whole object stands in that relation. But why can’t this be true of event causation? For
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example, perhaps the event in question has the property of being loud or bright.
1 18
These
sorts of properties need not have any bearing on that event’s causing a future event. 1 19
There appears to be some inconsistency in what Clarke suggests about events. In
discussing a different objection (concerning time), Clarke claims that events have
temporal parts and that substances do not (Clarke forthcoming, 253). The objection
under consideration (concerning time) has to do with the following question: “how can it
be. . .that the cause existed. ..at some earlier time and did not bring about the effect then?”
(253). A substance would supposedly do so whereas an event would not. 120 Clarke
considers “whether an event can cause an effect at a certain time even though that event
was occurring (it had temporal parts occurring) prior to the time at which it caused that
effect” (253). If so, then the objection does not fare well. Clarke appears to answer the
question in the affirmative (although he admits it is not exactly analogous to the
substance causation case) and thus dismisses the objection.
He suggests the following possibility:
Suppose that El_ occurred over the interval tl to t2, where td is
significantly prior to t2, and E2 was caused at t3, which was not earlier
than t2. Could it be that IH
,
and not just the temporal part of Ed occurring
at t2, caused E2 ? It seems that this might be so if the constituent property
of Ed, and the property that is causally relevant in the production of E2, is
a property that required, in this case, the interval from td to t2 to be
instantiated. (Clarke forthcoming, 254, his footnote omitted)
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1 owe these examples to Stephen Griffith. We might add here that if one believes (as van Inwagen is
said to; see Lombard 1996, 159) that the causes of an event are essential to it, these might also count as the
sorts of properties of an event that need not contribute to its causing a later effect.
1 19
Perhaps someone who accepts Clarke’s view of events would say that these properties do not apply to
the event in question but apply to separate (even simultaneous) events.
120
1 discuss a similar objection in Chapter 5.
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What is puzzling about this passage is, again, the characterization of an event. In what
sense can an event be “the having of a property at a time”? It seems that (if the example
is possible) it must either be the case that the property is “had” over an interval, in which
case it seems that it is not “at a time”, or it must be the case that Ef begins before it has
the property (i.e, before it is instantiated), in which case Ed is no longer identical to the
having of that property. 121 It appears that in this example, the causal power is conferred
on the event. It is difficult to reconcile this argument with his claims about the nature of
events.
Perhaps in the interest of charity, we should ignore any apparent inconsistencies
and even .grant Clarke’s claim about events. Is there then a uniformity problem as Clarke
suggests? Obviously, there will not be complete uniformity—the first relata of the two
relations (in event-causation versus that in agent-causation) will be from different
ontological categories. But as we have already seen, this kind of uniformity should not
be required. Thus we should return to what appears to be Clarke’s main worry—i.e., the
uniformity of the conferral of causal power. I do not see why there is a problem, even
when we grant him his view of events. Can’t we say in the case of event-causation that
the power is still conferred upon the event itself even though the event just is the having
of the property? If we dismiss that the power belongs to the event itself, then we must
dismiss that events (as events) can actually cause things. Surely that is not something
Clarke would want to do.
121
Perhaps Clarke would say that “at a time” can be expanded to mean “during a time” or “over an interval
of time.” But I do not think this is something Clarke wants to say because he is using this example to argue
that an event can exist prior to what it causes and not yet bring about its effect (if it really “has” the
property during that interval, then why would it fail to bring about its effect right away?).
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Discovery
The last objection I will consider has to do with discovery. The objection is that
substance causation could never be discovered—that is, no evidence could ever be given
for its existence (Clarke forthcoming, 261). The underlying intuition appears to be that it
ought to be discoverable if it really exists. Furthermore, the objectors would maintain
that there is evidence for event causation in the patterns that we find in what occurs
(261).
Clarke suggests that any evidence that points towards agent-causation, is really
just evidence that agents’ having certain properties cause certain behaviors (Clarke
forthcoming, 261). Thus, the implication is that the evidence is really just evidence of
event-causation occurring within agents (the implication comes from applying Clarke’s
notion of events). I will put aside my misgivings about this notion of events and grant
Clarke’s point that there is no direct evidence for agent-causation.
i: “
According to Clarke, some agent-causal theorists (such as O’Connor and
Campbell) claim that we have internal evidence of agent-causation—“in the way things
seem to us when we act” (Clarke forthcoming, 262). Clarke claims that this is not
plausible given that the concept of substance-causation “is a sophisticated philosophical
construct” which would not be apparent to ordinary agents in their ordinary experiences
(262). I will (reluctantly) grant this point as well (although I believe that we do have
strong inclinations for believing that we do cause things as agents, not just in virtue of
events occurring inside of us). I will grant it mostly because I do not have a sufficiently
122 We should here reiterate Clarke’s claim (to which I agree) that even those who take the causal relation
to be real and observable (such as Armstrong) need not require that agent causation is directly experienced
(Clarke forthcoming, 239, discussed above).
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detailed account of what it means for something to count as evidence of a given
phenomenon.
Even granting these points, however, there is not really a problem for agent-
causation. Clarke himself dismisses the objection because, as he says, “plainly, there can
exist things that are unknowable by us” (Clarke forthcoming, 262). Undiscoverability
does not equal impossibility (262). I agree with Clarke here, although I do admit that this
point is not uncontroversial. But it seems to be extreme hubris on the part of human
beings to assume that anything that is possible must be discoverable by us.
Perhaps the intuition underlying this objection is really the concern about
explanation. If we cannot discover agent-causation, how can it help us understand
anything about our world? But this concern is misplaced. The possibility of agent-
causation has explanatory value apart from any evidence that it exists (see the objection
regarding explanation above, as well as Chapter 5). A discovery can indeed help us to
understand certain things about the world, but so can the postulation of something that
has not yet been (or cannot be) discovered (e.g., strings or superstrings in contemporary
physics). These postulations have explanatory value even before there is any evidence.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the objections to agent-causation do not hold up under scrutiny.
Van Inwagen’s objections concerning the failure of agent-causation to solve the problem
of free will are not successful. The objections discussed by Clarke are also not
successful. Clarke himself dismisses many of the objections. I have argued that the
objections he does not dismiss do not work either. The failure of these objections,
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together with the arguments made in previous chapters, leaves the agent-causal view
unscathed (and perhaps even stronger).
123
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Special thanks to Randolph Clarke for sending me a copy of his manuscript and allowing me to cite it in
this chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
Obviously, there is no way to prove the truth of agent-causation. As Clarke points
out:
There is no observational evidence that could tell us whether our world is
an indeterministic world with agent causation or an indeterministic world
without it. We do not introspectively observe agent causation, and even
highly improbable behavior could occur in a world without agent
causation. (Clarke 1995, 210)
Perhaps the best one can ask for is an argument for its plausibility and superiority over
other positions. I will reiterate that not only is agent-causation intuitively plausible, but it
also has many advantages over other competing views. In this chapter, I will illustrate
the significance of Chapters 2 through 4 to my project as a whole. I will then make some
remarks about non-agent causes. Finally, I will conclude with my argument for why an
agent-causal view should be accepted.
Chapter 2: Freedom and Alternative Possibilities
In Chapter 2, 1 argue that Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP are successful.
Thus the principle that states that one is morally responsible for what she does only if she
could have done otherwise (Frankfurt 1988a, 1), is false. An agent need not have a
robust alternative in order to be responsible. The value of Frankfurt’s counterexample is
in the way it highlights our intuitions about responsibility. It pulls us out of the rut of
‘could have done otherwise’ and focuses our energies on the actual sequence of action.
His example allows us to understand that what is relevant is the way the action ensues in
actuality and the control the agent has over it. What matters to us for responsibility is
whether the agent is the true originator of the action in the actual sequence. On my view,
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this sort of origination and control is agent-causal. Recall the “flicker of freedom”
objection, in which some incompatibilists have tried to revive PAP by suggesting that
there really is some alternative in every Frankfiirt-style example (e.g., doing it on one 's
own vs. doing it as a result ofintervention). I argue, with Fischer, that these flickers are
not robust enough to ground responsibility. But note the strong intuition lurking here—
i.e., that there is significance to doing something on one’s own. Agent-causation allows
us to explain this: if the action is agent-caused it has been done on one ’s own and is thus
something the agent is responsible for. It is not the flicker that grounds his responsibility,
but his agent-causation. Thus, I am suggesting replacing PAP with something better: a
person is morally responsible for what she does only if she agent-caused her action.
The reader should note what this principle does not say. Like PAP, it does not
give sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. Many other factors (besides agent-
causation) must often be present in order for the agent to be morally responsible. For
example, take a case of coercion. Suppose someone agent-causes her action of giving in
to a blackmailer's demand. We might say here that the action, although agent-caused, is
not one for which the agent is morally responsible
.
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My new principle also does not mention responsibility for consequences or
omissions, but only mentions actions (i.e, "what she does"). The implication appears to
be that we are never responsible for consequences or omissions (because these are not
things that are agent-caused and agent-causation is a requirement for moral
124 There miSht be - however, ways of viewing the agent as responsible in such cases. Frankfurt makes a
valuable suggestion in “Coercion and Moral Responsibility.” He claims that in order for coercion to
absolve someone of responsibility, it must compel him to act as he does (Frankfurt 1988b, 36). We might
be able to say that when true compulsion is involved, the agent does not agent-cause her action. Thus, we
can say that there are different levels of coercion, some which compel and thus absolve of responsibility
and some which do not. Or, we could say as Frankfurt does, that all coercion involves compulsion, but
not all duress is coercion” (37). The difference seems to be merely linguistic.
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responsibility). This is not what the principle says, however. The principle does not say
"a person is morally responsiblefor anything only if she agent-caused it," but instead
limits its scope to actions. Although I argue elsewhere (see Chapter 3) that we are not
directly responsible for consequences (and that actions are the main target of
responsibility), it is important to note that my view does not limit moral responsibility to
• 125
actions.
But to return to my main point, once PAP is replaced with my new principle, we
can explain the significance of doing something on one's own.
Chapter 3: Compatibilism and Incompatibilism
Obviously, the idea of doing something on one ’s own could be explained by
appeal to other things besides agent-causation. I believe Fischer and Ravizza give it a
compatibilist spin with their notion of guidance control. This notion involves the history
of the action and whether it comes from an agent’s own reasons-responsive mechanism.
In Chapter 3, 1 discuss their view and argue that the kind of control required for
responsibility (and the kind highlighted by Frankfurt-style counterexamples) is not as
they say it is: what is required is, instead, an incompatibilist kind of control. I argue that
guidance control is not enough for responsibility, because it allows for scenarios in which
a person is morally responsible (on their view) even though she has been programmed to
act a certain way (a situation in which she has taken responsibility for her previously
programmed “mechanism” and has made it “her own”). Intuitively, this is the wrong
result. I believe that the only way to obtain the correct result is to rely on some form of
incompatibilist control. Guidance control is not enough for moral responsibility because
125
I would like to thank Owen Herring for comments he made at a talk of mine. These comments inspired
me to reflect on responsibility for things other than actions and to clarify the scope of my principle.
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it does not require that the agent be the true origin of her action. Thus, it is not that an
agent need have robust alternatives, but simply that the agent be the free source of what
she does. Guidance control does not ensure this because it allows for scenarios in which
there is another source. The burden is on the compatibilist to show how such a view
could enable the agent to be the ultimate source of her action. Thus, the stage is set for
asserting an incompatibilist view.
Chapter 4: Kinds of Incompatibilism
It is my view that agent-causation is superior to incompatibilist views that do not
employ agent-causation (I am referring to these latter views, in general, as indeterminist
views). The reason for this has to do with intelligibility. Although Robert Kane makes a
valiant effort to assert an indeterminist view that solves the intelligibility problem and
avoids agent-causation, I think in the end his view fails. In fact, it is difficult to see how
any indeterminist view could succeed. What is required for the kind of freedom relevant
to moral responsibility is a sort of control that only agent-causation provides.
Indeterminist views, such as Kane’s, severely limit the control the agent has over his
action by placing too much weight on indeterminate processes and by failing to allow the
action to be determined by the agent. It is not intelligible to hold an agent morally
responsible when his action is not determined by him. Agent-causation allows an agent
to determine his (free) action, not merely influence it or make it more likely—and this
occurs without the agent being determined to do so by other factors. Thus freedom and
intelligibility are achieved.
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A Word About Non-Agent Causes
On my view, just as there need not be total freedom to do otherwise, there also
need not be total freedomfrom non-agent causes. The existence of prior non-agent
causes can fit in quite well with the agent-causation view. For instance, the causal
influences on the agent’s action can be probabilistic and thus need not necessitate what
the agent does. As Clarke points out, “probabilistic causation is not the threat to free will
that causal necessitation is” (Clarke 1995, 204). Also, as discussed in previous chapters,
these sorts of causes could be seen as contributing (and not in themselves sufficient)
causes. These causes do somewhat limit what an agent can do, however. But this is not
usually a threat to the kind of freedom that matters to responsibility. Again, as Clarke
suggests,
the occurrence of certain prior events will be a necessary condition of an
agent’s causing a certain event. Absent those prior events, the later event
will not be naturally possible, and an agent can cause only what is
naturally possible. (Clarke 1995, 204)
For example, it will be necessary that the agent was bom, became an agent, etc. It may
be necessary that the agent came to be in a certain place at a certain time in order for him
to be able to cause something (e.g., in order for an agent to punch someone, it is
necessary for him to be in the same place as that person at the same time). But it is only
when prior causes come together to determine or necessitate what an agent does that they
take away the relevant sort of freedom. In these cases, there is no room left for the agent-
cause. Even though we will often say in such cases that the agent “causes” something,
the causal relation really holds between the factors and the action, not the agent and the
action. We can still, however, retain our usage of ‘cause’ without admitting that there is
agent-causation in these cases.
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These points fit nicely with our intuitions. We feel strongly that in certain cases,
prior factors control an agent’s action. For example, suppose we are convinced that the
kleptomaniac is truly compelled to steal—i.e., he has an illness of sorts that necessitates
his stealing under certain circumstances. If we are convinced that this is the nature of
kleptomania, then we are also convinced that the kleptomaniac is not morally responsible.
On my view (assuming that this is the truth about kleptomania), he did not agent-cause
his action. His action was caused by him only in a manner ofspeaking. Strictly
speaking, the causal relation held between compelling psychological factors and his
action. Agent-causation allows us to explain the difference between the actions of the
true kleptomaniac and the actions of the teenager who shoplifts on a dare. Certain factors
influenced the teenager (e.g., peer pressure, upbringing, etc.), but presumably did not
necessitate her action. She is responsible because her action was agent-caused. The
causal influences in her case did not crowd out her agent-causal ability. 126 Sometimes, of
course, an agent will act spontaneously and irrationally. Agent-causation allows for this
possibility, too. This is because the agent need not act according to these influences. 127
Why Agent Causation Should be Accepted
Many factors serve to make agent-causation superior to other views. The
following argument for agent-causation is adapted from an argument made by Clarke
(Clarke 1995, 210-1 1):
128
6
Ifwe were brought to believe that the teenager was truly compelled by certain factors, then we would nolonger hold her responsible. Likewise, if we were to be led to the view that kleptomania is not an illness of
true compulsion, then we might hold the kleptomaniac responsible.
Again, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which an agent has no reasons (either conscious or
unconscious) for what she does. It is most likely that something about the agent’s circumstances or past
plays a role in her acting “spontaneously” and “without reason.”
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(1) we are morally responsible agents;
(2) if we are morally responsible agents, then we sometimes act
with free will;
(3) if we sometimes act with free will, then determinism is false;
(4) if determinism is false and still we sometimes act with free
will, then we agent-cause some of our actions; and
(5) therefore, we agent-cause some of our actions.
Support for premises (1) and (2) is largely intuitive. We must start somewhere and (1)
seems as good a place to start as any. There is no doubt that we do hold agents morally
responsible, and strong intuitions lead us to believe that these practices reflect the
metaphysical facts. As for premise (2), this stems from the basic intuition that praise and
blame are not fairly placed on one who lacks control (and control requires some sort of
freedom). Theologians have wrestled with a version of this issue. How can a benevolent
God justly hold one accountable for one’s sins if these sins are somehow necessitated by
God’s plan? In everyday life, if we come to believe that someone lacked control, we
cease to hold her responsible.
With regard to the remaining premises, Clarke claims that
the crucial steps of the argument are, of course, the rejection of
compatibilism and of nonagent-causal libertarian views. What inclines
many of us to follow those steps, I believe, is that we find unsatisfactory
any view of free will that allows that everything that causally brings about
an agent’s action is itself causally brought about by something in the
distant past. Certainly any freedom of the will that we enjoy on such a
view, if not a complete fraud, is a pale imitation of the freedom that is
characterized by an agent-causal account. (Clarke 1995, 211)
My previous chapters are an attempt to fill in these crucial missing elements of the
argument. I suggest why we should reject compatibilism and why we should reject
nonagent-causal libertarian views. Compatibilist control is not enough because it does
128
Specifically, I have added "sometimes" to premises (2) - (4) and "some of' to premise (4). I have also
replaced his "(5) if our acting with free will requires that we agent-cause our actions, then that freedom is
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ensure that the agent is the true free source of her action. Nonagent-causal libertarian
views do not work because they cannot make free and responsible action intelligible
(This is because the agent does not determine his free action). Thus, by process of
elimination, an agent-causal view is the view to accept. But furthermore, although
philosophers are skeptical of our pre-philosophical, man-on-the-street intuitions, I think
such intuitions are quite powerful in this context and lead us to agent-causation. It is
usually quite clear to the non-philosopher that we are influenced i
certain factors, and that we determine what we do.
but not necessitated by
As Thomas Reid insightfblly points out (mentioned above), we start to believe in
causation in the first place because of our own causal powers. We have very strong
intuitions about our ability to cause things and our determination of our own actions. We
also have strong intuitions about being influenced, but not necessitated, by outside
factors. Many philosophers do not put much faith in such intuitions (some even deny that
we have them). Although I agree that we always need to be wary, I also think that some
of these intuitions are fundamentally important to us. In fact, if Reid is correct, much of
our knowledge of the world comes to us as a result of such intuitions. If we did not
recognize our own causal powers, we would never be able to formulate ideas about
causation in the external world. And as even Hume recognizes, the notions of cause and
effect are central to our understanding of this world.
The point here is not that these intuitions are infallible or inescapable, but that
they are strong enough and fundamental enough to allow them to bolster the arguments
made above. If agent-causation is possible and intelligible (as I argue in Chapters 5 and
as presented in the account sketched above" with
(see (5) above).
my conclusion that "we agent-cause some of our actions"
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6), if it is the best of the exist.ng options (as I argue via Chapters 2, 3, and 4-and also in
5 and 6), and if it is supported by strong intuitions (as I think it is), then the case for an
agent-causal view is a strong one.
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